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Abstract	
		 The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	detail	and	explore	both	the	ethical	and	pragmatic	implications	of	aggressive	climate	change	mitigation	on	a	coordinated	international	level.	Particularly,	this	paper	attempts	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	the	leadership	of	the	United	States	influences	the	relative	success	and	failure	of	international	agreements,	and	the	agreements,	structures	and	mechanisms	themselves.	A	secondary	assessment	is	the	extent	to	which	the	United	States	has	incurred	additional	responsibilities	to	mitigate	beyond	those	shared	by	the	world,	from	both	a	harm-based	and	special	responsibilities	standpoint.	In	this	paper,	I	will	ultimately	argue	that	the	United	States	has	incurred	additional	mitigation	responsibilities	because	of	its	extensive	historical	emissions,	and	because	of	its	voluntarily	assumed	leadership	role.	First,	the	ethical	imperatives	for	immediate	and	aggressive	global	mitigation	are	discussed,	followed	by	an	assessment	of	the	establishment	of	the	IPCC	and	UNFCCCC	as	well	as	the	Kyoto	and	Montreal	Protocols.	I	argue	that	the	Paris	Agreement,	signed	in	2015,	has	the	requisite	flexibility	to	be	successful	across	the	diversity	of	the	international	contexts.	I	finally	analyze	the	role	of	the	United	States	in	forging	and	implementing	these	agreements,	and	present	an	argument	for	heightened	leadership	and	mitigation	responsibilities	for	America.						
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Preface:	Purpose	and	Introduction			 Since	the	mid-1980s	and	early	1990s,	several	coordinated	attempts	have	been	orchestrated	at	the	international	level	to	combat	and	mitigate	climate	change	and	address	other	pressing	environmental	issues.	Though	there	have	been	sporadic	successes,	the	majority	of	these	treaties	and	protocols	have	fallen	short	of	their	intended	purposes,	leaving	the	global	threat	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	largely	unchecked.	However,	the	most	recent	treaty,	orchestrated	at	the	UN	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	21st	Conference	of	the	Parties	held	in	Paris	(typically	referred	to	as	the	“Paris	Agreement”)	is	starkly	different	from	its	predecessors	in	form,	and	through	voluntary	contributions,	may	prove	more	successful.	In	the	wake	of	the	Paris	Convention,	environmentalists	and	politicians	alike	await	early	benchmarks	of	success	and	failure.	Domestically,	the	United	States	and	its	current	administration	have	vowed	to	dismantle	its	role	the	Agreement	and	renege	on	the	emissions	cuts	to	which	predecessors	had	agreed.	The	various	layers	of	ethical	questions	and	pragmatic	considerations	in	the	field	of	international	environmental	law	led	me	to	explore	the	manner	in	which	United	States	leadership	is	influencing	the	environmental	law	matrix,	and	the	extent	to	which	its	leadership	has	impacted	both	successful	and	unsuccessful	international	environmental	laws	in	the	past.		 The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	detail	and	explore	both	the	ethical	and	pragmatic	implications	of	aggressive	mitigation	on	a	coordinated	international	level.	Particularly,	this	paper	attempts	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	the	leadership	of	the	United	States	influences	the	relative	success	and	failure	of	international	agreements,	and	the	international	agreements,	structures	and	mechanisms	themselves.	A	secondary	assessment	is	the	extent	to	which	the	United	States	has	incurred	additional	responsibilities	to	mitigate	beyond	those	
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shared	by	the	world,	from	both	a	harm-based	and	special	responsibilities	standpoint.	In	this	paper,	I	will	ultimately	argue	that	the	United	States	has	incurred	additional	mitigation	responsibilities	because	of	its	extensive	historical	emissions,	and	because	of	its	voluntarily	assumed	leadership	role.		 This	thesis	is	divided	into	four	chapters,	each	with	its	own	objectives	and	structure.	The	purpose	of	Chapter	One	is	to	assess	the	ethical	implications	of	global	emissions	and	establish	duties	of	mitigation.	It	is	here	that	I	establish	a	duty	to	mitigate	emissions	and	global	warming,	based	on	a	simple	and	relatively	uncontroversial	base	premise:	it	is	prima	facie	wrong	to	harm	other	people.	This	chapter	introduces	this	ethical	principle,	applies	it	to	the	particular	harm	of	climate	change,	and	assesses	both	current	and	predicted	global	economic	and	physical	harms.	I	also	offer	brief	responses	to	objections	such	as	skepticism,	overdetermination,	and	the	non-identity	problem.	Ultimately,	I	conclude	that	there	exists	a	pressing	global	duty	to	mitigate	climate	change	and	reduce	emissions	in	order	to	prevent	future	harms	and	compensate	for	harms	already	incurred.	Chapter	Two	analyzes	the	primary	international	institutions	used	to	coordinate	mitigation	efforts	and	collect	relevant	scientific	data,	and	their	potential	effectiveness	in	securing	the	targets	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	This	chapter	addresses	the	nature	of	collective	action	problems	and	the	particular	difficulties	of	climate	change,	and	measures	the	ability	of	past	treaties	like	the	Montreal	Protocol	and	Kyoto	Protocol	to	address	the	collective	action	dilemma.	The	structures	of	the	two	relevant	bodies	–	the	IPCC	for	collecting	international	scientific	data	and	the	UNFCCC	for	conducting	international	discussion	and	agreements	–	will	also	be	detailed	here.	I	then	assess	the	effectiveness	and	desirability	of	international	institutions	in	addressing	these	problems,	considering	an	intergenerational	
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objection	and	the	pragmatic	consideration	of	previous	failures.	I	ultimately	argue	that	the	existing	mechanisms	are	well-poised	to	coordinate	international	solutions	with	consideration	of	flexibility	and	differentiation	amidst	committed	parties.	Flexibility	and	differentiation	are	important	aspects	of	the	2015	Paris	Climate	Agreement,	the	subject	of	my	next	chapter.	Chapter	Three	specifically	focuses	in	on	the	Paris	Climate	Agreement,	examining	party	positions,	negotiation	strategies,	and	early	metrics	of	success	a	year	after	the	agreement	and	a	few	months	after	the	treaty	entered	into	force.	This	chapter	provides	relevant	context	for	the	convention,	especially	that	which	led	to	the	individualized	commitment	mechanism	of	the	INDC.	I	will	assess	the	blend	of	voluntary	and	binding	targets	that	Paris	has	created,	then	discuss	preliminary	benchmarks	that	the	Paris	Agreement	has	already	met.	COP	22,	held	in	Marrakech,	Morocco,	in	2016	will	also	be	briefly	discuss.	I	will	end	by	considering	perverse	incentives	objections	and	objections	to	the	voluntary	structure.	Ultimately,	I	will	conclude	that	the	Paris	Agreement	and	component	structures	are	in	an	excellent	position	for	significant	climate	change	mitigation,	though	I	acknowledge	that	more	ambitious	targets	must	be	committed	to	in	the	future.	Chapter	Four	analyzes	the	United	States’	role	in	shaping	and	adhering	to	these	international	treaties.	I	begin	with	an	analysis	of	the	failed	Kyoto	Protocol	and	the	United	States’	inability	and	unwillingness	to	ratify	the	treaty,	though	it	signed	and	pushed	for	the	emissions	cuts	included	in	the	text.	I	will	contrast	these	actions	with	those	of	the	Montreal	Protocol,	in	which	the	U.S.	corporation	DuPont	stood	to	make	great	profit	through	market	share	of	CFC	substitute.	I	will	also	show	that	because	of	its	historical	emissions	and	voluntarily	incurred	leadership	role,	the	United	States	has	assumed	special	responsibilities	
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to	mitigate	domestically	and	shape	policy	internationally.	I	will	look	at	U.S.	commitments	in	the	Paris	Convention	and	immediately	after,	looking	at	key	negotiations.	Finally,	I	will	consider	two	objections	of	heightened	U.S.	leadership	and	responsibility,	namely	the	threat	of	Donald	Trump	in	derailing	U.S.	Paris	commitments,	and	the	increasing	emissions	of	the	rapidly	developing	states	of	China	and	India.	Ultimately,	I	aim	to	show	that	these	pragmatic	concerns	do	not	negate	the	ethical	imperatives	of	the	U.S.	to	aggressively	mitigate	its	own	emissions	and	encourage	the	rest	of	the	world	to	do	likewise.	
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Chapter	1:	The	Ethics	of	Mitigation		I.	Introduction										 In	1824,	Joseph	Fourier,	a	French	physicist,	postulated	the	existence	of	a	natural	greenhouse	effect	of	the	Earth’s	atmosphere,	stating	that	heat	from	sunlight	met	less	resistance	in	initially	penetrating	the	earth’s	atmosphere	than	when	exiting	as	non-luminous	heat.1	John	Tyndal,	an	Irish	physicist,	furthered	Fourier’s	theory	in	1861,	showing	that	water	vapor	and	other	gasses	contributed	to	this	natural	greenhouse	effect.2	Thirty-five	years	later,	Svante	Arrhenius,	a	Swedish	chemist,	concluded	that	the	coal-burning	of	industrialization	would	exacerbate	the	greenhouse	effect,	with	a	few	degrees	Celsius	of	warming	occurring	should	atmospheric	carbon	dioxide	levels	double.3	From	Arrhenius’	viewpoint	in	1896,	this	man-made	greenhouse	effect	would	seemingly	be	beneficial	for	future	generations.4									 Now,	196	years	after	the	greenhouse	effect	was	first	postulated,	the	scientific	consensus	regarding	anthropogenic	climate	change	is	nearly	absolute.	Ninety-seven	percent	or	more	of	actively	publishing	scientists	in	the	field	agree	that	the	trends	in	atmospheric	carbon	levels	and	subsequent	warming	trends	are	extremely	likely	attributable	to	human	activities.5	We	now	understand	that	the	greenhouse	effect	is	a	natural,	homeostatic	process,	allowing	energy	from	the	sun	to	enter	our	atmosphere	while	trapping	a	portion	of	that	energy	from	exiting	into	space	–	without	this	process,	life	would	
																																																						1	BBC	News,"	A	Brief	History	of	Climate	Change,"	BBC	News,	September	20,	2013.		2	Ibid.	3	Ibid.	4	Ibid.	5	NASA,	"Scientific	Consensus:	Earth's	Climate	Is	Warming."		
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be	impossible.6	However,	since	the	Industrial	Revolution,	human	activity	has	negatively	interfered	with	the	natural	homeostasis	of	our	atmospheric	composition,	releasing	more	carbon	dioxide	than	our	natural	carbon	sinks	can	absorb	and	causing	more	molecules	to	trap	energy	and	heat	in	the	atmosphere.7	Carbon	dioxide	levels	have	increased	by	42	percent,	from	280	parts	per	million	at	the	onset	of	the	Industrial	Revolution,	to	400	ppm	today.	Methane,	a	gas	that	is	300	times	more	potent	per	molecule	than	carbon	dioxide	over	a	100-year	period,	has	increased	150	percent	since	1750.8	Since	1988,	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(IPCC)	has	evaluated	the	effects	of	climate	change	as	a	division	of	the	United	Nations	Environmental	Programme	(UNEP)	and	the	World	Meteorological	Organization	(WMO).9	The	195	member	states	of	the	UN	and	WMO	are	represented	by	the	IPCC,	which	aims	to	coordinate	international	scientists	so	as	to	present	a	snapshot	of	climate	change	consensus.10	In	their	Fifth	Assessment	Synthesis	Report,	published	in	2014,	the	IPCC	asserted	that	1)	Human	influence	on	the	climate	system	was	evident,	and	anthropogenic	greenhouse	gas	emissions	were	now	the	highest	in	history;	and	2)	Climate	change	has	had	a	“widespread	impact”	on	both	human	and	natural	systems.11									 The	IPCC	summarized	the	ecological	harms	of	global	warming	in	its	Fifth	Assessment,	assessing	climate	warming	trends	as	well	as	less-broadcasted	impacts,	such	as	
																																																						6	David	Hunter,	James	Salzman,	and	Durwood	Zaelke,	International	Environmental	Law	and	
Policy.	4th	ed.	(2011):	2.	7	Ibid.	8	Ibid.	9	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change,	"IPCC	Media	Advisory:	IPCC	Meetings	In	Bangkok,"	IPCC	Press	Office,	October	7,	2016,	2.	10Ibid.	11Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change,	"Climate	Change	2014	Synthesis	Report:	Summary	for	Policymakers,"	IPCC	Press	Office,	2014,	2. 
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ocean	acidification.	Since	the	industrial	revolution,	the	global	surface	temperature	has	warmed	0.85	degrees	Celsius,	and	the	surface	temperature	of	the	ocean	has	warmed	0.11	degrees	per	decade	since	1971.12	Nitrous	oxide,	methane,	and	carbon	dioxide	molecules	have	reached	levels	that	are	unprecedented	in	the	last	800,000	years.13	Accordingly,	the	acidity	of	the	ocean,	as	measured	by	the	amount	of	hydrogen	ions,	has	increased	by	26	percent	since	the	Industrial	Revolution.14	The	Greenland	and	Antarctic	ice	sheets	have	lost	mass,	and	permafrost	temperatures	in	most	regions	have	increased	since	the	1980s	in	response	in	higher	surface	temperatures.15	If	the	West	Antarctic	ice	sheet	were	to	melt	–	a	likely	occurrence	if	the	Earth	reached	two	degrees	of	warming	–	the	U.S.	Geological	Survey	asserts	that	sea	levels	would	rise	by	eight	meters.16	A	further	six-meter	rise	would	occur	should	the	Greenland	ice	sheet	follow	suit.17	With	nearly	half	of	the	Earth’s	population	living	within	60	kilometers	of	the	coast,	sea	level	rise	will	likely	lead	to	large	loss	of	property,	and	possibly	human	life.18	In	the	U.S.,	a	14-meter	sea	rise	would	correspond	to	a	flooding	of	25	percent	of	the	population.19									 It	is	thus	apparent	that	climate	change	is	not	only	attributable	to	human	activities,	but	will	also	have	a	harmful	impact	upon	both	ecological	and	human	systems.	These	impacts	will	be	spread	across	time,	space,	and	species,	making	climate	change	a	
																																																						12	Ibid.,	2-4.	13	Ibid.,	8.	14	Hunter,	Salzman,	and	Zaelke,	International	Environmental	Law,	4.	15	Ibid.,	8.	16	Ibid.	17	Ibid.	18	UNHCR	News,	"Climate	Change	and	Disasters,"	Accessed	November	04,	2016.		19	Hunter,	Salzman,	and	Zaelke,	International	Environmental	Law,	4.	
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particularly	difficult	type	of	collective	action	problem.20	Just	as	we	in	the	present	day	are	being	harmed	by	the	damaging	effects	of	past	emitters,	the	effects	of	our	own	emissions	will	be	felt	for	hundreds,	thousands,	and	even	tens	of	thousands	of	years	because	of	the	half-life	of	carbon.21	Furthermore,	those	in	developing	nations,	who	have	contributed	the	least	to	atmospheric	greenhouse	gas	levels,	are	likely	to	feel	the	effects	most	heavily	and	be	least	able	to	enact	effective	adaptation	strategies.22	As	such,	the	majority	of	the	harms	of	climate	change	are	imposed	by	developed	nations	onto	developing	nations	and	their	people.									 Because	of	the	pervasive	impact	of	harms	directly	and	indirectly	attributable	to	climate	change,	aggressive	mitigation	strategies	are	imperative	to	combat	the	existing	trends	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	and	prevent	future	harms.	Furthermore,	these	mitigation	efforts	need	to	begin	as	soon	as	possible.	II.	The	Ethics	of	Aggressive	Mitigation									 The	need	to	implement	aggressive	mitigation	strategies	rests	upon	a	simple	and	pervasive	moral	imperative:	it	is	prima	facie	wrong	to	cause	harm	to	other	people.	My	argument	will	rest	upon	this	common-sense	moral	principle,	showing	that	it	is	morally	wrong	to	inflict	harm	upon	others.	I	will	further	show	that	this	moral	obligation	is	consistent	with	our	domestic	tort	litigation	principles,	as	well	as		international	law	cases.	I	will	then	provide	evidence	and	research	that	indicates	and	measures	the	current	and	expected	harms	linked	to	climate	change,	concluding	that	it	is	prima	facie	wrong	to	
																																																						20	Stephen	M.	Gardiner,	A	Perfect	Moral	Storm:	The	Ethical	Tragedy	of	Climate	Change.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	8.	21	Ibid.	22	IPCC,	Climate	Change	2014	Synthesis	Report,	8.	
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contribute	to	climate	change	because	doing	so	harms	others,	and	will	continue	to	harm	others	for	many	generations.	I	will	then	argue	that	the	duty	to	refrain	from	harm	necessarily	creates	a	corresponding	duty	to	mitigate	the	causal	chain	that	has	been	created	by	the	harmful	actions.	For	these	reasons,	I	will	ultimately	conclude	that	aggressive	adaptation	and	mitigation	strategies	are	morally	required.	A.	It	is	prima	facie	wrong	to	cause	harm	to	other	people.									 A	prima	facie	obligation	is	a	type	of	obligation	that	holds	under	normal	circumstances.23	If	other	influences	are	equal,	a	prima	facie	obligation	becomes	a	binding	obligation	unless	another	moral	consideration	intervenes	and	outweighs	the	obligation.24	An	act	or	occurrence	can	thereby	be	shown	to	be	prima	facie	wrong	if	it	is	in	violation	of	a	prima	facie	obligation.	As	people	who	coexist,	we	have	a	prima	facie	obligation	to	refrain	from	harming	others.	This	moral	principle	requires	no	particular	moral	theory	to	back	it;	it	is	common-sense	morality	that	absent	other	considerations,	I	am	obligated	to	refrain	from	punching	you	in	the	nose,	because	to	do	so	would	constitute	undue	harm	to	your	person.	It	is	possible	that	other	moral	imperatives	might	allow	me	to	violate	this	prima	facie	obligation,	such	as	you	physically	threatening	my	life,	but	without	other	moral	reasons	for	action,	punching	you	in	the	nose	would	constitute	an	unjustifiable	wrong.									 The	same	basic	principle	which	ethically	prevents	me	from	cavalierly	punching	people	in	the	nose	also	applies	to	collectively	harmful	activities,	such	as	those	relevant	to	climate	change.	Collectively	harmful	activities	are	those	that	cause	real	and	significant	harms	when	many	people	engage	in	them,	though	these	activities	are	not	sufficient	to	cause	
																																																						23	Nicholas	Asher	and	David	Bonevac,	"Prima	Facie	Obligation,"	Studia	Logica:	An	
International	Journal	for	Symbolic	Logic	57:1	(June	1996):	19.	24	Ibid.	
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harm	on	an	individual	level.25	In	specific	regard	to	climate	change,	collectively	harmful	activities	include	driving	a	car	that	runs	on	gasoline,	consuming	foods	that	produce	proportionally	large	emissions	(such	as	beef),	unnecessarily	using	water,	relying	upon	electricity	produced	by	coal-fired	power	plants,	and	many	others.	On	an	individual	level,	driving	one’s	car	on	a	Sunday	afternoon	is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	to	cause	global	climate	change.26	On	a	collective	level	however,	the	drives	of	millions	of	automobile	drivers	result	in	significant	emissions	that	are	sufficient	to	cause	some	of	the	harms	associated	with	climate	change.	Thus,	the	act	of	driving	is	collectively,	though	not	individually,	harmful.27	Individuals,	however,	are	unable	to	solve	these	problems	through	personal	restraint,	but	it	is	fully	within	their	power	to	abstain	from	participation	in	the	problem.28	I	am	thus	not	suggesting	that	morality	requires	that	individuals	solve	large-scale	collective	action	problems,	for	it	is	impossible	for	them	to	do	so;	I	am	only	suggesting	the	weaker	moral	principle	that	it	is	unethical	to	contribute	to	collectively	harmful	activities	through	knowing	participation.									 To	understand	why	morality	might	require	restraint	in	collectively	harmful	activities,	we	can	turn	to	a	number	of	moral	theories.	Brad	Hooker’s	rule	consequentialism	asserts	that	we	have	a	duty	to	refrain	from	actions	that	violate	a	code	of	norms	that,	if	followed	by	the	overwhelming	majority	of	people,	would	create	bad	consequences.29	
																																																						25	Jason	Brennan,	"Polluting	The	Polls:	When	Citizens	Should	Not	Vote,"	Australasian	
Journal	of	Philosophy	87:	4	(2009):	539.	26	Walter	Sinnott-Armstrong,	"It's	Not	My	Fault:	Global	Warming	And	Individual	Obligations,"	Perspectives	on	Climate	Change:	Science,	Economics,	Politics,	Ethics	Advances	in	
the	Economics	of	Environmental	Research	5	(2005),	334.	27	Brennan,	“Polls,	”539.	28	Ibid.,	540.	29	Ibid.	
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Collectively	harmful	activities,	such	as	those	complicit	in	climate	change	and	global	warming,	would	by	definition	fall	under	such	a	category.	From	a	deontological	perspective,	collectively	harmful	activities	stand	in	direct	contrast	to	Kant’s	second	categorical	imperative,	which	requires	that	people	engage	only	in	those	activities	and	maxims	that	one	could	will	to	be	universalized.30	Collectively	harmful	activities	logically	create	a	“contradiction	in	the	will”	that	Kant	described,	because	rational	agents	cannot	will	that	everyone	act	in	a	way	that	creates	large-scale	harm.31		The	moral	duty	to	refrain	from	harm	not	only	constitutes	a	common-sense	moral	principle	and	is	defensible	from	both	consequentialist	and	deontological	perspectives,	but	is	also	so	pervasive	that	it	forms	the	basis	of	our	system	of	tort	law.	In	general,	there	exist	two	kinds	of	proscriptive	duties	in	tort	law.32	Fault-based	proscriptive	duties	are	those	which	obligate	people	to	refrain	from	faulty	harming,	and	this	duty	often	extends	an	obligation	of	preventing	such	harms.33	Fault-based	proscriptive	duties	divide	into	duties	to	refrain	from	causing	intentional	harm,	and	duties	to	refrain	from	causing	negligent	harm.34	Duties	arising	from	strict	liability	are	far	more	demanding:	they	require	that	one	refrain	from	or	otherwise	prevent	harms	irrespective	of	whether	these	harms	are	intentional	or	negligent.35	One	need	not	accept	strict	liability	notions	of	duties	in	order	to	recognize	a	general,	fault-based	prima	facie	duty	to	refrain	from	causing	intentional	or	negligent	harm.	Our	tort	system	in	this	regard	reflects	an	alignment	of	legality	and	morality.	
																																																						30	Robert	Johnson,	"Kant's	Moral	Philosophy,"	Stanford	University,	2004.	31	Brennan,	“Polls,”	540.	32	Hanoch	Sheinman,"Tort	Law	and	Corrective	Justice,"	Law	and	Philosophy	22:1	(2003):	28.	33	Ibid.	34	Ibid.	35	Ibid.,	29.	
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								 In	areas	that	align	more	closely	with	conservation	and	common	resources,	we	do	see	a	similar	alignment	of	law	and	morality.	The	legal	basis	for	the	prevention	and	correction	of	harms	is	already	well-documented	in	both	domestic	and	international	environmental	law.	Much	of	our	environmental	law	bases	the	duty	to	refrain	from	pollution	and	contamination	upon	the	logical	basis	of	the	fault-based	proscriptive	duties	of	our	tort	system.	To	elucidate	the	ways	in	which	pollution	or	contamination	might	constitute	a	tortious	negligence	or	harm,	consider	the	following	thought	experiment:									 Imagine	a	considerable,	though	modestly-sized	river	that	flows	from	the	mountains	to	the	sea.	On	its	path,	it	transverses	hundreds	of	miles	and	fuels	the	lives	and	endeavors	of	thousands	of	people,	as	well	as	countless	species.	In	particular,	the	river	supplies	water	to	the	irrigation	system	of	a	farmer	whose	crops	feed	the	nearby	population.	Let’s	call	the	farmer	person	B.	Upstream	from	B,	there	is	an	individual,	A,	who	runs	a	metal-smithing	company	that	produces	a	large	amount	of	toxic	waste.	A	has	options	as	to	the	disposal	methods	of	such	waste.	He	can	dispose	of	the	waste	through	the	proper	authorities,	who	are	trained	to	dispose	of	hazardous	waste	and	can	minimize	the	negative	effects,	incurring	a	cost	and	reducing	his	profit-margin,	or	A	can	dump	his	waste	into	the	river	at	no	cost	to	himself.	However,	many	harms	will	be	felt	downstream,	both	to	people	that	he	is	physically	near,	such	as	person	B,	and	to	those	hundreds	of	miles	down	the	river’s	path.	In	particular,	because	of	B’s	proximity	to	A,	B	will	feel	the	effects	strongly	and	will	be	acutely	harmed;	his	crops	will	die	because	of	the	heightened	toxicity,	and	his	own	enjoyment	of	the	river	will	be	significantly	diminished.	In	this	microcosm,	it	seems	clear	that	A	has	a	firm	duty	to	refrain	from	contaminating	the	river;	his	use	of	the	river	in	such	a	manner	ruins	the	benefits	and	
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use	of	the	river	by	person	B,	inflicting	significant	harm.	Furthermore,	there	seems	to	be	no	reason	to	limit	the	scope	of	this	duty	to	the	harms	inflicted	by	A	to	B;	those	hundreds	of	miles	downstream	will	suffer	from	the	effects	of	A’s	intentional	disposal.	Though	the	harm	might	be	lessened,	the	distance	itself	is	irrelevant;	it	would	seem	that	by	virtue	of	the	river’s	status	as	the	common	resource	of	thousands	of	people,	A	has	a	moral	duty	to	not	intentionally	contaminate	its	waters,	and	all	along	its	path	have	a	right	to	be	excluded	from	the	negative	effects	of	A’s	actions.									 The	beginnings	of	international	environmental	protection	were	formed	from	real-life	cases	of	transboundary	air	pollution,	grounded	upon	the	same	duties	and	rights	that	apply	to	our	toxic	waste	example.	Unlike	the	river	case,	where	the	reliance	upon	the	river	was	clear	and	recognized	by	its	dependents,	atmosphere	and	clean	air	are	background	conditions	that	many	people	take	for	granted.	If	asked	to	think	of	an	example	of	a	limited	resource,	it	is	unlikely	that	most	people	would	immediately	respond	with	air	and	atmosphere,	and	as	such,	our	atmosphere	has	been	used	as	a	major	waste	repository	since	the	Industrial	Revolution,	but	without	a	long	history	of	legal	recourse.	These	pollutions	have	not	been	without	harms,	however;	according	to	the	World	Bank,	an	unthinkable	800,000	people	die	from	air	pollution	related	to	emissions	each	year.36									 One	of	the	first	transboundary	air	pollution	cases	was	arbitrated	between	the	United	States	and	Canada	during	the	1940s.	Known	as	the	Trails	Smelter	Arbitration,	this	case	demonstrated	the	possibility	of	transboundary	harms;	a	factory	located	entirely	within	Canada	was	polluting	portions	of	the	United	States	downwind	from	its	location.37	
																																																						36	Hunter,	Salzman,	and	Zaelke,	International	Environmental	Law,	504.	37	Ibid.,	505.	
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The	amount	of	pollutants	steadily	increased	from	the	smelter’s	establishment	in	1896,	and	by	1930,	over	10,000	tons	of	sulfur	was	emitted	each	month,	approximately	300-350	tons	of	sulfur	daily.38	In	Washington	state,	the	fumes	of	sulfur	dioxide	damaged	the	property	of	apple	growers,	though	the	apple	growers	could	not	directly	bring	a	lawsuit	in	either	Washington	or	British	Columbia	because	of	the	transboundary	nature	of	the	pollution;	the	government	of	the	United	States	thus	intervened.39	The	arbitration	panel	and	tribunal	investigating	the	case	focused	largely	on	factual	issues,	including	whether	harms	were	actually	incurred	on	the	United	States	residents	by	the	pollution.	At	the	time,	the	tribunal	described	their	investigation	as	“the	most	thorough	study	ever	made	of	any	area	subject	to	atmospheric	pollution	by	industrial	smoke.”40	However,	the	most	contentious	factor	was	not	simply	assigning	a	value	of	monetary	compensation.	Instead,	the	arbitration	tribunal	had	to	question	not	only	the	manner	of	damages,	but	whether	Trail	Smelter	ought	to	be	legally	prevented	from	causing	future	damages.41	in	other	words,	it	was	forced	to	consider	whether	a	duty	to	prevent	harms	existed	within	an	international	context.	The	most	important	legacy	of	this	case	was	thus	the	establishment	of	a	rule	now	widely	recognized	in	customary	international	law:	states	have	a	moral	duty	to	prohibit	activities	in	its	jurisdiction	that	harm	the	environment	of	a	neighboring	state.42	The	Tribunal	found	that	“no	State	has	the	right	to	use	or	permit	the	use	of	its	territory	in	such	a	manner	as	to	cause	injury	by	fumes	in	or	to	the	territory	of	another	
																																																						38	Ibid.,	509.		39	Ibid.,	510.		40	Ibid.,	511.	Excerpt:	J.	Read,	The	Trail	Smelter	Dispute,	Canadian	Yearbook	of	International	Law,	1963.		41	Hunter,	Salzman,	and	Zaelke,	International	Environmental	Law,	512.	42	Ibid.,	505.	
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or	the	properties	of	persons	therein,	when	the	case	is	of	serious	consequence	and	the	inquiry	is	established	by	clear	and	convincing	evidence.”43		 The	moral	duty	to	refrain	from	causing	harm	is	thus	not	only	backed	up	by	ethical	principles,	but	by	established	international	law	and	domestic	law	precedence.	The	convergence	of	law	and	morality	lends	strength	to	the	common-sense	moral	code	that	prevents	me	from	punching	people	in	the	nose	without	cause,	and	is	similarly	defensible	from	both	rule	utilitarian	and	deontological	standpoints.	In	the	next	section,	I	will	show	that	the	harms	predicted	by	climate	change	are	significant	and	violate	the	duty	to	refrain	from	causing	harm.	B.	Climate	change	will	cause	significant	harms.	The	net	harms	of	climate	change	are	real	and	well-established.	While	some	regions	will	incur	at	least	temporary	benefits	from	altered	climate	systems,	as	a	whole,	the	net	global	impact	will	be	severely	harmful.	In	addition	to	impacting	the	ecological	systems	globally,	these	global	climate	change	will	affect	human	systems	as	well.	The	IPCC	asserts	that	it	is	likely	that	human	influence	has	doubled,	and	perhaps	more	than	doubled,	the	probability	of	heat	waves	in	certain	regions.44	The	World	Health	Organization	expects	that	climate	change	will	cause	an	additional	5.25	million	deaths	in	the	2030	to	2050	period.45	Excluding	impact	costs	to	agriculture,	water,	and	sanitation	sectors,	the	direct	costs	to	human	health	will	reach	$2	billion	to	$4	billion	per	year	by	2030.46	Furthermore,	the	United	
																																																						43	Ibid.,	514.	44	IPCC,	“2014	Synthesis	Report,”	8.	45	World	Health	Organization,	"Climate	Change	and	Health,"	June	2016.	46	Ibid.	
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Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees	(UNHCR)	has	given	a	conservative	estimate	that	250	million	climate	refugees	will	be	displaced	by	extreme	weather	conditions	by	2050.47	The	impacts	across	continents	is	expected	to	vary	greatly	by	specific	region.	In	the	following	sections,	I	will	give	an	overview	of	some	of	the	expected	benefits	and	harms	of	climate	change,	organized	by	continent	for	an	elucidation	of	case	studies	and	regional	impacts.	I	will	begin	by	detailing	the	expected	effects	of	climate	change	on	United	States	regions	and	economies,	then	profile	global	regions	and	specific	nations	to	assess	projected	global	harms.	The	emphasis	on	the	United	States	and	Europe	is	primarily	because	of	more	concrete	data	sets	and	projections	for	future	impacts	in	both	near	decades	and	the	2100	benchmark.	i.	The	United	States									 One	of	the	greatest	expected	benefits	of	climate	change	to	the	United	States	and	its	people	will	be	an	increased	growing	season	and	decreased	frost.	According	to	the	National	Aeronautics	and	Space	Administration	(NASA),	since	the	1980s,	the	length	of	the	frost-free	season	has	been	increasing		across	the	nation,	with	the	most	extreme	changes	occurring	in	the	western	United	States.48	The	lengthened	frost-free	season	has	impacted	ecosystems,	but	has	had	a	positive	effect	on	agricultural	output	in	the	United	States.49	Given	current	emissions	trends,	increases	in	growing	seasons	of	a	month	or	more	are	expected	across	the	majority	of	the	United	States	by	the	year	2100,	though	the	impact	will	not	be	as	extreme	in	
																																																						47	Melita	Sunjic,	"Top	UNHCR	Official	Warns	about	Displacement	from	Climate	Change,"	UNHCR	News,	December	9,	2008.	48	NASA,	"The	Consequences	of	Climate	Change,"	Accessed	November	04,	2016.	49	Ibid.	
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the	northern	Great	Plains.50	An	increase	in	the	growing	season	of	more	than	eight	weeks	is	projected	in	the	western	United	States,	with	the	greatest	increases	occurring	in	upper	elevations	and	coastal	areas.51	These	agricultural	benefits	will	necessarily	be	lessened	if	greenhouse	gas	emissions	are	reduce	and	subsequent	climate	change	is	lessened.									 The	United	States	will	not,	however,	be	immune	to	the	negative	impacts	of	climate	change	in	its	human	and	financial	systems,	and	extreme	adverse	effects	are	expected	across	the	nation.	While	climate	change	will	improve	the	growing	season	in	the	United	States,	it	is	also	expected	to	cause	an	increased	number	of	natural	disasters.	In	particular,	the	number	of	floods,	droughts,	and	hurricanes	is	expected	to	continue	to	increase.52	In	addition	to	changing	weather	patterns,	the	United	States	will	also	need	to	adapt	to	a	sea	level	rise	between	one	and	four	feet;	since	the	1880s,	the	sea	level	has	risen	only	eight	inches.53	Corresponding	property	destruction	and	inland	movement	is	expected	along	both	the	eastern	and	western	coasts	of	the	United	States.	While	these	changes	will	doubtless	have	an	emotional	and	psychological	impact	on	United	States	residents,	there	will	also	be	considerable	economic	costs.	To	estimate	the	effects	of	climate	change	on	American	industries,	I	will	give	an	account	of	expected	impacts	within	the	insurance	industry,	which	in	the	United	States	accounts	for	1.4	trillion	dollars	annually.54	Insurers	have	already	begun	to	reduce	coverage	and	policies	in	certain	states	and	regions	because	of	anticipated	climate-change	impacts.	
																																																						50	Ibid.	51	Ibid.	52	Ibid.	53	Ibid.	54	Michael	Tucker,	"Climate	Change	and	the	Insurance	Industry:	The	Cost	of	Increased	Risk	and	the	Impetus	for	Action."	Ecological	Economics	22:	2	(August	1997):	85. 
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								 The	U.S.	Global	Change	Research	Program	releases	periodic	assessments	of	projected	weather	pattern	shifts	across	domestic	regions.	According	to	its	Third	Climate	Assessment,	the	northeastern	United	States	is	projected	to	experience	increased	heat	waves,	heavy	rain,	and	sea	level	rise;	infrastructure,	agriculture,	fisheries	and	ecosystems	will	be	increasingly	and	exponentially	compromised	in	the	coming	decades.55	The	Northwest,	by	contrast,	is	expected	to	experience	less	predictability	in	stream	and	river	flow,	reducing	the	water	supply	and	placing	increased	strain	upon	competing	demands.56	Erosion,	inundation,	and	sea	level	rise	are	expected	to	threaten	infrastructure,	and	ocean	acidification	is	expected	to	have	a	potent	impact	upon	the	fishing	industry.	Wildfires,	arboreal	diseases,	and	outbreaks	of	certain	insect	species	is	expected	to	cause	widespread	destruction	to	western	forests.57	In	the	southeastern	states,	extreme	heat	is	expected	to	affect	overall	health	and	agriculture,	with	increased	heat	waves	and	water	scarcity.58	The	Southwest	is	likely	to	experience	the	worst	effects	of	the	northwestern	and	southeastern	regions,	with	heat,	drought,	insect	outbreaks,	increased	wildfires,	and	extreme	drought	expected	to	cripple	agricultural	yields	and	overall	human	health.	Flooding	and	erosion	in	coastal	states	will	increasingly	threaten	property	values.59	Midwestern	states	will	experience	alternating	extreme	heat	and	flooding,	impacting	agricultural,	forestry,	and	transportation	industries.	The	Great	Lakes	are	also	expected	to	be	negatively	impacted	by	
																																																						55	NASA,	“Consequences	of	Climate	Change.”	56	Ibid.	57	Ibid.	58	Ibid.	59	Ibid.	
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climate	change,	with	decreased	water	supply	and	increased	resource	demands	threatening	the	vitality	of	the	region.60									 Sea	level	rise	and	hurricanes	will	increasingly	affect	property	owners	and	cause	widespread	destruction.	Because	of	the	high-demand	of	property	in	these	coastal	regions	and	the	luxury	of	these	neighborhoods,	the	expected	economic	impact	of	property	destruction	will	be	especially	high.	The	value	of	insured	properties	in	the	hurricane	portion	of	the	East	and	Gulf	Coast	region	doubled	between	1997	and	2007,	to	more	than	$7	trillion.61	The	particular	vulnerability	of	these	regions	will	increase	significantly	with	continued	changes	in	climate	patterns	and	extreme	weather,	posing	a	particularly	salient	issue	for	the	insurance	industry.									 Many	insurance	companies	have	begun	to	develop	adaptation	strategies	for	climate	change,	both	in	the	United	States	and	Europe,	with	acknowledgment	that	the	impact	of	climate	change	on	future	losses	is	likely	to	be	grave	and	significant.62	The	Chairman	of	Loyd’s	in	London	identified	climate	change	as	the	number	one	issue	for	his	group,	while	Allianz,	the	largest	insurer	in	Europe,	believes	that	climate	change-related	insured	losses	are	likely	to	increase	by	37	percent	by	the	end	of	this	decade,	topping	$1	trillion	in	a	severe	year.63	Domestically,	Allstate	identified	climate	change	as	a	reason	for	cancelling	and	denying	the	renewal	of	many	policies	in	Gulf	Coast	states.64	This	trend	is	particularly	evident	in	Florida,	where	Allstate	cut	policies	from	1.2	million	to	400,000	in	the	last	
																																																						60	Ibid.	61	"The	Potential	Impact	of	Climate	Change	on	Insurance	Regulation,"	National	Association	of	Insurance	Commissioners,	2008,	5.	62	Mills,	Evan.	"Responding	to	Climate	Change:	The	Insurance	Industry"	ClimateActionProgram.org.	Accessed	November	4,	2016,	1.	63	Ibid.	64	Ibid.	
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decade.65	In	the	next	10-year	period,	Allstate	intends	to	insure	no	more	than	100,000	properties	in	the	state	of	Florida.66	Climate	change	thus	threatens	the	vitality	of	one	of	the	United	States’	largest	industries.	ii.	Other	regions		 Because	of	its	higher	latitudes,	Europe	is	projected	to	experience	temperature	increases	that	top	global	averages	by	the	end	of	the	century,	the	extremes	of	which	will	be	recorded	in	northern	and	eastern	European	nations	in	winter,	and	southern	nations	in	the	summer	months.67	The	wet	regions	in	the	north	are	projected	to	experience	increased	rain,	while	the	southern	regions	will	suffer	droughts.68	As	with	the	United	States,	an	increased	number	of	extreme	weather	events	is	projected,	as	well	as	rapidly	accelerating	sea	level	rise.69	Like	much	of	the	world,	the	poorest	peoples	and	areas	of	Europe	are	the	most	vulnerable	to	climate	change,	and	deepened	socio-economic	imbalances	are	therefore	projected.70	The	European	Environment	Agency	has	assembled	projected	effects	data	for	both	high	and	low	emissions	scenarios	according	to	IPCC	projections	of	temperature	increases	from	the	pre-industrial	era	to	2100.	A	low-emissions	scenario	as	defined	by	the	European	Environment	Agency	corresponds	to	a	1.7-degree-Celcius	temperature	increase	by	2100;	a	high	emissions	scenario	corresponds	to	a	conservative	2.6-degree-Celcius	increase.71	
																																																						65	Ibid.	66	Ibid.,	3.	67	"Climate	Change	Impacts	and	Adaptation,"	European	Environment	Agency,	February	18,	2015.	68	Ibid.		69	Ibid.	70	Ibid.	71	Ibid.	
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Without	aggressive	mitigation,	a	high-emissions	scenario	would	more	than	double	many	climate	impacts.	Heat-related	deaths	in	Europe	are	projected	to	double	to	200,000	people	per	year	under	such	a	scenario.72	Flood	damage	costs	from	rivers	would	double	to	10	billion	euros	per	year,	and	the	annual	area	affected	by	forest	fires	would	double	to	800,000	hectares.73	The	number	of	people	in	Europe	affected	by	droughts	if	global	temperatures	were	to	hit	the	2.6-degree	benchmark	would	increase	seven-fold,	to	150	million	annually.74	The	expected	impact	of	sea-level	rise	will	triple	to	42	billion	euros	per	year.75		 Unlike	the	United	States	and	Europe,	the	impacts	of	climate	change	faced	by	the	majority	of	the	world	occur	without	their	significant	contribution	to	fossil	fuel	consumption	and	emissions.	Algeria,	for	instance,	has	contributed	virtually	nothing	to	the	greenhouse	in	the	past	century	with	extremely	limited	historical	emissions,	and	currently	accounts	for	only	0.41	percent	of	the	world’s	total	emissions.76	Algeria’s	land	is	nearly	all	arid	or	semi-arid	and	receives	little	rain;	the	country	attributes	a	30	percent	decrease	in	rainfall	over	the	past	several	decades	to	climate	change.77	Projections	for	the	region	include	vast	increases	in	desertification	and	land	degradation;	50	million	hectares	face	immediate	deterioration.78	A	study	compiled	in	2000	predicts	that	as	a	fraction	of	GDP	in	the	year	2100,	Algeria	is	
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expected	to	suffer	the	third	largest	average	loss	to	its	agricultural	sector	in	the	world	from	land	loss.79		 Algeria	is	already	categorized	as	a	water-scarce	nation	by	the	United	Nations	Development	Program;	its	water	availability	per	capita	is	600	cubic	meters	per	year,	well	under	the	1,000	cubic	meter	benchmark	for	scarcity.80	By	2013,	the	groundwater	exploitation	had	reached	90	percent	capacity,	while	its	71	dams	have	nearly	reached	the	mobilizeable	surface	water	potential.81	As	droughts	and	heatwaves	increase	and	lengthen,	rainfall	will	decrease	by	10	to	15	percent	by	2050.82	In	the	steppe	of	Algeria,	cyclical	drought	increase	from	one	out	of	three	years	to	seven	out	of	10	years	in	only	two	decades.83	The	exact	fiscal	and	human-life	impact	of	Algeria’s	increased	water-scarcity	is	expected	to	vary	widely	depending	on	local	and	global	mitigation	strategies.84		 Latin	America,	as	defined	by	the	IPCC,	includes	all	countries	in	the	Americas	from	Mexico	to	the	southernmost	tip	of	South	America.85	The	combined	total	contribution	from	these	nations	is	presently	4	percent	of	global	greenhouse	gas	emissions.86	The	negative	impacts	of	global	warming	and	climate	change	from	other	emitters	will	thus	fall	disproportionately	upon	the	region.	The	agricultural	sector	of	Latin	America	is	particularly	vulnerable,	and	significant	harms	are	projected	to	be	felt	much	sooner	than	in	other	
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regions.	By	2030,	the	rice	crop	yield	of	Central	America	will	decrease	by	10	percent.87	Assuming	global	trajectories	for	emissions	hold	true	for	the	period	2020	to	2050,	over	80	percent	of	Nicaragua’s	growing	area	will	be	unsuitable	for	growing	and	harvesting	coffee	crops	in	only	34	years.88	iii.	Global	Summary		 Global	impacts	of	climate	change	and	greenhouse	gas	emissions	will	vary	widely	by	region	and	specific	country,	but	the	overall	global	impact	is	projected	to	be	largely	and	even	grotesquely	harmful.	Furthermore,	the	countries	that	have	contributed	lesser	amounts	of	emissions	will	suffer	the	consequences	of	emissions	in	disproportionate	numbers,	and	climate	change	is	expected	to	intensify	the	global	gaps	in	wealth	disparities.89	The	harms	inflicted	by	high-emission	countries	onto	both	themselves	and	other	nations	are	preventable;	future	harms	might	be	avoided	and	current	harms	curtailed	through	aggressive	mitigation.			 Economic	impacts	will	be	most	heavily	felt	in	those	industries	acutely	threatened	by	climate	change;	in	the	United	States,	the	clearest	and	most	acute	harms	will	be	seen	in	the	insurance	industry,	but	globally,	many	areas	will	experience	an	acute	decrease	in	agricultural	production	necessary	for	their	survival.	Water-scarce	nations	like	Algeria	will	experience	intense	desertification,	while	regions	prone	to	flooding	in	Europe	and	elsewhere	will	experience	an	increased	number	of	floods	and	subsequent	damage.	The	humanitarian	crisis,	as	measured	in	refugees,	air-pollution	deaths,	and	increased	wealth	
																																																						87	Climate	Change,	Agriculture,	and	Food	Security,	"2015	Annual	Report:	A	Look	at	How	a	Changing	Climate	Will	Hit	South	and	Central	America."	CCAFS.	September	5,	2014.	88	Ibid.	89	World	Health	Organization,	"Climate	Change	and	Health.”	
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disparity	between	rich	and	poor	is	still	more	worrisome;	the	250	million	displaced	persons	and	additional	5.25	million	deaths	from	climate	change	in	the	next	34	years	are	statistics	which	demand	particular	attention	to	the	subject	of	mitigation	and	incurred	harms.	C:	It	is	wrong	to	contribute	to	climate	change.		 As	established	in	section	P1,	it	is	prima	facie	wrong	to	cause	harm	to	other	people.	This	ethical	principle	has	justifications	in	common	sense	morality,	as	it	is	wrong	absent	other	considerations	for	a	person	to	punch	another	person	in	the	nose.	The	ethical	duty	to	refrain	from	causing	harm	is	similarly	supported	by	consequentialist	frameworks	of	rule	utilitarianism,	as	well	as	being	deontologically	supported	by	Kant’s	second	categorical	imperative.	This	moral	principle	is	so	strong	that	it	established	the	basis	of	the	American	and	English	tort	law	system,	and	is	especially	salient	in	fault-based	proscriptive	duties	of	tort	law.	In	an	environmental	context,	the	fault-based	proscriptive	duties	to	refrain	from	harm	can	be	seen	in	a	thought-experiment	concerning	hazardous	waste	in	a	river.	It	is	similarly	reflected	in	the	beginnings	of	international	environmental	law,	as	shown	in	the	logic	of	the	Trails	Smelter	Arbitration	between	the	United	States	and	Canada.	This	case	created	an	international	principle	that	legally	required	nations	from	harming	one	another,	barring	individual	nations	from	using	their	resources	in	such	a	manner	that	harmed	others.		 As	section	P2	detailed,	though	the	effects	of	climate	change	are	far	from	uniform	on	a	global	scale,	the	expected	impact	will	cause	real	harms	throughout	the	globe.	Industries	ranging	from	insurance	to	agriculture	and	water	will	be	heavily	impacted,	and	loss	to	property	and	life	expected.	The	most	pressing	harms	will	come	in	the	form	of	expected	displacement	and	loss	of	human	life,	with	250	million	refugees	and	5.25	million	additional	
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deaths	from	climate	change	expected	before	2050.90	These	statistics	predict	real,	pressing,	and	grave	harms	in	addition	to	those	already	being	incurred	by	victims	of	emissions;	800,000	people	currently	die	of	emission-related	air	pollution	alone.91		 Because	it	is	prima	facie	wrong	to	cause	harm,	and	contributions	to	climate	change	are	causing	and	will	continue	to	cause	grave	harms	for	decades	to	come,	it	necessarily	follows	that	it	is	wrong	to	cause	climate	change	and	a	duty	exists	to	refrain	from	contribution.	D:	If	it	is	wrong	to	cause	climate	change,	then	there	exists	a	duty	to	mitigate	its	effects.		 It	seems	intuitive	that	if	it	is	wrong	to	cause	a	harm,	there	exists	a	corresponding	duty	to	mitigate	or	stop	the	effects	once	the	harm	has	been	inflicted	or	begun.	If	I	punch	you	in	the	nose	without	cause,	it	seems	like	I	am	morally	obligated	at	the	very	least	to	provide	you	with	an	ice	pack.	If	I	run	over	your	fence,	I	ought	to	pay	to	repair	it,	and	if	I	my	household	waste	is	seeping	into	your	well,	I	ought	to	bear	the	full	cost	of	mitigating	the	problem	in	the	future.	This	principle	of	reparation	is	as	entrenched	into	the	United	States	tort	system	as	the	original	duty	to	refrain	from	harm,	and	in	fact	dates	back	to	the	centuries-old	foundation	of	trespass,	case,	and	negligence	in	English	common	law.	The	system	of	trespass,	case,	and	negligence	existed	to	ensure	that	the	legal	system	provided	recourse	so	that	those	who	were	harmed	were	made	at	least	as	well	off	through	the	litigation	process	as	they	were	before	the	harm	was	committed;	this	principle	was	decidedly	“eminently	fair”	and	readily	apparent.		E:	Aggressive	mitigation	is	morally	required	of	those	who	cause	climate	change	harm.	
																																																						90	Ibid.	91	Ibid.	
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Contributing	to	climate	change	entails	a	moral	wrong,	and	there	exists	a	duty	to	repair	wrongs	by	those	who	commit	them.	As	such,	it	seems	natural	that	if	it	is	wrong	to	cause	climate	change,	there	exists	a	subsequent	duty	to	mitigate	the	associated	harms	and	incur	relevant	costs	on	the	part	of	those	who	cause	the	harm	in	the	first	place.	Therefore,	aggressive	mitigation	and	the	provision	of	adaptation	strategies	is	morally	required	of	heavy-emitter	countries,	who	must	bear	the	costs	to	remedy	these	harms.	III.	Objections	I	will	now	assess	other	moral	obligations	and	considerations	involved	in	climate	change	ethics.	First,	I	will	consider	the	skeptic	viewpoint,	which	aims	to	show	that	climate	change	will	not	cause	significant	harm	or	that	the	problem	is	so	overdetermined	that	mitigation	will	not	matter,	and	I	will	ultimately	show	that	these	skeptics	are	falsely	assessing	the	scope	of	the	problem.	I	will	then	consider	the	objection	known	as	the	non-identity	problem,	ultimately	concluding	that	the	expected	harms	to	future	generations	are	inexcusable	regardless	of	whether	we	can	specify	their	identities.	Thus,	I	will	show	that	other	moral	considerations	do	not	override	the	imperative	to	refrain	from	inflicting	harm	upon	others.	A.	Skepticism	and	Overdetermination		 There	are	two	distinct	branches	of	what	I	view	as	skepticism	in	climate	change	ethics.	The	first	encompasses	skepticism	towards	the	problem	of	climate	change	itself,	in	that	some	believe	that	the	harms	and	scope	of	climate	change	is	not	significantly	bad	enough	to	warrant	mitigation.	The	second	branch	encompasses	skepticism	toward	the	benefit	and	impact	of	mitigation	itself;	these	ethicists	believe	that	if	some	degree	of	climate	change	is	overdetermined	and	will	occur	regardless	of	our	present	and	future	actions,	we	
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might	as	well	enjoy	the	free-riding	and	not	worry	about	it.	I	will	show	that	both	of	these	views	present	a	false	outlook	on	climate	change	ethics	and	the	moral	requirements	of	mitigation,	the	first	because	of	its	false	outlook	on	the	scope	of	climate	change,	and	the	second	because	it	falsely	ignores	the	impact	of	marginal	emissions	to	favor	a	“threshold”	approach	to	overdetermination.	The	second	branch	will	be	henceforth	referred	to	as	“overdetermination”;	the	first	I	will	refer	to	as	“skepticism.”		 One	high-profile	philosopher	who	advocates	for	the	skeptic	approach	to	climate	change	is	Bjorn	Lomberg.	His	brand	of	skepticism	is	moderate,	classifying	anthropogenic	climate	change	as	a	problem,	but	not	one	that	deserves	the	level	of	aggressive	mitigation	that	some	like	myself	advocate.92	Lomborg’s	primary	reason	for	this	assertion	is	his	belief	that	the	social	cost	of	carbon	used	by	the	IPCC	and	other	mitigation	advocates	is	too	high.	The	social	cost	of	carbon	is	an	economic	figure	that	can	be	best	defined	as	the	estimated	price	of	damages	expected	by	each	marginal	ton	of	CO2	released	into	the	atmosphere.93	Lomborg	cites	a	study	conducted	by	Richard	Tol	in	establishing	his	estimate	of	the	social	cost	of	carbon	–	in	the	range	of	$2	to	$14	per	ton	of	CO2.94	Instead	of	aggressive	mitigation,	Lomborg	advocates	for	a	modest	carbon	tax	set	at	this	price,	which	would	cut	emissions	by	5	percent.95	However,	the	exceptionally	low-range	of	the	social	cost	of	carbon	advocated	by	Tol	is	probably	not	our	best	estimate;	the	possibility	of	gross	miscalculation	by	Tol	and	Lomborg	is	best	seen	by	examining	the	figure	used	by	an	organization	with	a	vested	
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interest	in	killing	mitigation	strategies:	Exxon-Mobile.	As	a	producer	of	oil	and	gas,	it	is	highly	intuitive	that	Exxon-Mobile	has	a	strong	vested	interest	in	retaining	levels	of	oil	consumption;	any	significant	mitigation,	including	a	carbon	tax	or	cap-and-trade	system	will	curb	the	company’s	profits.	Yet	Exxon-Mobile	acknowledges	that	the	social	cost	of	carbon	likely	tops	$80	per	ton	of	CO2.96	This	figure,	40	times	higher	than	the	low	range	of	Lomborg’s	estimate,	does	not	represent	the	extreme	high	of	social	cost	estimates	(Lomborg	cites	Al	Gore	as	advocating	for	a	$140	estimate97).	Exxon-Mobile’s	figure	thus	raises	a	significant	challenge	to	the	moderate	skeptics	who	believe	a	5	percent	decrease	in	emissions	is	enough	to	relieve	polluters	of	their	ethical	duties	to	the	world	and	its	people.	Furthermore,	the	social	cost	of	carbon	metric	is	likely	to	mistakenly	identify	the	liability	levels	of	emitter	countries	because	the	figure	is	purely	utilitarian	by	nature,	averaging	the	global	benefits	of	mitigation.		Regardless	of	his	position	on	mitigation,	Lomborg	does	concede	that	spending	0.5	percent	of	every	nation’s	GDP	on	climate	change	research	is	warranted	to	develop	non-carbon	emitting	energy	technologies.98	Deep	cuts	in	emissions	will	thus	become	both	possible	and	desirable	from	a	utilitarian	prospective	when	technology	makes	mitigation	more	reasonable	priced.99	This	assertion	advocates	a	purely	utilitarian	assessment	of	mitigation	that	uses	a	dollar	metric	of	utility	and	cost.	While	it	is	always	desirable	that	utility	will	be	maximized	through	mitigation,	this	purist	approach	fails	to	consider	deeply-entrenched	notions	of	liability,	fault,	and	the	duty	to	refrain	from	causing	harm.	It	seems	
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that	if	I	punch	you	in	the	nose	so	that	you	require	an	ER	visit	that	will	cost	$1000,	I	cannot	escape	the	duty	to	pay	by	claiming	that	spending	the	money	elsewhere	will	better	maximize	overall	utility.	It	would	be	a	highly	weak	argument	if	I	asserted	that	I	didn’t	have	to	pay	for	your	ER	visit	because	I	would	get	more	utility	out	of	investing	that	money	than	your	repaired	nose	will	yield.	I	still	ought	to	pay	for	your	ER	visit	because	I	am	morally	and	legally	liable	for	the	damage;	as	such,	even	if	we	concede	that	Lomborg	is	right	in	asserting	that	the	expected	damage	of	climate	change	does	not	yet	align	with	the	cost	of	mitigation,	it	does	not	follow	that	there	is	no	obligation	to	incur	these	costs	so	as	to	prevent	harm	to	others.		Overdetermination	accounts	of	climate	change	appeal	to	a	different	type	of	skepticism	–	namely,	if	the	problem	of	climate	change	is	so	certain	that	we	have	already	committed	ourselves	to	high	atmospheric	carbon	levels	for	centuries,	it	is	futile	to	incur	heavy	costs	in	order	to	halt	an	inevitable	process.100	It	is	true	that	even	if	we	were	to	cease	all	emissions	right	now,	carbon	dioxide	will	remain	in	the	atmosphere	for	centuries,	continuing	the	greenhouse	effect	through	a	series	of	feedback	loops.101	The	sentiment	that	climate	change	is	catastrophically	inevitable	has	recently	increased;	in	September	of	2016,	the	world’s	atmospheric	carbon	level	annual	minimum	exceeded	400	ppm	for	the	first	time	in	recorded	history.102	This	symbolic	threshold	has	often	been	dubbed	the	“point	of	no	return”	or	the	“tipping	point,”	a	signal	that	significant	global	warming	is	overdetermined	because	of	feedback	loops.103	For	this	reason,	might	seem	intuitive	that	when	a	collective	
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harm	like	climate	change	is	already	occurring	–when	a	problem	is	so	overdetermined	that	your	restraint	will	not	prevent	the	scope	of	the	problem	–	that	it	is	morally	permissible	to	simply	join	in	the	collectively	harmful	action	and	reap	the	benefits.	Yet	simply	because	something	bad	is	happening	does	not	mean	one	is	entitled	to	participate,	even	if	it	is	impossible	for	them	to	stop	the	collective	harm	from	occurring	and	it	will	progress	regardless.	Consider	Jason	Brennan’s	famous	firing	squad	thought	experiment:									 In	this	experiment,	Brennan	asks	us	to	imagine	a	ten-person	firing	squad	who	is	moments	away	from	executing	an	innocent	child,	all	of	whom	will	shoot	the	child	at	the	exact	same	time.104	Because	you	happen	to	be	in	the	vicinity,	the	firing	squad	offers	you	an	opportunity	to	join	them	in	shooting	the	child.	The	child	is	going	to	die	anyway;	each	of	the	ten	bullets	alone	is	sufficient	enough	to	kill	him.	You	are	fully	free	to	walk	away	without	consequence,	or	you	can	join	with	the	knowledge	that	your	participation	will	have	absolutely	no	bearing	upon	the	outcome	of	what	you	are	about	to	witness.									 Naturally,	the	typical	response	to	such	an	experiment	is	that	you	should	not	join	the	firing	squad;	in	fact,	morality	forbids	you	from	participating,	though	the	outcome	is	already	overdetermined	and	the	child’s	fate	is	sealed	–	your	individual	duty	to	refrain	from	participation	in	something	harmful	remains	intact.	Accordingly,	many	collective	action	problems	are	overdetermined;	the	inevitability	of	the	problem	does	not	exclude	participants	from	the	related	moral	responsibilities.		If	such	a	duty	exists	even	in	circumstances	of	inevitability,	then	it	certainly	applies	to	collectively	harmful	activities	where	the	outcome	is	not	so	certain,	or	can	conceivable	
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become	marginally,	increasingly,	and	significantly	worse.	It	is	true	that	climate	change	of	some	degree	has	already	occurred,	and	that	atmospheric	carbon	levels	have	committed	the	Earth	and	its	population	to	a	certain	amount	of	future	harm	regardless	of	current	or	future	cuts	in	emissions.	Yet	it	is	also	clear	that	marginal	increases	in	emissions	and	atmospheric	carbon	levels	will	create	marginally	greater	harms,	that	aggressive	mitigation	and	stabilization	at	400	parts	per	million	will	create	lesser	harm	than	stabilization	at	450	parts	per	million,	500	parts	per	million,	and	700	parts	per	million.	Thus,	while	some	degree	of	climate	change	is	overdetermined,	the	scale	of	the	harm	is	by	no	means	inevitable;	collectively,	we	could	prevent	marginally	greater	harms	through	aggressive	mitigation	and	stabilization	efforts.	The	false	sense	of	inevitable	harm	thus	does	not	pose	a	moral	hurdle	for	the	ethics	of	aggressive	mitigation.	B.	Non-Identity	problem	 		 Another	common	objection	to	mitigation	strategies	questions	the	premise	that	future	generations	will	actually	be	harmed	by	our	actions.	The	non-identity	problem	does	not,	however,	address	the	harm	by	questioning	the	science	or	models	of	future	impacts;	instead,	it	questions	whether	future,	un-born	humans	are	philosophically	able	to	be	harmed	by	present	actions.	The	non-identify	problem	was	made	prominent	by	philosopher	Derek	Parfit.105	Essentially,	it	stipulates	that	the	identity	of	a	person	is	dependent	upon	her	origin	–	the	exact	sperm	and	egg	from	whence	she	originates.106	Consequently,	even	the	slightest	environmental	variations	in	the	timing	of	conception	create	a	different	human	being.107	These	biological	claims	are	seemingly	uncontroversial.	
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	 Consider	the	full	implications	of	the	non-identity	problem.	Let’s	say	a	person	–	let’s	call	him	Jerry	–	living	in	the	year	2100	has	a	difficult	life	because	of	unchecked	global	warming.	His	poverty,	hunger,	and	quality	of	life	are	significantly	worse	than	they	would	have	been	if	we	in	the	present	had	implemented	aggressive	mitigation,	and	he	suffers	significantly	more	as	a	result.	Can	it	be	said	that	people	today	harmed	Jerry?	According	to	Parfit,	such	harm	is	philosophically	impossible;	because	Jerry	was	conceived	under	a	high-emissions	scenario,	had	we	implemented	aggressive	mitigation,	the	conditions	of	his	conception	would	have	never	existed,	and	neither	would	Jerry.108	Instead,	a	different	person	altogether	would	be	living	in	a	low-emissions	world.	Within	several	generations	of	a	low-emissions	framework,	the	entire	world’s	population	would	have	consisted	of	different	people	–	this	phenomenon	is	known	as	the	non-identity	effect.109	The	full	philosophical	implication	of	Parfit’s	argument	is	that	it	is	impossible	to	harm	a	person	by	an	action	that	occurred	prior	to	their	existence	even	if	it	leads	to	a	harmed	condition,	provided	that	this	person’s	life	is	still	worth	living.110		 Underlying	Parfit’s	claim	is	an	implicit	premise:	my	actions	can	only	be	counted	as	wrong	if	there	exists	a	particular	person	who	is	worse	off	than	they	would	otherwise	be	had	I	acted	differently.111	Similarly,	Parfit	also	stipulates	Kripke’s	genetic	origins	point	of	view,	which	argues	that	only	those	people	in	alternative	scenarios	with	my	exact	genetic	origins	can	count	as	me.112	
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	 A	different	set	of	premises	is	applied	when	considering	the	harms	of	genetic	disorders.	Rather	than	a	genetic	origins	approach,	Divers	introduced	a	theory	that	allows	for	a	selection	of	counterparts	in	philosophy;	that	counterparts	to	an	individual	are	those	similar	to	the	original	in	relevant	respect	and	degree.113	Lewis	added	specificity	to	this	counterpart	approach;	a	“John-qua-human”	is	similar	to	John	in	significant	respects,	but	possesses	a	different	genetic	property	(eye-color,	deafness,	etc.).114	The	match	of	genetic	origins	does	not	survive	scrutiny	under	such	an	approach;	rather,	a	“tenacity	of	origin”	test	is	used,	which	demands	only	that	a	counterpart	to	an	individual	have	an	origin	that	maintains	something	similar	to	actual	origins	that	is	normally	fixed	in	counterfactual	situations.115	These	underlying	principles	allow	for	the	philosophical	possibility	of	a	person	with	a	genetic	disorder	claiming	harm,	provided	that	the	cause	was	foreseen,	alternatives	were	available,	and	genuine	choice	was	possible.116	The	particular	genetic	information	of	a	person	does	not	preclude	the	possibility	of	their	experiencing	harm.	Similarly,	a	person	experiencing	harm	in	a	high-emissions	scenario	could	very	much	claim	that	we	living	in	the	present	harmed	him	respective	to	his	counterpart,	low-emissions-scenario	self,	provided	that	the	harms	of	climate	change	were	foreseen,	alternatives	were	available,	and	genuine	choice	was	possible.	As	detailed	in	Section	2,	such	harms	are	foreseeable,	and	mitigation	strategies	are	available;	that	they	would	entail	a	cost	does	not	preclude	genuine	choice.	As	such,	the	non-identity	problem	can	be	reassessed	through	different	stipulations	about	genetic	origins	and	counterparts.	
																																																						113	Ibid.,	180.	114	Ibid.,	181.	115	Ibid.,	182.	116	Ibid.,	185.	
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	 Even	if	the	genetic	origins	view	of	humanity	is	the	correct	account,	it	still	does	not	follow	that	the	non-identity	problem	clears	individuals	of	all	blame.	Though	on	the	societal	level,	the	genetic	origins	of	future	people	will	be	significantly	altered	in	a	few	generations	by	moving	from	business-as-usual	to	a	low-emissions	model,	the	impacts	of	each	individual	person	will	not	significantly	alter	the	spectrum	of	future	people’s	genetic	codes.	Should	I	cut	down	my	emissions	immediately,	it	is	true	that	my	changed	behavior	will	impact	those	close	to	me	compared	to	a	business-as-usual	model,	and	these		impacts	will	slightly	alter	the	identities	of	babies	born	who	are	progressively	more	remote	from	me.117	These	ripples,	however,	will	not	spread	across	the	world	for	several	generations,	so	for	the	immediate	future,	the	identities	of	the	vast	majority	of	children	born	in	the	world	will	retain	the	same	identities	regardless	of	my	actions.118	Yet	my	reduction	itself	would	have	begun	to	cease	causing	harms	across	the	world	almost	immediately,	and	this	impact	would	be	compounded	over	time;119	thus,	I	am	individually	capable	of	NOT	harming	those	born	in	future	generations	whose	genetic	code	would	have	remained	identical	regardless	of	my	actions,	and	therefore	it	is	entirely	possible	to	directly	cause	harm	to	these	individuals	through	my	personal	emissions.	Because	it	is	philosophically	possible	for	individuals	to	harm	people	in	such	a	manner,	the	non-identity	problem	does	not	allow	one	to	escape	the	generational	implications	of	the	harm	principle.	The	duty	to	mitigate	remains	entirely	the	same.	Furthermore,	it	is	certainly	the	case	that	presently-living	people	who	will	live	to	2030,	2050,	and	beyond	are	presently	being	harmed	and	will	continue	to	be	harmed	by	the	
																																																						117	Broome,	Climate	Matters,	63.		118	Ibid.	119	Ibid.	
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impacts	of	global	warming	and	our	current	emissions.	The	non-identity	problem	cannot	philosophically	excuse	their	harm,	as	their	genetic	identities	have	already	been	established.			 In	addition	to	these	responses	to	the	non-identity	problem,	there	also	exists	the	distinct	pragmatic	possibility	that	it	is	possible	to	harm	someone	even	if	your	harmful	actions	do	not	ultimately	make	the	person	worse	off.	Consider	that	possibility	that	I	am	in	possession	of	a	large	brick.	It	appears	that	dropping	this	brick	on	a	passersby’s	head	from	an	upper	window	would	constitute	a	distinct	harm	in	that	I	would	hurt	the	person.	But	what	if	the	brick	were	made	of	solid	gold?	It	seems	that	the	value	of	the	brick	is	immaterial	to	whether	my	action	constitutes	a	harm;	even	if	I	have	made	the	person	economically	better	off	by	dropping	a	brick	on	them,	I	have	nevertheless	harmed	them.	Though	this	thought-experiment	is	rather	far-fetched,	the	possibility	of	making	someone	better	off	while	simultaneously	harming	them	has	very	real	and	serious	grounds	in	the	case	of	a	pregnancy	conceived	through	rape.	It	seems	fully	plausible	that	a	woman	who	conceives	a	child	through	rape	might	perceive	her	life	as	better	on	the	whole	because	of	her	relationship	with	that	child;	it	does	not	follow,	however,	that	her	rapist	did	not	harm	her	or	violate	her	rights.120	This	possibility	shows	that	benefit	and	harm	are	not	mutually	exclusive,	but	the	benefit	produced	does	not	ethically	excuse	the	egregious	nature	of	the	harm.	As	such,	it	is	fully	plausible	that	a	future	person,	whose	entire	existence	and	life	worth	living	is	dependent	upon	a	business-as-usual	emissions	trajectory,	could	not	be	simultaneously	harmed	by	my	emissions	actions.	Thus,	the	emissions	of	greenhouse	gasses	
																																																						
120	Elizabeth	Harman,	"Can	We	Harm	and	Benefit	In	Creating?,"	Philosophical	Perspectives	18,	no.	1	(2004):	99,	doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00022.x.	
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constitute	a	harm	to	present	and	future	generations;	the	non-identity	problem	thus	cannot	override	the	duty	to	implement	aggressive	mitigation.121	C.	Objections	do	not	outweigh	the	duty	for	aggressive	mitigation		 In	this	section,	I	have	shown	that	appeals	to	skepticism,	overdetermination,	and	the	non-identity	problem	cannot	morally	outweigh	the	duty	to	implement	aggressive	mitigation.	Though	moderate	skeptics	like	Lomborg	advocate	for	lesser	mitigation	strategies	and	correspondingly	weaker	duties,	he	does	so	on	the	false	assumption	that	the	social	cost	of	carbon	hovers	around	$2	to	$14	per	ton;	we	have	reason	to	question	these	figures	because	institutions	with	vested	interest	in	continued	pollution,	such	as	Exxon-Mobile,	recognize	an	$80	per	ton	price	point.	Furthermore,	the	moderate	skeptics	do	not	leave	room	for	duties	of	harm,	reparations,	or	fault	when	advocating	their	utilitarian	calculus;	even	if	it	were	true	that	the	expected	harms	were	less	than	the	cost	of	mitigation,	these	appeals	to	utility	do	not	weigh	deeply-entrenched	notions	of	fault	and	tort	law.	Another	branch	of	skepticism	doubts	that	mitigation	will	actually	do	any	good;	if	we	are	already	committed	to	400	ppm	of	CO2	in	the	atmosphere	and	significant	harm	will	come	of	the	present	atmospheric	carbon	levels,	it	seems	plausible	that	climate	change	is	overdetermined.	However,	simply	because	something	is	overdetermined	does	not	give	one	a	moral	right	to	participate	in	a	harm;	it	is	morally	reprehensible	to	join	a	firing	squad	simply	because	the	death	of	the	innocent	victim	is	already	inevitable.	Even	if	one	could	participate	in	overdetermined	collectively	harmful	activities,	the	marginal	harms	of	climate	change	are	not	overdetermined;	significantly	more	harm	will	occur	with	each	additional	degree	of	warming	and	marginally	greater	harm	will	occur	with	each	additional	part-per-
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millions	of	atmospheric	carbon	established.	As	such,	both	appeals	to	skepticism	fail	to	morally	outweigh	the	duty	to	mitigate	climate	change	and	prevent	its	harms.		 The	non-identity	problem	does	not	challenge	the	scope	of	the	problem	or	the	potential	benefits	of	mitigation;	instead,	it	attempts	to	establish	that	it	is	physically	impossible	to	harm	someone	if	the	harmful	action	occurred	before	their	conception.	However,	the	genetics	origin	account	of	identity	is	not	the	only	philosophical	claim	for	morality,	and	counterpart	accounts	have	been	used	to	establish	harm	in	cases	of	genetic	disorders	provided	the	harm	was	foreseeable,	preventable	and	that	an	alternate	choice	was	conceivable.	The	same	logic	present	in	the	argument	for	harm	in	genetic	disorders	applies	to	climate	change	harm	in	future	generations,	where	harms	are	foreseen,	preventable,	and	alternate	choices	are	readily	apparent.	Furthermore,	even	if	it	could	be	proven	that	the	genetics	origin	account	of	identity	was	the	correct	approach	to	identity,	individual	harms	are	still	philosophically	possible	under	such	an	account,	since	individual	actions	cannot	be	expected	to	alter	the	identities	of	future	populations	for	several	generations,	but	can	influence	ambient	atmospheric	carbon	levels.	As	such,	the	non-identity	problem	does	not	pose	a	significant	threat	to	the	duty	to	mitigate	climate	change	for	future	generations,	and	logically	cannot	excuse	the	harm	inflicted	on	humans	whose	identities	are	already	genetically	conceived.	IV.	Ethical	Conclusions		 	Since	the	greenhouse	effect	was	first	postulated	in	1824,	scientists	attempted	to	understand	how	our	behaviors	influence	the	atmosphere’s	retention	of	heat;	97	percent	now	agree	that	human	actions	are	directly	responsible	for	the	rapid	rise	in	atmospheric	carbon	levels,	ocean	acidification,	and	extreme	weather	events.	However,	this	knowledge	
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itself	is	useless	unless	accompanied	by	an	ethical	assessment	of	the	normative	implications	of	the	expected	harms	and	our	present	actions.	I	do	believe	that	human	influence	is	significant	enough	to	normatively	require	aggressive	mitigation	strategies	based	on	the	simple	ethical	principle	that	it	is	morally	obligatory	to	refrain	from	causing	harm	to	others.		 In	the	preceding	sections,	I	showed	that	the	status	of	this	prima	facie	obligation	is	entrenched	in	both	our	ethical	and	legal	frameworks.	It	is	cognitively	apparent	that	it	is	immoral	for	me	to	cause	injury	to	a	person	absent	other	considerations	through	physical	force;	this	duty	is	similarly	entrenched	in	notions	of	rule	consequentialism	and	Kantian	deontology.	Furthermore,	the	fault-based	proscriptive	duty	to	abstain	from	causing	harm	forms	the	cornerstone	of	modern	tort	law;	in	international	contexts,	courts	recognized	in	1941	that	this	duty	limits	how	states	can	use	their	resources	when	their	actions	harm	parties	elsewhere.	It	is	also	readily	apparent	that	climate	change	constitutes	significant	moral	harm;	loss	of	human	life	and	loss	of	property	are	expected,	and	these	burdens	will	fall	disproportionately	on	non-emitter	and	low-emitter	states.	As	such,	it	necessarily	follows	that	climate	change	violates	the	harm	principle,	and	that	we	should	not	contribute	the	climate	change	to	avoid	harming	others.	Similarly,	this	duty	to	refrain	from	harm	creates	a	similar	duty	to	mitigate	this	harm	after	the	causal	chain	has	been	launched.	As	such,	there	exists	a	duty	for	aggressive	mitigation.		 I	further	showed	that	the	skeptic	viewpoints	and	non-identity	problem	do	not	present	significant	moral	reasons	for	overriding	the	duty	to	mitigate.	While	moderate	skeptics	predict	less-severe	crisis	in	the	future,	their	social	cost	of	carbon	figures	are	incredibly	low,	and	their	moral	theories	ignore	fault-based	proscriptive	duties	prevalent	in	our	legal	and	ethical	systems	for	centuries.	Other	skeptics	falsely	believe	that	the	climate	
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change	problem	is	overdetermined,	and	thus	marginal	contributions	to	the	problem	are	excusable.	But	just	as	I	am	not	permitted	to	join	in	on	the	execution	of	an	innocent	person	on	the	grounds	that	it	would	happen	anyway,	my	moral	obligations	to	refrain	from	causing	climate	change	are	similarly	unaltered	by	the	possibility	of	overdetermination.	Furthermore,	there	is	little	reason	to	dismiss	the	marginally	worse	outcomes	associated	with	marginally	increasing	levels	of	atmospheric	carbon;	significant	harm	can	be	prevented	by	stabilizing	carbon	levels	at	400	ppm	instead	of	continuing	to	pollute	without	restraint.	Furthermore,	the	non-identity	problem	can	be	overcome	by	considering	alternative	theories	of	genetic	identity,	and	scrutinizing	the	so-called	problem	from	an	individual	rather	than	societal	level.	As	such,	the	non-identity	problem	does	not	excuse	inflicting	harm	onto	future	generations,	and	cannot	excuse	the	liability	to	mitigate	harm	to	present	generations.	The	moral	duty	for	aggressive	mitigation	holds	against	objections.		 With	the	ethical	roots	of	aggressive	mitigation	established,	I	will	turn	to	international	institutions	in	my	next	chapter,	examining	how	they	function,	the	international	status	of	their	laws,	and	how	they	might	be	used	to	facilitate	cooperative	backgrounds	for	aggressive	mitigation	strategies.									
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Chapter	2:	International	Institutions	–	The	IPCC	and	UNFCCC	I.	Introduction		 As	we	established	in	Chapter	1,	there	exists	a	firm	duty	to	combat	climate	change	through	aggressive	mitigation	strategies,	and	that	these	strategies	ought	to	be	implemented	in	the	present	day.	Future	predictable	harms	will	be	imposed	by	climate	change,	as	well	as	present	harms	inflicted	in	loss	of	life	and	property.	Given	these	impacts,	and	the	general	duty	to	prevent	harms,	it	seems	logical	that	mitigating	climate	change	would	be	a	top	priority	for	the	world’s	people	and	their	governments.	However,	there	are	a	number	of	challenges	particular	to	climate	change	that	make	mitigation	difficult	for	individual	countries	–	and	individual	people	–	to	implement	successful	strategies.	Climate	change	constitutes	a	collective	action	problem	–	a	public	goods	problem	and	tragedy	of	the	commons	more	specifically.			 The	particular	challenges	of	collective	action	problems	and	tragedies	of	the	commons	make	unilateral	solutions	to	climate	change	unattractive	for	individual	countries,	especially	small	and	low-emissions	countries.	The	lack	of	incentives	for	small,	low-emissions	countries	is	self-	evident;	if	Luxembourg	were	to	cut	its	emissions	to	zero,	for	example,	there	would	be	little	to	no	impact	on	the	overall	atmospheric	carbon	levels,	and	little	to	no	benefit	for	the	country	itself.	As	such,	small,	low-	emissions	countries	would	reap	almost	no	benefits	from	implementing	mitigation	strategies	alone,	while	incurring	the	costs	of	mitigation.	Because	the	common	resource	of	the	Earth’s	atmosphere	constitutes	a	public	good,	it	is	subject	to	overuse,	and	individual	countries	are	incentivized	from	incurring	the	costs	of	fixing	it	alone.122		
																																																						122	Paul	Krugman	and	Robin	Wells,	CourseSmart	E-Book	for	Economics,	2012,	479.	
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	 However,	collaboration	amongst	countries	through	international	agreements,	backed	by	international	institutions,	can	incentivize	countries	to	contribute	to	climate	change	mitigation	and	decrease	the	risk	for	defection.	There	is	strong	evolutionary	basis	for	persuasive	social	influences	to	facilitate	coercion	and	enforcement,	making	effectiveness	more	feasible.123	As	such,	collective	agreements	backed	by	international	institutions	can	strengthen	existing	incentives	to	mitigate	climate	change,	while	simultaneously	formulating	new	incentives	through	cooperation.	There	have	been	numerous	past	instances	of	success	in	solving	tragedies	of	the	commons	and	providing	public	goods	through	international	agreements,	both	within	environmental	law	and	in	other	international	contexts.			 In	this	chapter,	I	will	examine	the	processes	by	which	international	agreements	and	institutions	can	best	foster	the	global	cooperation	needed	to	effectively	solve	the	collective	action	problem	of	climate	change	and	mitigate	its	effects.	I	will	argue	that	the	specific	collective	action	problems	implicit	to	climate	change	can	best	be	addressed	through	concerted	international	agreements.	I	will	show	that	international	institutions	are	well-suited	to	effectively	arrange	cooperation	strategies	and	make	defection	less	attractive.	Furthermore,	international	agreements	backed	by	international	institutions	have	successfully	created	and	enforced	effective	collective	action	strategies	in	the	past,	both	in	an	environmental	and	non-environmental	context.	I	will	examine	successful	instances	in	order	to	elucidate	which	particular	aspects	and	methods	can	be	reproduced	in	future	environmental	law	transactions.	My	ultimate	argument	is	that	the	collective	action	problem	
																																																						123	Elinor	Ostrom,	"Collective	Action	and	the	Evolution	of	Social	Norms,"	Journal	of	
Economic	Perspectives	14,	no.	3	(Summer	2000):	148.	
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of	climate	change	and	its	mitigation	can	be	facilitated	through	concerted	international	agreements	backed	by	international	institutions.		 In	section	II,	I	will	discuss	the	challenges	inherent	to	collective	action	problems	in	general,	and	then	focus	specifically	on	the	aspects	of	climate	change	that	disincentivize	individuals	and	singular	countries	from	aggressively	mitigating	its	impacts	and	effects.	I	will	examine	prisoner’s	dilemma	problems	and	game	theory,	and	then	show	why	public	goods	are	typically	subjected	to	underprovision,	overuse	and	tragedy-of-the-commons	scenarios.	Furthermore,	there	are	specific	aspects	inherent	to	climate	change	that	make	the	collective	action	problem	more	complicated	that	will	be	detailed	in	this	section.		 In	my	next	section,	I	will	show	the	potential	effectiveness	of	an	international	strategy	to	climate	change	mitigation,	illustrating	that	despite	the	challenges	of	collective	action	problems,	these	institutions	can	foster	effective	cooperation.	I	will	examine	specific	achievements	of	international	law,	with	a	heavy	focus	on	the	successful	environmental	treaty	of	the	Montreal	Protocol.	I	will	begin	by	examining	a	general	international	law	case,	the	provision	of	collective	security	through	NATO,	which	illustrates	the	potential	for	effective	global	cooperation.	I	will	use	this	case	to	establish	the	general	legitimacy	and	effectiveness	of	international	institutions	in	solving	broader	collective	action	problems.		I	will	also	briefly	discuss	the	Vienna	Convention	and	subsequent	Montreal	Protocol	as	a	singular	event	within	international	law,	showing	how	effective	cooperation	was	used	to	solve	a	collective	action	problem.	Together,	Vienna/Montreal	are	considered	one	of	the	primary	achievements	–	if	not	the	apotheosis	of	achievements	–	within	environmental	law.	These	agreements	focused	on	fixing	and	mitigating	ozone	depletion	and	the	ozone	“hole”	above	Antarctica	through	a	reduction	in	the	consumption	and	production	of	
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chlorofluorocarbons	(CFCs),	using	international	agreements	to	incentivize	effective	compliance.	I	will	note	the	particular	arrangements	that	made	this	protocol	and	convention	so	successful,	as	well	as	detailing	the	universal	success	the	Protocol	has	achieved.	I	will	conclude	by	arguing	that	international	institutions	have	a	record	of	success	in	solving	collective	action	problems	through	collective	means	in	both	an	environmental	and	non-environmental	context.	In	section	4,	the	existing	international	institutions	relevant	to	climate	change	will	be	discussed	and	examined,	specifically	focusing	on	the	IPCC	(Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change),	whose	purpose	is	to	collect	and	consolidate	the	scientific	evidence	of	global	warming,	climate	change,	and	harms	without	making	policy	implications	or	agreements;	and	the	UNFCC	(the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change).	I	will	explore	the	formation	and	objectives	of	both	of	these	international	organizations,	but	will	focus	the	majority	of	my	analysis	on	the	UNFCCC,	as	it	is	this	branch	that	has	enacted	and	continues	to	enact	policy	and	international	agreements	regarding	climate	change.	I	will	close	by	arguing	that	these	international	institutions	are	well-suited	to	enact	and	enforce	effective	global	mitigation	for	climate	change.	I	will	present	the	overall	conclusion	that	the	collective	action	problem	of	climate	change	and	its	mitigation	can	best	be	facilitated	through	concerted	international	agreements	backed	by	international	institutions.			 Before	ending	this	chapter,	I	will	consider	objections	to	the	effectiveness	and	desirability	of	international	institutions.	The	first	objection	I	will	consider	is	the	intergenerational	aspect	of	climate	change	–the	majority	of	mitigation	benefits	will	accrue	to	future	generations	while	costing	the	present.	Typical	successful	international	
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agreements	solve	problems	that	accrue	immediate	benefits.	I	will	respond	by	showing	that	while	this	might	discourage	cooperation,	there	exist	powerful	pushes	for	mitigation	across	the	majority	of	the	world;	the	lack	of	immediate	benefits	does	not	seem	to	be	overwhelmingly	dissuading	to	the	relevant	actors.		The	second	objection	that	some	argue	is	that	these	institutions,	particularly	the	UNFCCC,	have	already	failed	to	create	meaningful	agreements,	with	the	failure	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	being	particularly	embarrassing.	I	will	respond	to	this	objection	by	analyzing	Kyoto’s	failure,	arguing	that	the	problem	is	not	one	inherent	to	international	agreements,	but	was	attributable	instead	to	other	circumstances.	On	a	related	note,	I	will	address	the	argument	that	voluntary,	unilateral	agreements	are	best	suited	to	address	the	collective	action	problem	of	climate	change,	as	these	are	less	costly	and	less	likely	to	create	mass	defection.	I	will	respond	to	this	objection	by	showing	how	the	voluntary	and	unilateral	arrangements	typically	praised	by	this	objection	can	be	integrated	into	concerted	international	agreements,	particularly	the	2015	Paris	Climate	Convention	and	subsequent	Paris	Agreement.	Thus,	I	will	show	that	the	aspects	which	make	unilateral	arrangements	attractive	can	be	effectively	reflected	in	concerted	international	agreements,	and	how	these	international	arrangements	can	increase	the	effectiveness	of	unilateral	treaties	by	increasing	the	assurance	of	mass	cooperation.		I	will	show	that	the	conclusion	that	international	agreements	are	well-suited	to	solve	climate	change	holds	despite	these	objections.	The	Paris	Agreement	will	be	more	extensively	examined	and	analyzed	in	Chapter	4;	it	will	be	detailed	in	this	section	only	as	it	pertains	to	the	strength	of	international	agreements	and	illustrates	the	union	of	voluntary	arrangements	and	international	backing.	
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II.	Game	Theory	–	Why	is	solving	climate	change	so	tough?		 Where	general	economic	principles	are	concerned,	we	tend	to	assume	that	groups	of	people	who	share	common	interests	or	objectives	will	work	together	to	achieve	these	common	goal.124	It	is	common	to	ascribe	those	drives	which	govern	individual	pursuits	to	the	group	or	cooperative	level;	however,	a	number	of	factors	impede	direct	analogy	between	individual	and	group	economic	behavior.125	Instead,	we	typically	see	that	rational,	self-interested	people	will	not	act	to	achieve	common	interests	unless	coercion	or	some	other	incentivizing	device	is	at	play.126	These	aspects	of	collective	action	problems	bind	most	large	groups	even	with	unanimous	agreement	about	the	common	good	and	the	best	method	of	attaining	it.127			 As	such,	large	groups	of	self-interested	individuals	tend	to	produce	sub-optimal	results	on	the	group	level.	An	individual	self-interested	firm,	for	instance,	is	economically	incentivized	to	produce	until	the	marginal	cost	of	production	is	equal	to	the	market	price,	without	consideration	of	how	the	extra	output	affects	the	prices	of	the	industry	as	a	whole.128	Stipulate	that	this	additional	supply	on	the	market	level	will	cause	prices	to	fall	–	had	the	industry	restricted	production	as	a	whole,	the	group	and	each	individual	firm	would	be	better	off.	Even	in	such	a	scenario,	a	firm	who	alone	voluntarily	restrains	its	production,	foreseeing	the	damage	that	producing	to	the	marginal	cost	would	have	on	the	entire	industry,	is	made	even	worse	off,	as	the	price	will	fall	on	the	market	level	absent	
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similar	restraint	across	the	industry.129	Thus,	the	non-cooperative	economic	structure	at	play	in	this	scenario	unfortunately	ensures	that	all	firms	are	individually	incentivized	to	increase	production,	though	the		group	and	each	subsidiary	is	left	with	a	sub-optimal	result.	Without	reassurance	that	other	firms	will	restrain	productivity,	the	firm	must	over-supply	to	remain	competitive.		Prisoner’s	dilemmas	constitute	one	form	of	collective	action	problem	that	can	help	lay	some	of	the	ground	work	for	understanding	the	mechanisms	that	make	climate	change	negotiations	difficult	to	resolve	and	implement.	Prisoner’s	dilemmas	describe	scenarios	in	which	all	actors	have	selected	an	individually	wise	strategy,	and	no	actor	can	independently	change	its	existing	strategy	without	making	herself	worse	off.130	The	equilibrium	which	arises	is	called	a	“Nash	equilibrium,”	from	which	no	parties	can	individually	escape	without	incurring	a	loss.131	The	problem	is	that	Nash	equilibriums	are	often	sub-optimal	for	the	group	as	a	whole.	The	classic	prisoner’s	dilemma	example	involves	two	prisoners	who	have	both	been	arrested	for	a	minor	crime,	but	the	police	suspect	they	also	committed	a	major	crime,	though	there	is	insufficient	evidence.132	If	both	of	them	confess	to	the	major	crime	and	turn	one	another	in,	they	will	each	be	sentenced	to	eight	years	in	prison.133	If	one	confesses	but	the	other	does	not,	the	police	will	grant	the	confessor	immunity	and	give	the	other	a	20-year	sentence.134	If	neither	confess,	they	will	
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both	serve	one	year	for	the	minor	crime.135	The	optimal	scenario	is	for	neither	to	confess,	but	by	not	confessing,	the	prisoner	risks	a	20-year	sentence;	by	confessing,	the	maximum	sentence	he	can	get	is	eight	years,	and	he	might	even	be	given	immunity.	The	Nash	equilibrium	and	most-likely	result	in	such	a	scenario	would	be	for	both	to	confess,	and	both	to	serve	an	8-year	sentence;	the	likelihood	of	this	result	occurring	is	heightened	by	the	fact	that	neither	can	communicate	with	one	another.	Communication	under	such	scenarios	can	help	reduce	sub-optimal	results	and	bring	about	mutually	beneficial	strategies.	Because	people	can	communicate,	they	can	design	cooperative	structures	to	maneuver	past	the	Nash	equilibrium,	or	so	it	is	assumed.	The	prisoner’s	dilemma	structure	is	one	of	the	most	classic	setups	for	collective	action	problems;	its	fascination	is	so	pervasive	that	several	gameshows	such	as	“Golden	Balls”	in	the	United	Kingdom	and	“Friend	or	Foe?”	in	the	United	States	have	run	for	seasons,	following	the	simple	communication	techniques	and	strategies	people	will	employ	when	faced	with	a	prisoner’s	dilemma.136	However,	without	instruments	of	coercion,	social	pressures,	or	incentives	available,	the	risk	of	defection	is	high,	and	trust	rather	low	in	these	types	of	shows	and	situations.	The	risk	of	a	sub-optimal	result	produced	without	cooperation	is	certainly	relevant	and	evident	on	the	private	enterprise	level,	but	is	far	more	burdensome	on	the	public	goods	level.	By	definition,	public	goods	are	non-excludable	and	non-rival	in	consumption.137	Non-excludable	goods	are	those	that	benefit	many	people	regardless	of	if	they	have	paid	for	
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their	deliverance	–	it	is	impossible	to	provide	the	good	without	its	benefits	extending	to	all	people.138	Examples	of	non-excludable	goods	include	national	defense,	fresh	air,	and	rule	of	law.	Non-rival	in	consumption	means	that	the	provision	of	the	good	to	one	person	does	not	diminish	the	usefulness	to	another	person139	–	think	of	broadcast	TV,	for	example.	A	sewer	system	in	London	in	the	mid-19th	century	was	both	non-excludable	and	non-rival	in	consumption,	a	classic	public	good.	The	need	for	a	sewer	system	was	enormous	–	neighborhoods	near	the	Thames	experienced	cholera	at	a	rate	six	times	greater	than	the	surrounding	neighborhoods.140	Yet	the	economic	cost	of	a	sewer	system	was	too	great	to	incentivize	private	parties	to	embark	upon	its	provision	–	it	was	not	until	the	Great	Stink	of	1858	that	Parliament	approved	a	plan	for	a	sewer	system,	which	opened	in	1865.141		While	the	sewer	system	was	a	public	good	–	both	non-rival	and	non-excludable	–	the	cleanliness	of	the	water	itself	in	the	Thames	would	be	classified	as	a	common	resource.142	Common	resources	are	non-excludable,	but	the	use	by	one	party	does	reduce	the	amount	available	to	others,	and	as	such	it	is	not	non-rival.	However,	both	public	goods	and	common	resources	tend	to	be	underprovided	and	over-exploited	without	government	intervention,	which	typically	involves	punishments	and	coercion	for	defectors.143	Without	such	mechanisms	for	provision	and	punishment,	non-excludable	goods	are	subjected	to	the	free-rider	problem,	wherein	self-interested	consumers	fail	to	pay	for	the	good,	instead	allowing	others	to	pay	for	its	provision	and	reaping	the	benefits	regardless.144	Thus,	inefficiently	low	
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production	occurs	in	the	economic	market	for	non-excludable	goods	in	the	absence	of	government.145	Common	resources,	by	contrast,	are	subject	to	chronic	exploitation	leading	to	tragedies	of	the	commons	without	significant	protection	and	intervention.	For	these	reasons,	the	protection	of	the	public	good	of	the	world’s	clean	and	usable	atmosphere,	as	well	as	related	common	resources,	are	subjected	to	sub-optimal	provision	and	cooperation	by	the	residents	of	the	Earth.	I	define	a	clean	atmosphere	as	public	good	because	it	is	non-excludable	and	generally	non-rival,	though	one	could	argue	that	some	functions,	such	as	its	capacity	to	store	carbon,	are	rival	in	consumption	because	the	release	of	carbon	by	one	party	means	that	other	parties	are	less	able	to	release	carbon	without	exceeding	the	atmosphere’s	realistic	threshold.	The	atmosphere’s	ability	to	absorb	carbon	is	vastly	overexploited,	and	its	protection	under-provided;	this	alone	poses	significant	challenges	for	mitigation,	but	climate	change	as	a	collective	action	problem	is	further	complicated	by	a	series	of	other	factors.	Because	countries	as	a	whole	are	better	off	combatting	climate	change,	but	individually	better	off	without	reducing	emissions	or	incurring	the	necessary	costs,	global	agreements	must	entice	countries	to	collectively	reduce	emissions	and	keep	their	commitments.146	Those	that	view	climate	change	in	terms	of	the	economic	problems	at	hand,	with	the	ultimate	economic	goal	being	for	the	world	in	total	to	invest	in	reducing	GHG’s	to	the	point	where	the	cost	of	increased	expenditure	on	mitigation	equals	the	benefit	of	reduced	climate	change	damage.147	In	short,	we	should	mitigate	up	until	the	marginal	
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cost.	However,	each	country’s	unique	position	means	that	the	absolute	value	of	its	own	individual	cost-benefit	analysis	will	vary	substantially,	according	to	its	personal	risk	from	climate	change	as	well	as	its	existing	economic	position.148	By	leaving	the	matter	of	climate	change	to	unilateral	actions,	we	risk,	and	likely	guarantee,	that	each	country’s	actions	will	not	necessarily	align	with	the	perspective	of	the	world	as	a	whole.	For	this	reason,	global	agreements	offer	the	best	chance	of	effectively	negotiating	the	interests	of	parties	to	resolve	the	collective	action	problem	and	produce	meaningful	treaties	and	agreements.	An	influential	work	by	Stephen	Gardiner,	titled	“A	Perfect	Moral	Storm,”	postulates	that	the	characteristics	of	the	climate	change	problem	undermine	our	ability	to	address	it,	as	the	convergence	of	these	peculiar	features	make	us	vulnerable	to	moral	corruption.	In	addition	to	the	features	typical	of	collective	action	problems,	global	and	intergenerational	storms	surrounding	climate	change	obscure	this	essential	moral	corruption,	and	the	synergy	of	the	two	combined	is	far	greater	than	the	sum	of	the	individual	storms.149		 The	global	storm	is	characterized	by	a	spatial	dispersion	of	causes	and	effects,	a	fragmentation	of	agency,	and	institutional	inadequacy.150	These	factors	both	limit	the	willingness	to	respond	of	individual	countries,	and	perhaps	more	crucially	their	ability	to	respond.	He		identifies	reliable	and	coercive	sanctions	as	the	primary,	and	perhaps	only,	means	of	making	collectively	rational	action	individually	rational.151			 Gardiner’s	point	that	poor	countries	are	badly	situated	to	hold	rich	nations	accountable	bears	attention;	if	we	can	call	sanctions	a	form	of	altruistic	punishment,	we	
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must	further	acknowledge	that	the	costs	of	such	punishment	can	be	borne	only	by	the	few.152	A	global	governance	system	that	holds	asymmetric	availability	of	enforcement	and	altruistic	punishment	doubtless	creates	systemic	problems.	This	asymmetry	might	very	well	provide	further	incentive	for	wealthy	nations	to	delay	climate	change	response	and	acknowledgement;	as	Gardiner	asserted,	acknowledging	the	moral	defects	of	climate	change	and	carbon	distribution	will	likely	encourage	attention	to	other	moral	defects	of	our	global	governance	system	and	economic	system,	namely	poverty.153	If	the	logical	similarities	between	climate	change	and	global	poverty	are	such	that	to	accept	the	logic	of	one	it	is	necessary	to	apply	it	to	the	other,	then	there	is	strong	economic	incentive	for	wealthy	nations	to	retain	the	status	quo	in	both	dimensions.		 Intergenerationally,	back	loading	and	substantial	deferral	compound	difficulties	in	collaboration.	Because	temporally	fragmented	agents	cannot	unite,	there	is	even	stronger	incentive	to	delay	action	and	pass	the	burden	to	future	generations.154	Meaningful	solutions	to	make	collectively	rational	solutions	individually	rational	are	thus	far	more	difficult	when	actors	are	temporally	separated	rather	than	spatially	distant.	However,	inaction	in	such	scenarios	creates	egregious	violations	of	the	harm	principle,	as	kicking	the	can	down	the	road	implicates	more	temporally	distant	generations	that	might	have	otherwise	been	spared.155		 These	aspects	addressed	by	Gardiner	complicate	the	existing	collective	action	problem,	and	provide	further	explanation	as	to	why	creating	meaningful	solutions	to	
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mitigation	strategies	is	so	hard.	The	intergenerational	objection	he	poses	warrants	particular	attention,	and	will	be	addressed	in	section	5	of	this	chapter.	His	other	points	give	us	reason	to	anticipate	failure	on	the	global	scale,	and	yet	these	points	largely	ignore	the	fact	that	effective	international	agreements	have	been	implemented	in	the	past,	both	within	and	outside	the	environmental	realm.	III.	International	Strategy	–	Are	International	Institutions	and	Treaties	Viable?		 Despite	the	challenges	of	collective	action	problems,	international	institutions	and	treaties	are	often	highly	successful	at	providing	member	states	with	public	goods	that	they	could	not	achieve,	or	could	not	achieve	as	effectively,	when	acting	individually.	A	public	good	that	is	often	the	subject	of	treaties	is	peace	and	collective	security,	and	one	prominent	international	organization	that	was	founded	primarily	for	its	provision	was	NATO.	The	North	Atlantic	Trade	Organization	was	founded	in	1949,	between	the	United	States,	Canada,	and	10	European	Nations.156	Its	three	essential	functions	were	to	deter	Soviet	expansion	across	Europe,	preventing	a	revival	of	nationalist	militarism	in	Europe,	and	encouraging	political	integration	across	the	continent.157	The	organization	provides	collective	security,	and	its	North	Atlantic	Treaty	provides	that	an	armed	attack	against	one	member	state	is	considered	an	armed	attack	against	them	all.158	Though	this	particular	clause	has	only	been	invoked	once,	in	response	to	the	9/11	terrorist	attacks	against	the	United	States,	NATO	has	acted	together	many	times	to	successfully	achieve	the	three	ends	
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of	its	initial	formation.159	One	prominent	success	for	the	organization	was	its	actions	in	Kosovo.		 The	Balkans	remained	outside	of	NATO’s	borders	in	the	1990s,	and	the	collapse	of	Yugoslavia	lead	to	many	wars	in	the	region,	threatening	European	security	and	causing	humanitarian	tragedies.160	The	NATO	Implementation	Force	united	more	than	30	countries,	including	Russia,	to	form	a	coalition	of	peace,	but	the	situation	in	Kosovo	nevertheless	escalated.161	In	the	fall	of	1998,	approximately	300,000	Kosovar	citizens	fled,	about	one-sixth	of	whom	went	to	the	surrounding	mountains	and	forests.162	As	many	died	of	cold	and	starvation	that	winter,	the	U.N.	identified	the	hostilities	as	an	“impending	humanitarian	catastrophe.”163	Facing	a	“deliberately	engineered	mass	expulsion”	just	outside	its	borders,	NATO	decided	to	intervene.164	NATO	launched	a	77-day	airstrike,	prevailing	without	any	casualties	of	its	own	and	avoiding	another	ethnic	cleansing	crusade	in	Europe.165	Though	the	airstrikes	were	heavily	criticized,	the	institution	of	NATO	achieved	success	in	Kosovo	by	the	metrics	of	the	goals	set	by	its	establishment.	Today,	NATO	has	28	member	states,	and	has	invoked	collective	security	initiatives	during	the	Cold	War,	in	Afghanistan,	against	maritime	piracy,	and	in	Libya.166	The	international	organization	has	been	able	to	successfully	provide	the	public	good	of	security	through	its	
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nation	states	in	a	more	stable	and	effective	way	than	would	likely	have	been	achieved	by	individual	state	actors.		 Within	International	Environmental	Law,	the	Vienna	Convention	and	Montreal	Protocol	clearly	illustrate	the	potential	for	success	in	the	domain	of	collective	environmental	protection.	These	two	international	agreements	were	formulated	in	response	to	widespread	concern	of	ozone	depletion,	the	ozone	hole,	and	related	health	risks.	As	of	2010,	both	the	Vienna	Convention	(1985)		and	the	Montreal	Protocol	(1987)	were	universally	ratified	by	all	196	parties.167	The	crowning	achievement	of	these	deals	was	the	elimination	by	2010	of	the	production	of	97	percent	of	ozone-depleting	substances,	with	commitments	to	phase-out	the	remaining	substances	by	2030.168	These	accomplishments	were	achieved	despite	scientific	uncertainty,	unequal	regional	contribution	to	the	problem,	high	transition	costs,	unequal	capacity	across	parties	to	bear	the	costs,	and	the	need	for	near-universal	participation	to	achieve	the	solution.169		Strong	public	outcry	and	the	availability	of	a	usable	substitute	engineered	by	DuPont	aided	the	feasibility	of	implementation.170	Short-term	competitive	benefits	were	added	in	the	amendment	process	–	the	treaty	would	enter	into	force	only	when	11	countries	representing	66	percent	of	emissions	ratified	the	treaty.171	This	clause	ensured	that	the	perverse	incentive	to	hold	out	in	order	to	gain	competitive	advantage	was	strategically	lessened.172	Funding	mechanisms	and	technology	transfers	were	also	included	
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in	the	adjustments	and	amendments	to	ensure	developing	countries	were	included	in	a	manner	that	reflected	their	differing	economic	position.173	Furthermore,	non-compliance	procedures	were	added	in	1992;	the	Implementation	Committee	for	review	was	given	the	power	of	enacting	potential	response	measures	that	included	providing	assistance	in	meeting	targets,	issuing	warnings,	and	suspending	Protocol	privileges.174	Potential	privileges	that	can	be	revoked	concerned	industrial	rationalization,	production,	consumption,	trade,	technology	transfers,	the	Multilateral	Fund,	and	other	non-specified	institutional	arrangements.175	Global	institutions	effectively	and	rather	rapidly	responded	to	the	threat	of	ozone	depletion	with	universal	ratification	in	the	Vienna	Convention	and	subsequent	Montreal	Protocol.	A	97-percent	reduction	was	achieved	in	the	production	of	ozone-depleting	substances,	despite	the	usual	difficulties	present	in	environmental	collective	action	problems.	This	highly	successful	case	illustrates	the	potential	effectiveness	of	international	institutions	to	collectively	enact	meaningful	change	to	promote	a	cleaner	environment	and	atmosphere.	Furthermore,	cases	outside	of	the	environmental	law	umbrella,	such	as	NATO’s	provision	of	collective	security,	illustrate	that	cooperative	treaties	and	arrangements	are	often	used	to	provide	public	goods.	As	such,	in	spite	of	the	multi-faceted	difficulties	inherent	to	collective	action	problems,	international	institutions	have	a	history	of	providing	public	goods	and	environmental	services	that	lend	credence	to	their	capabilities	at	addressing	effective	climate	change	mitigation.	IV.	Existing	Environmental	Institutions	–	The	IPCC	and	UNFCCC	
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	 Two	prominent	institutions	–	the	IPCC	and	the	UNFCCC	–	have	been	developed	by	international	bodies	to	address	the	threat	of	climate	change.	The	IPCC	focuses	primarily	on	collecting	and	analyzing	scientific	data	so	that	governments	can	understand	both	regional	and	global	patterns	and	enact	informed	policy.	The	UNFCCC	by	contrast	is	the	policy	body	of	the	United	Nations	designated	to	create	effective	response	to	climate	change.	One	of	the	major	hurdles	to	enacting	global	change	is	often	creating	the	relevant	institutions	necessary;	fortunately,	these	bodies	already	exist	to	combat	and	mitigate	climate	change.		 In	1972,	the	United	Nations	decided	at	its	Stockholm	Conference	on	the	Human	Environment	to	create	a	specific	program	focused	on	solving	and	tracking	environmental	challenges.176	The	United	Nations	Environment	Program	(UNEP)	was	confirmed	by	the	UN	General	Assembly	to	“facilitate	international	co-operation	in	the	environmental	field;	to	keep	the	world	environmental	situation	under	review	so	that	problems	of	international	significance	receive	appropriate	consideration	by	Governments;	and	to	promote	the	acquisition,	assessment	and	exchange	of	environmental	knowledge.”177	To	stress	the	acquisition,	assessment	and	exchange	of	knowledge	clause,	the	International	Panel	on	Climate	Change	was	created	in	1988,	a	subsidiary	of	UNEP	and	the	World	Meteorological	Organization	(WMO).178	The	first	task	for	the	IPCC	was	outlined	in	the	UN	General	Assembly	Resolution	43/53;	the	panel	was	to	prepare	a	comprehensive	review	of	the	science,	social	and	economic	impact,	and	possible	response	strategies	for	climate	change.179	This	institution	was	founded	to	inform	governments	and	relevant	institutions	of	climate	
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change	impacts;	today,	its	goal	is	to	comprehensively,	transparently	and	objectively	assess	the	scientific	and	economic	impact	on	anthropogenic	climate	change,	including	its	potential	future	impacts	and	strategies	for	adaptation	and	mitigation.180		 In	1990,	the	IPCC	released	its	First	Assessment	Report,	in	which	it	identified	climate	change	as	a	challenge	that	would	require	concerted	international	cooperation	to	resolve.181	This	aspect	of	the	report,	along	with	the	magnitude	of	its	scientific	findings,	acted	as	a	major	incentive	for	the	creation	of	an	international	institution	specifically	aimed	at	addressing	and	mitigating	climate	change	on	a	comprehensive	global	level.		 The	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	was	first	established	in	1992	by	international	agreement.182	By	its	inception,	a	certain	degree	of	warming	and	subsequent	impacts	were	already	perceived	as	inevitable.183	As	of	2016,	there	were	197	Parties	to	the	Convention,	making	it	the	most	comprehensive	international	institution	focusing	specifically	on	climate	change.184	Its	size,	as	well	as	its	overwhelming	success	at	incentivizing	parties	to	join	its	convention,	makes	it	the	best-suited	institution	to	enact	global	climate	change	treaties	that	aim	for	specific	mitigation	targets.			 The	UNFCCC	document	details	the	essential	background	agreements	and	stipulations	needed	to	enact	effective	mitigation.	Its	universal	ratification	–	all	196	countries	and	1	economic	integration	organization185	--	signals	a	global	acceptance	that	
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climate	change	and	its	effects	are	a	“common	concern	of	human	kind,”	a	stipulation	addressed	in	the	document.186	It	established	as	an	objective	the	achievement	of	a	stabilization	of	atmospheric	greenhouse	gas	levels	so	as	to	prevent	serious	anthropogenic	interference	in	the	climate.187	The	document	establishes	a	precautionary	principle	to	minimize	climate	change	and	its	adverse	effects	even	where	there	exists	doubt,	and	to	enact	global	mitigation	in	such	a	manner	as	is	sensitive	to	the	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	of	developed	and	developing	countries.188	It	calls	upon	the	world	to	commit	to	develop	national	inventories	of	emissions,	formulate	mitigation	measures	nationally,	promote	technological	developments	and	sustainable	management,	and	create	adaptation	strategies.189	Though	there	were	no	specific	targets	included,	the	Convention	expressed	the	common	goals	of	the	world	and	laid	the	necessary	background	work	and	positions	necessary	to	facilitate	further	treaties.190		 Thus,	both	the	IPCC	and	the	UNFCCC	have	achieved	important	baselines	that	can	aid	the	effectiveness	of	future	and	existing	climate	treaties.	The	continuous	appraisal	of	scientific	metrics	of	global	climate	change	is	essential	for	monitoring	trends	and	measuring	the	scope	of	the	problem;	as	such,	the	existence	of	the	IPCC	helps	build	factual	consensus	and	continually	establishes	and	reaffirms	the	scientific	basis	for	climate	change	mitigation.	The	UNFCCC	as	a	Convention	established	the	common	goals	of	the	world	in	addressing	climate	change,	laying	out	the	stipulations	that	unite	the	globe.	As	a	recurring	convention,	the	UNFCCC	provides	the	body	and	legal	metrics	for	the	establishment	of	new	treaties,	
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revision	of	existing	ones,	and	potential	enforcement	mechanisms.	These	institutions	are	pre-designed	and	already	in	full-force;	as	such,	much	of	the	institutional	requirements	that	can	impede	the	speedy	address	of	global	collective	action	problems	have	already	been	cared	for.	With	universal	ratification	and	participation	behind	us,	international	institutions	are	in	a	far	better	position	to	address	this	collective	action	problem,	though	the	need	for	incentivization	structures	and	ambitious	yet	realistic	and	successful	targets	remains.	V.	Overall	Conclusions	Despite	the	inherent	difficulties	of	collective	action	problems,	climate	change	can	be	effectively	addressed	with	global	cooperation.	Concerted	international	efforts	solidified	by	treaties	and	international	institutions	have	historically	been	successful	in	providing	public	goods	and	have	been	effective	at	solving	international	environmental	law	problems,	such	as	ozone	depletion.	The	existence	of	two	international	structures	dedicated	to	climate	change	mitigation,	the	IPCC	and	UNFCCC,	make	creating	new	treaties	more	feasible,	as	the	necessary	background	structures	and	common	goals	are	already	established	and	universally	ratified	by	the	globe.	As	such,	international	institutions	are	well-equipped	to	facilitate	aggressive	mitigation	of	climate	change.	VI.	Objections	to	International	Structures	–Intergenerational	Problems	and	Past	Failures		 There	exist	several	objections	to	the	effectiveness	and	desirability	of	international	institutions	that	ought	to	be	addressed.	The	first	objection	I	will	consider	is	the	concept	that	the	intergenerational	aspect	of	climate	change	undermines	the	possibility	of	effective	mitigation.	The	second	is	that	because	of	past	failure	of	international	climate	change	treaties,	other	solutions,	such	as	unilateral	and	multilateral	arrangements,	present	the	only	truly	viable	options	to	addressing	climate	change	mitigation.	
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		Unlike	many	collective	action	problems	and	arrangements,	wherein	cooperation	involves	immediate	group	costs	and	immediate	group	benefits,	the	majority	of	mitigation	benefits	will	accrue	to	future	generations	while	costing	the	present.191	It	seems	feasible	that	the	long	arch	of	climate	change	might	dissuade	actors	from	incurring	costs;	after	all,	why	incur	costs	in	the	present	when	the	majority	of	benefits	won’t	accrue	till	many	of	the	payers	are	dead?	However,	while	this	might	discourage	participation,	it	seems	as	though	this	particular	aspect	has	not	dissuaded	parties	from	at	recognizing	the	desirability	of	doing	something	in	the	present.	The	very	wording	of	the	UNFCCC	demonstrates	that	there	exist	powerful	pushes	for	mitigation	across	the	majority	of	the	world;	the	lack	of	immediate	benefits	does	not	seem	to	be	overwhelmingly	dissuading	to	the	relevant	actors.	Furthermore,	the	most	successful	international	environmental	law	treaty	–	the	Montreal	Protocol	–	was	not	immune	to	this	very	problem.		With	the	adoption	of	the	UNFCCC,	the	parties	of	the	world	voluntarily	incurred	enumerated	provisions	and	duties	with	fervent	knowledge	that	climate	change	mitigation	would	be	costly,	with	the	benefits	of	mitigation	being	accrued	primarily	in	the	distant	future.192	All	of	the	Earth’s	countries	recognized	at	this	conference	the	existence	of	a	problem,	established	a	costly	and	lofty	goal	in	common,	recognized	the	necessity	of	leadership	from	developed	countries	in	aiding	developing	countries,	and	recognized	that	adaptation	for	the	sake	of	future	generations	would	be	necessary	in	the	present.193	These	provisions	do	not	necessarily	dismiss	entirely	the	potential	reluctance	about	the	delay	of	
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benefits,	but	it	does	show	that	the	intergenerational	aspect	of	climate	change	mitigation	were	not	so	salient	that	relevant	actors	were	unwilling	to	sign	on	to	the	treaty.	Furthermore,	the	specific	actors	who	negotiate	these	treaties	belong	to	a	relatively	small	group	of	negotiators	–	thus,	strong	social	norms	at	this	level	can	incentivize	cooperation	through	the	introduction	of	immediate	social	benefits.194	Developments	in	the	study	of	cultural	revolution	show	both	genetic	and	adaptive	incentives	that	increase	the	propensity	to	cooperate	based	on	social	norms.195	Despite	the	long-term	nature	of	the	total	collective	benefit	within	climate	change	settings,	evolutionary	psychology	suggests	that	social	norm	benefits	from	both	the	internal	group	and	world-wide	outcry/media	influence	can	be	significant	enough	to	promote	cooperation.196	Furthermore,	the	very	existence	of	climate	change	treaties	through	the	UNFCCC	and	the	continuous	compliance	and	attendance	at	the	Conferences	of	the	Parties	shows	that	global	cooperation	exists	regardless	of	the	present	asymmetry	between	mitigation	costs	and	benefits.	The	awareness	of	the	long-term	benefits	but	present	costs	was	actually	articulated	during	the	adoption	of	the	Montreal	Protocol.	The	overwhelming	success	of	this	Protocol	was	discussed	in	Section	2	of	this	chapter,	and	yet	the	very	same	asymmetry	–	of	present	costs	and	far-off	benefits	–	was	present	in	the	ozone	depletion	problem	as	is	present	in	the	climate	change	mitigation	problem.	The	chief	American	negotiator	of	the	Protocol	stated	that	overcoming	this	aspect	was	an	incredible	feat	for	international	law.	He	stated	that	“the	most	extraordinary	aspect	of	the	treaty	was	its	imposition	of	substantial	short-term	economic	costs	to	protect	human	health	and	the	environment	against	unproved	future	
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dangers	…	at	the	time	of	the	negotiations	and	signing,	no	measurable	evidence	of	damage	existed.”197	The	success	of	the	Montreal	Protocol	and	its	universal	adoption	shows	that	this	objection	does	not	pose	an	overwhelming	threat	to	the	viability	of	international	treaties.	While	the	intergenerational	aspect	certainly	complicates	the	relevant	collective	action	problems,	this	feature	does	not	pose	an	inherent	threat	to	a	concerted	international	arrangement	for	aggressive	mitigation.	The	second	objection	that	some	argue	is	that	these	institutions,	particularly	the	UNFCCC,	have	already	failed	to	create	meaningful	agreements,	with	the	failure	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	being	particularly	embarrassing.	As	such,	voluntary	unilateral	arrangements	might	achieve	speedier	change,	and	even	be	more	cost-effective.	However,	the	failure	of	Kyoto	does	not	reflect	an	inherent	defect	of	international	agreements,	but	rather	elucidates	a	number	of	structures	that	must	be	improved	upon.	Furthermore,	the	voluntary	and	unilateral	arrangements	typically	praised	by	this	objection	can	be	integrated	into	concerted	international	agreements,	and	aspects	were	in	fact	featured	in	the	2015	Paris	Climate	Convention	and	subsequent	Paris	Agreement.	Thus,	I	will	show	that	the	aspects	which	make	unilateral	arrangements	attractive	can	be	effectively	reflected	in	concerted	international	agreements,	and	how	these	international	arrangements	can	increase	the	effectiveness	of	unilateral	treaties	by	increasing	the	assurance	of	mass	cooperation.		While	there	does	exist	a	long	pattern	of	failure	with	international	climate	change	treaties,	an	examination	of	their	structure	and	efficacy	can	give	us	an	understanding	of	why	they	have	failed.	In	most	cases,	I	believe	that	the	failure	of	these	treaties	was	not	attributable	to	their	global	structure,	but	rather	was	attributable	to	a	number	of	individual	
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factors.	Furthermore,	many	of	the	features	that	supposedly	make	success	more	probable	in	unilateral	and	bilateral	cooperations	–	such	as	the	social	group	dynamics	of	the	actors	and	the	voluntary	nature	of	the	agreements	–	are	features	that	can	be	integrated	into	a	global	agreement	and	treaty.		In	the	wake	of	signing	the	UNFCCC,	much	emphasis	was	placed	on	the	need	to	find	and	establish	specific	targets	for	relevant	countries	and	actors.	As	such,	at	the	Berlin	Conference	of	the	Parties	(CoP)	in	1995,	The	Berlin	Mandate	was	drafted	and	agreed	upon.198	This	document	established	a	time	table	for	QUELROs	–	quantifiable	emissions	limitation	and	reduction	objectives	–	to	be	negotiated	at	the	third	session	of	the	CoP.	This	session	was	scheduled	for	December	1997	in	Kyoto,	Japan.199			 The	first	Convention	required	that	developed	countries	take	steps	towards	meeting	1990	levels	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	by	the	year	2000	in	Article	4	of	the	convention.200	The	UNFCCC	required	that	the	first	Conference	of	the	Parties	(CoP)	to	review	developed	countries’	commitments	to	meeting	this	target,	but	by	the	first	CoP,	two	things	were	decidedly	clear.	Firstly,	the	Article	4	commitments,	even	with	perfect	compliance,	were	going	to	be	insufficient	to	meet	the	Article	2	objective	–	stabilizing	greenhouse	gasses	at	a	safe	and	sustainable	level.201	Secondly,	even	if	such	targets	were	sufficient,	few	developed	countries	were	going	to	be	even	reasonably	near	their	1990	levels	by	the	year	2000.202	The	targets	set	by	the	UNFCCC	establishment	were	not	ambitious	enough	to	successfully	achieve	the	original	goals	and	purpose	of	its	existence;	furthermore,	compliance	was	low	
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and	enforcement	so	weak	that	even	these	unambitious	targets	were	not	producing	the	desired	results.203	Firm	targets	would	need	to	be	set	at	the	Kyoto	CoP.		 Heavy	media	attention	was	placed	upon	the	Kyoto	conference,	but	the	key	parties	–	the	European	Union,	United	States,	and	G-77,	all	had	released	position	statements	in	prior	negotiations	that	seemed	too	distant	and	irreconcilable	for	a	meaningful	treaty	to	be	reached	within	the	confines	of	the	Kyoto	Conference.204	Yet	there	was	such	lofty	public	scrutiny	of	the	convention	that	most	parties	were	highly	incentivized	to	strike	a	deal.205	Even	with	the	majority	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	preliminary	text	heavily	bracketed,	with	multiple	alternatives	for	nearly	every	provision	elaborated,	no	single	party	wanted	to	be	blamed	for	killing	Kyoto	with	the	stakes	so	high	and	with	the	world	watching.206	Furthermore,	the	unexpected	attendance	of	U.S.	Vice	President	Al	Gore	intensified	the	stakes	of	failure	and	increased	the	collaboration.207	It	also	increased	the	desperation	to	reach	a	deal	by	the	conclusion	of	the	conference,	with	compromises	being	hastily	drafted	to	extend	by	a	full	year	deadlines	agreement	of	certain	provisions.208		 Kyoto	required	through	QELROs	all	industrialized	party	to	reduce	their	net	emissions	below	1990	levels.209	The	biggest	failure	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	was	the	United	States’	failure	to	ratify	the	treaty	through	its	Congress.210	The	U.S.	Senate	instead	adopted	a	resolution	stating	that	the	country	would	not	sign	any	international	agreement	that	limited	
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greenhouse	gas	emissions	if	doing	so	would	substantially	harm	the	United	States	economy.211	Though	the	United	States	substantially	increased	its	emissions	post-1990	levels	instead	of	adhering	to	its	agreed	7	percent	reduction,	the	majority	of	developed	countries	in	fact	made	substantial	reductions	in	the	wake	of	Kyoto.212	Once	it	was	clear	that	Kyoto	would	not	be	adopted	by	the	United	States,	the	remaining	industrialized	countries	still	agreed	to	reduce	their	emissions	by	5.2	percent	below	1990	levels	by	2012.213	This	was	substantially	less	than	the	8	percent	average	agreed	to	before	the	U.S.	defected	on	its	commitments,	but	nevertheless,	the	agreement	entered	into	force	with	127	parties	in	2005.214		 Though	the	Kyoto	Protocol	was	deemed	a	failure	of	the	international	community,	its	failure	rests	heavily	on	the	United	States’	inaction,	and	perhaps	says	more	about	the	domestic	priorities	of	the	United	States	rather	than	the	viability	of	international	institutions.	And	while	it	is	true	that	Kyoto	failed	to	meet	the	QUELRO	objectives	it	established,	international	agreements	have	been	successful	in	reducing	greenhouse	gas	emissions	in	the	past.	In	addition	to	addressing	ozone	depletion,	the	Montreal	Protocol	was	also	highly	successful	at	reducing	greenhouse	gas	emissions.	The	net	reduction	of	the	Protocol	before	2010	was	135	billion	tons	of	Co2-equivalent	–	approximately	11	billion	tons	of	CO2-equivalent	each	year.215	Protocol	mandates	and	subsequent	voluntary	measures	in	the	U.S.	and	Europe	had	an	effect	on	global	warming,	with	an	approximate	
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delay	of	35	to	41	years.216	Though	the	express	purpose	of	the	Protocol	was	divorced	from	the	reduction	of	greenhouse	gasses,	it	effectively	produced	a	vast	and	substantial	global	reduction	in	the	use	of	CO2	equivalent.	Thus,	this	externality	of	the	Montreal	Protocol	illustrates	that	reductions	of	greenhouse	gases	can	and	have	been	facilitated	through	international	agreements.	However,	global	agreements	take	considerable	compromise	and	are	often	very	slow.	As	development	continues	to	expand	rapidly	across	much	of	the	world,	the	risk	of	eclipsing	the	2-degree-Celcius-of-warming	threshold	increases,	making	the	need	for	significant	cuts	increasingly	urgent.217	There	exists	a	significant	possibility	that	the	world	no	longer	has	the	luxury	of	waiting	for	universal	acceptance	of	a	particular	climate	change	treaty,	and	that	instead	countries	should	work	individually	and	in	smaller	groups	to	combat	the	effects	of	climate	change.218	Some	speculate	that	such	arrangements	would	be	more	quickly	created	and	more	strongly	enforced	because	they	are	purely	voluntary,	and	exist	between	smaller	groups	with	well-established	relationships.219	The	G20	bloc,	for	example,	which	includes	the	majority	of	the	world’s	top	emitters,	might	be	in	an	excellent	position	to	negotiate	significant	cutbacks	in	carbon	emissions	without	the	need	for	a	fully	globalized	treaty.220	I	will	stipulate	that	any	reduction	in	emissions	by	a	unilateral	or	multilateral	agreement	is	better	than	unfettered	emissions	when	it	comes	to	mitigating	global	climate	change.	Should	negotiating	a	climate	change	treaty	prove	impossible,	with	all	proposals	ending	in	utter	failure	and	gridlock	after	multiple	methods	had	been	tried,	I	would	likely	
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also	concede	that	such	agreements	constitute	the	best	option.	However,	what	unilateral	and	bilateral	arguments	fail	to	persuasively	address	is	why	they	would	be	more	effective	than	a	successful	global	treaty.	There	exists	no	reason	to	prefer	unilateral	and	bilateral	solutions	to	large	global	treaties	unless	global	treaties	are	inherently	destined	to	fail.	The	existence	of	the	substantial	greenhouse	gas	reduction	in	the	Montreal	Protocol	undermines	inherent	failure	in	international	agreements	in	this	dimension.	The	failure	of	Kyoto	and	others	is	not	one	inherent	to	international	climate	change	treaties,	but	rather	is	a	systemic	and	policy	failure.	Furthermore,	the	social	influence	and	voluntary	properties	of	unilateral	and	multilateral	agreements	that	supposedly	make	them	so	attractive	can	be	replicated	on	the	international	level.	Though	cooperation	in	collective	action	problems	is	increasingly	difficult	in	large	groups,	small	group	phenomena	are	much	more	nuanced	and	complex.221	The	Conference	of	the	Parties	is	sufficiently	small	that	evolutionary	and	social	norms	exert	meaningful	influence	and	increase	the	likelihood	of	international	agreements.222	As	to	the	voluntary	component	of	unilateral	treaties,	the	global	Paris	Agreement	effectively	utilized	voluntary	arrangements	and	sacrifices	on	the	part	of	individual	countries	to	create	a	concerted	effort	in	its	use	of	INDCs.223	These	Intended	Nationally	Determined	Contributions	were	submitted	by	individual	parties	ahead	of	the	Paris	COP21,	with	countries	asked	to	set	their	own	ambitious	targets	for	mitigation	based	on	their	varying	capabilities.224	Rather	than	setting	sweeping	targets	that	all	developed	and	developing	
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countries	were	bound	to	meet,	these	INDCs	allowed	countries	to	put	forward	their	best	efforts	while	simultaneously	being	mindful	of	varying	national	objectives.225	In	2018,	the	efforts	of	all	countries	will	be	assessed,	with	all	parties	required	to	report	regularly	on	emissions	and	implementation	strategies.226	The	threshold	for	entry	into	force	was	met	on	October	5,	2016,	less	than	a	year	after	the	Conference	and	many	months	ahead	of	even	the	most	optimistic	predictions.227	As	such,	both	the	social	and	voluntary	aspects	that	might	make	unilateral	arrangements	more	effective	can	and	have	been	integrated	into	the	international	treaty	level,	and	the	Paris	Conference’s	rapid	ratification	seems	to	indicate	a	higher	degree	of	enthusiasm	for	mitigation	than	was	anticipated.	Though	past	failures	and	the	intergenerational	aspect	of	climate	change	might	give	us	reason	to	doubt	the	potential	effectiveness	of	international	institutions,	these	considerations	do	not	reveal	inherent	flaws	in	international	agreements.	The	success	of	Montreal	illustrates	that	delayed	benefits	do	not	necessarily	undermine	the	viability	of	a	treaty,	and	the	greenhouse	gas	reductions	of	this	treaty	prove	that	the	world	can	and	has	significantly	been	able	to	delay	mass	global	warming.	Though	the	failure	of	Kyoto	is	certainly	a	dark	stain	on	the	UNFCCC’s	record,	the	Paris	Accord	has	integrated	the	voluntary	aspects	of	unilateral	and	multilateral	treaties	in	its	system	of	INDCs.	While	it	is	too	early	to	measure	the	success	of	Paris,	the	rapid	ratification	seems	to	indicate	fervent	global	enthusiasm.	Overall,	the	conclusion	that	international	frameworks	have	the	potential	combat	climate	change	and	are	well-suited	to	do	so	holds	against	these	objections.	The	
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particular	role	of	the	U.S.	–	which	arguably	doomed	the	Kyoto	Protocol	–	is	deserving	of	further	examination;	the	politics	and	incentives	of	the	United	States	are	the	subject	of	the	next	chapter.																					
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Chapter	3:	COP	21,	The	Paris	Agreement	1.	Introduction		 The	Paris	Agreement	was	drafted	and	agreed	upon	during	the	21st	annual	Conference	of	the	Parties	(COP)	held	in	December	2015	in	Paris,	France.	Its	primary	goal	was	to	achieve	a	climate	change	agreement	that	would	be	binding	and	universal,	yet	the	agreement	would	set	goals	according	to	objectives	and	targets	announced	by	individual	parties.	This	method	blended	voluntary	elements	into	a	binding	structure,	contrasting	previous	treaties	that	featured	limits	set	by	the	overarching	body.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	contend	that	the	structure	and	aims	of	the	Paris	Agreement	have	set	the	treaty	up	well	for	successful	implementation	and	adherence;	the	Paris	Agreement	serves	as	a	promising	example	of	meaningful	mitigation	achieved	through	well-	established	international	institutions	in	international	environmental	law.		 I	will	begin	by	providing	context	for	the	Paris	Convention,	including	a	general	overview	of	the	articulated	aims	of	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change,	of	which	the	Paris	Convention	was	the	21st	installment.	I	will	mention	preceding	Conferences	of	the	Parties	(COPs)	that	significantly	influenced	the	structure	and	aims	of	the	Paris	Convention,	with	particular	emphasis	on	COP	20	held	in	Lima,	Peru,	in	2014	and	COP	19	held	in	Warsaw,	Poland	in	2013.	Both	of	these	conferences	significantly	shaped	the	structure	of	the	Paris	Conference	as	well	as	the	preliminary	necessities	of	party	participation.			 After	discussing	the	context	of	the	Convention,	I	will	then	shift	my	attention	to	structure	of	the	Paris	Convention	and	subsequent	treaty,	placing	particular	emphasis	on	the	voluntary	mitigation	apparatus	of	the	Intended	Nationally	Determinted	Contributions	
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(INDCs),	on	which	the	Paris	Agreement	is	fully	reliant.	I	will	also	explore	the	text	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	indicating	the	metrics	of	enforcement	within	the	document	to	incentivize	actors	to	meet	their	voluntary	targets.	I	will	also	illustrate	the	mechanisms	by	which	the	text	crafts	a	careful	and	deliberate	compromise	between	parties.		 Next,	I	will	discuss	the	degree	to	which	the	Paris	Agreement	has	made	progress	toward	its	mitigation	goals.	I	will	evaluate	the	impact	of	the	conglomeration	of	voluntary	promises,	the	rapid	ratification	of	the	Agreement,	and	the	extent	to	which	the	parties	have	progressed	toward	meeting	their	goals	in	the	past	year.	I	will	briefly	address	COP	22,	held	recently	in	November	of	2016	in	Marrakech,	Morocco,	and	the	extent	to	which	the	parties	at	this	conference	are	satisfied	or	dissatisfied	with	the	structure	of	Paris.	I	will	also	examine	the	efforts	made	to	quicken	the	agreement’s	entry	into	force,	championed	particularly	by	United	States	President	Barack	Obama	in	the	final	months	of	his	eight-year	presidential	tenure.		 Before	concluding,	I	will	consider	objections	to	the	Paris	Agreement,	first	examining	doubts	of	its	potential	efficacy,	and	then	turning	my	attention	to	objections	concerning	the	potential	for	perverse	incentives	inherent	to	voluntary	and	self-made	mitigation	commitments.	I	will	respond	to	these	categories	of	objections,	concluding	by	showing	that	the	blend	of	voluntary	limitations	and	binding	enforcement	places	the	Paris	Agreement	in	an	excellent	position	for	significant,	if	sub-ideal,	climate	change	mitigation.	II.	Context	of	COP	21	Paris	Convention	and	preceding	conventions	The	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC)	was	held	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	in	1992.	Its	highly	significant	contribution	to	global	climate	change	mitigation	was	the	provision	of	an	international	apparatus	to	negotiate	the	political	means	
	 74	
necessary	on	the	domestic	level	to	stabilize	concentrations	of	greenhouse	gasses	at	the	atmospheric	level.228	Its	long-	term	purpose	is	to	avoid	anthropogenic	interference	in	the	atmosphere	that	will	cause	dangerous	results	to	human	systems.229	With	195	parties	to	the	Framework	Convention,	the	UNFCCC	is	the	primary	international	body	aimed	at	creating	significant	climate	change	mitigation.230	To	maintain	consistent	progress	toward	attaining	this	goal,	the	UNFCCC	parties	meet	annually	at	Conferences	of	the	Parties	(COPs).		These	COPs	aim	to	review	the	implementation	of	the	original	UNFCCC	convention,	which	entered	into	force	in	1994.	These	COPs	began	in	1995	in	Berlin,	Germany.	Other	significant	COPs	have	included	COP3	(Kyoto,	Japan,	which	produced	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	largely	regarded	as	an	international	failure),	COP	11	(Montreal,	Canada,	which	introduced	the	Montreal	Action	Plan,	COP	15	(Copenhagen,	Denmark,	in	which	a	successor	to	Kyoto	failed	to	be	realized),	and	COP	17	(Durban,	South	Africa,	which	created	the	Green	Climate	Fund).231		Given	the	history	of	failure	evident	present	through	many	of	these	COPs,	the	overarching	goal	of	Paris	seems	even	more	ambitious	than	it	might	otherwise	appear.	In	the	prior	20	years	of	UNFCCC	negotiations,	the	parties	had	never	attempted	to	secure	a	mitigation	agreement	that	was	both	legally	binding	and	universally	agreed	upon.	Paris	aimed	to	solidify	not	only	these	binding	and	universal	clauses,	but	also	specifically	aimed	to	design	its	targets	so	as	to	limit	warming	to	2	degrees	Celsius	above	pre-industrial	levels.232	
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With	such	high	aims	on	the	line,	the	2015	COP	21	Paris	Conference	attracted	over	50,000	participants,	including	25,000	official	delegates.233	However,	the	general	ambitions	articulated	during	the	Paris	Convention,	including	the	timeline	and	commitment	mechanisms,	were	determined	far	in	advance	of	COP	21.	Beginning	at	COP	17	Durban,	held	in	2011,	countries	forged	agreements	regarding	the	post-2020	emissions	period,	deciding	that	the	2015	COP	at	the	latest	would	be	used	to	formalize	a	treaty.234	They	further	decided	that	this	agreement	would	be	universal	and	legally	binding.235	The	UNFCCC	deemed	the	Durban	Conference	to	be	a	“turning	point”	for	international	climate	change	negotiations;	the	parties	were	able	to	agree	that	a	comprehensive	blueprint	was	required	to	meaningfully	combat	climate	change.236	Included	in	this	agreement	was	the	understanding	that	parties	would	contribute	to	climate	change	mitigation	in	accordance	with	the	stipulated	principle	of	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	and	leaving	room	for	sustainable	development.237	However,	the	parties	to	the	Durban	Conference	also	recognized	a	need	for	greater	and	more	ambitious	action	to	reduce	emissions	and	adapt	to	existing	climate	change,	as	well	as	ease	the	process	of	enacting	a	2015	climate	change	agreement.238	
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The	next	Conference	of	the	Parties,	COP	18	held	in	Doha,	Qatar,	further	emphasized	the	goal	of	working	toward	a	universal	2020	climate	change	agreement	to	be	adopted	by	2015.239	However,	unlike	COP	17	Durban,	the	Doha	COP	18	Conference	established	an	additional	goal:	scaling	up	efforts	and	increasing	ambitions	for	the	pre-2020	period,	beyond	existing	pledges	to	which	the	parties	had	already	agreed.240	To	ensure	the	success	of	the	2015	Conference	and	treaty,	the	UN	Secretary	General	announced	at	Doha	that	he	would	lead	a	convention	of	world	leaders	in	2014	to	mobilize	political	will	ahead	of	the	COP	21	deadline.	The	Doha	convention	established	a	set	timetable	for	progress	towards	COP	21,	and	also	completed	an	action	plan	for	streamlining	the	2015	agreement	through	the	existing	Ad	hoc	Working	Group	on	the	Durban	Platform	for	Enhanced	Action	(ADP).	The	Convention	crafted	an	agreement	for	governments	to	submit	their	information,	views,	and	proposals	for	the	2015	climate	convention	by	March	1,	2013.	In	addition	to	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	finance,	infrastructure	and	technology	transfers,	and	an	amendment	to	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	Doha’s	central	contribution	to	the	UNFCCC	legacy	was	furthering	the	preliminary	processes	that	paved	the	road	to	Paris.	As	the	2015	Convention	became	more	imminent,	the	urgency	to	formalize	specific	preliminary	actions,	as	well	as	broader	goals	of	COP21,	increased.	The	2013	COP	19	conference	in	Warsaw,	Poland,	advanced	both	of	these	objectives.	In	regards	to	the	broader	goals	of	the	2015	conference,	at	the	Warsaw	Conference,	the	Parties	agreed	on	two	primary	objectives:	1)	create	a	binding,	universal,	and	effective	global	effort	to	reduce	emissions	at	
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sufficiently	rapid	pace	to	remove	humanity’s	long-term	emissions	bath	out	of	the	climate	change	danger	zone,	while	simultaneously	building	adaptation	capacity,	and	2)	stimulate	broader	and	faster	action	in	the	present	and	pre-2020	period.241		More	specifically,	the	Warsaw	Conference	established	a	requirement	for	governments	to	communicate	their	contributions	to	climate	change	in	advance	of	the	Paris	Convention.	It	also	established	standards	for	monitoring,	reporting,	and	verifying	metrics	for	domestic	action	to	be	finalized	before	implementation,	and	reiterated	the	importance	of	aiding	the	poorest	countries	adapt	to	climate	change	impacts,	create	sustainable	development,	and	address	loss	and	damage	caused	by	climate	change	impacts.242		It	was	at	Warsaw	that	the	Parties	of	the	UNFCCC	rhetorically	expressed	an	increasing	urgency	to	combat	climate	change,	stating	that	the	evidence	of	anthropogenic	climate	change	was	beyond	denial,	and	that	there	existed	only	a	“limited	time”	to	limit	warming	to	2	degrees	Celsius	past	pre-industrial	levels.243	To	achieve	this	limit	to	warming,	the	Warsaw	Convention	articulated	that	global	emissions	needed	to	peak	in	the	present	decade	(the	2010s),	and	that	the	globe	needed	to	achieve	zero	net	emissions	by	the	second	half	of	the	century	(2050).244	The	Warsaw	Convention	also	recognized	that	these	ambitious	and	necessary	goals	could	not	be	achieved	without	rapid,	concerted	and	coordinated	efforts	at	the	international,	domestic,	business,	and	finance	levels;	the	Convention	thus	included	a	cross-sector	climate	action	showcase	to	make	clear	that	the	world	had	the	money,	
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technology,	models,	and	knowledge	to	create	immediate	and	shared	benefits	to	all	sectors	of	the	global	economy	and	global	atmosphere.245		The	Warsaw	Convention	also	laid	out	the	structural	beginnings	of	the	Paris	Convention,	including	a	goal	that	the	resulting	treaty	would	enter	into	force	in	the	year	2020.246	The	Parties	also	agreed	at	Warsaw	to	submit	the	formal	draft	text	of	the	treaty	by	May	2015,	with	successful	negotiations	concluding	at	the	Paris	Convention	in	December.247	Domestic	preparations	for	implementing	nationally	determined	contributions	were	to	begin	in	the	first	quarter	of	2015	ahead	of	the	convention,	and	governments	further	agreed	to	identify	the	precise	information	required	of	the	nationally	determined	contribution	documents	at	the	2014	Lima	Conference.248	The	conclusions	reached	at	Warsaw	for	the	pre-2020	period	were	less	specific;	governments	resolved	to	strengthen	efforts	to	close	the	“ambition	gap”	between	existing	pledges	and	what	was	reasonably	required	of	countries	to	avoid	exceeding	the	warming	benchmark	of	2	degrees	Celsius.249	However,	no	binding	or	specific	benchmarks	were	established	to	close	this	gap,	merely	an	empty	assertion	that	governments	would	work	to	“accelerate	the	implementation	of	policies	and	environmentally	sound	technologies.”250	With	only	a	year	left	before	the	Paris	Convention,	the	2014	Conference	held	in	Lima,	Peru,	was	particularly	focused	on	cleaning	up	remaining	precursors	to	a	successful	2015	treaty.			The	aims	of	COP	20	Lima	were	primarily	to	lay	out	the	explicit	groundwork	and	
																																																						245	Ibid.	246	Ibid.	247	Ibid.	248	Ibid.	249	Ibid.	250	Ibid.	
	 79	
agreements	necessary	for	a	successful	Paris	Convention	the	following	year.	In	the	two	weeks	of	negotiations	of	Lima,	over	190	countries	agreed	to	explicit	elaborations	of	previous	proposed	tenets	of	the	Paris	Convention.	The	most	significant	elements	of	the	Lima	Call	for	Climate	Action	(the	resulting	text	of	COP	20)	were	submission	guidelines	for	national	contributions	(INDCs),	and	the	establishment	of	the	INDC	as	the	foundation	for	climate	action	in	post-2020	negotiations.	Lima	also	articulated	explicitly	that	the	Parties	did	not	anticipate	the	new	Paris	Agreement	to	come	into	effect	until	2020.	Transparency	apparatuses	were	also	agreed	upon	through	a	Multilateral	Assessment	process	to	review	emission	targets.	The	UNFCCC’s	technology	mechanism	was	further	strengthened	by	pledges	totaling	$10	billion	to	the	Green	Climate	Fund,	initiated	at	COP	17	Durban.251	Between	the	2014	Lima	Conference	and	2015	Paris	Conference,	over	190	countries	met	again	for	seven	days	of	interim	negotiations	in	Geneva,	Switzerland.252	Held	in	February	2015,	a	mere	two	months	after	COP	20	Lima	and	10	months	before	COP	21	Paris,	the	Geneva	Climate	Change	Talks	prepared	the	full	negotiating	text	for	Paris.253	The	content	of	the	draft	detailed	strategies	for	mitigation,	adaptation,	finance,	technology,	and	capacity	building	within	the	necessary	timetable	to	create	a	legally	binding	agreement	by	December	of	that	year.254	However,	preliminary	work	did	not	conclude	at	the	Geneva	Climate	Talks;	the	draft	text	would	be	further	edited	and	negotiated	at	three	additional	formal	sessions	in	
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Bonn,	Germany,	in	June,	August-September,	and	October	of	2015.255	At	the	ministerial-level,	interim	meetings	and	negotiations	were	held	at	the	Major	Economies	Forum,	the	Petersburg	Climate	Dialogue,	the	African	Ministerial	Conference	of	the	Environment,	and	the	G7	and	G20	meetings.256	Because	of	the	long-term	preparation	for	the	21st	Conference	of	the	Parties,	the	Paris	Convention	should	not	be	considered	merely	as	the	annual	meeting	in	a	long	series	of	conferences	demanded	by	the	original	UNFCC	Convention.	With	over	four	years	of	preliminary	and	progressive	negotiations,	the	Paris	Convention	carried	with	it	the	global	ambitions	of	parties	disappointed	by	previous	international	failures	and	insufficient	pledges.	As	such,	the	weight	of	Paris	cannot	be	fully	understood	nor	appreciated	without	grasping	the	vast	preparation	contributing	to	its	drafting	and	negotiations.	The	resulting	anticipation	increased	the	stakes	of	the	Convention,	and	given	the	failure	of	Kyoto	and	prior	UNFCCC	treaties	to	create	effective	mitigation,	much	of	the	perceived	viability	of	the	UN	Framework	rested	upon	the	Parties’	ability	to	successfully	negotiate	a	binding	and	universal	treaty.	III.	Structure	of	Paris		 Amid	these	high	stakes	and	intense	global	scrutiny,	the	Paris	Agreement	managed	to	create	a	structure	that	incorporated	both	voluntary	and	compulsory	elements.	The	UNFCCC	Parties	had	previously	agreed	that	the	2015	agreement	should	aim	to	be	both	universal	and	binding;	all	Parties	needed	to	be	invested	in	the	stakes	of	global	climate	change,	and	all	needed	to	be	held	to	some	level	of	accountability.	Where	previous	treaties	had	excluded	
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mitigation	targets	for	certain	nations	on	the	basis	of	their	developing	status,	Paris	aimed	to	unite	developing	and	developed	nations	under	a	common	cause,	requiring	commitments	from	both	but	maintaining	the	principle	of	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities.257	However,	the	Paris	Agreement	also	incorporated	voluntary	measures	by	avoiding	a	top-down,	imposed	structure.	Instead	of	targets	being	applied	across	nations,	regions,	or	Annexes,	countries	instead	determined	their	own	contributions	to	mitigation	strategies.	Thus,	instead	of	fulfilling	its	universal	and	binding	aims	through	sweeping	restrictions	that	did	not	individually	differentiate	between	countries’	capabilities	and	statuses,	the	Paris	Agreement	encouraged	universal	participation	by	binding	countries	to	targets	individually	proposed	from	the	bottom-up.			 The	most	revolutionary	feature	of	the	Paris	Agreement	is	its	solution	to	reaching	universality.	Serious	international	efforts	to	combat	climate	change	must	all	surpass	a	salient	problem:	international	bargaining.258	Getting	195	countries,	each	with	individual	preferences,	capabilities,	and	responsibilities	to	reach	consensus	poses	a	daunting	hurdle	for	climate	change	negotiations.	Rather	than	attempt	to	classify	countries	along	developed	and	undeveloped	lines,	as	the	UNFCCC	did	in	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	and	set	mitigation	targets	unilaterally,	the	Paris	Agreement	invited	each	country	to	set	its	own	agenda.259	This	flexibility	mechanism	promotes	durability,	while	stipulating	periodic	oversight	and	review.260	
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	 The	INDCs	themselves	are	not	mandated	to	include	a	specific	format;	however,	all	countries	were	required	to	submit	a	proposal	for	their	contribution	to	prevent	“dangerous	anthropogenic	interference	with	the	climate	system”	with	clarity	and	transparency,	and	to	consider	undertakings	for	implementing	the	proposal.261	The	documents	vary	in	length,	ranging	from	just	a	few	pages	to	more	than	30,	and	many	include	detailed	accounts	of	expected	climate	change	impact	within	their	borders,	specific	regional	challenges,	and	metrics	of	accountability.		To	illustrate	the	general	format	of	an	INDC,	the	United	States	submitted	an	excellent	example	of	an	INDC	with	baseline	transparency,	adaptation,	and	mitigation	metrics	included.	The	United	States	submitted	a	joint	INDC	and	cover	letter	which	together	comprise	five	pages.262	Its	contribution	to	climate	change	mitigation	is	clearly	stated	and	visually	supported	by	a	graph	–	by	2025,	the	U.S.	will	reduce	emissions	26-28	percent	below	2005	levels.263	This	pledge	is	contextualized	through	unchecked	emissions	predictions,	and	an	statement	which	declares	these	emissions	to	be	consistent	with	an	overall	goal	of	reducing	emissions	by	80	percent	or	more	by	2050	in	a	straight-line	path	from	2020.264	The	transparency	section	lists	included	gasses,	affected	sectors,	reference	points,	carbon	sinks	and	land	usage,	and	carbon	equivalency	metrics.265	The	U.S.	also	
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included	in	its	INDC	a	list	of	relevant	laws	and	regulations	to	secure	implementation,	specifying	heavy	reliance	on	the	Clean	Air	Act,	the	Energy	Policy	Act,	and	the	Energy	Independence	and	Security	Act.266	This	INDC	does	not	include	any	mention	of	expected	climate	change	impacts	on	the	U.S.,	nor	does	it	mention	any	promises	of	transfers	to	developing	nations,	be	that	monetary	or	technological.	It	does,	however,	fit	the	required	structure	agreed	upon	at	COP	20	Lima:	clearly	defined	mitigation	commitments,	transparency	in	outlining	the	context	of	the	commitment,	and	an	overview	of	domestic	implementation	metrics.	While	social	scientists	often	laud	the	flexibility	approach	of	INDCs,	they	also	recognize	the	varying	level	of	quality	present	within	both	the	documents,	and	in	the	pledges	themselves.267	During	the	next	decade	of	INDC	updating	periods,	what	will	be	necessary	is	to	ensure	that	the	stream	of	information	regarding	mitigation	costs	and	real	implementations	are	accurate.268	Overall,	the	initial	INDCs	have	proven	that	countries	are	voluntarily	willing	to	do	quite	a	lot	to	combat	climate	change,	but	ensuring	that	these	pledges	are	met	may	prove	challenging.269	However,	the	structure	of	Paris	in	fact	acknowledged	and	laid	the	groundwork	for	an	information	regime,	with	the	goal	of	lower	transaction	costs	for	further	international	and	multilateral	agreements	among	actors.270	Though	it	is	still	possible	for	strict	UN	accountability	metrics	to	emerge,	these	may	discourage	ambitious	targets	to	be	put	forth	in	further	meetings	if	sanctions	are	
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imposed.271	Instead,	following	the	voluntary	approach,	leaders	will	need	to	voluntarily	improve	the	quality	metrics	of	their	initial	pledges	consistent	with	the	spirit	of	the	UN	approach,	but	without	the	need	for	top-down	impositions	in	the	period	before	strict	monitoring	and	enforcement	systems	are	in	place.272	Taking	flexibility	as	a	serious	advantage	of	the	Paris	Agreement	requires	that	countries	commit	to	cooperation	outside	of	UN	surveillance,	through	a	bottom-up	emergence	through	multi-lateral	entities	known	as	“clubs”	to	lower	the	cost	of	bargaining.273			Differentiation	was	also	a	key	element	of	Paris,	stemming	from	the	long-standing	UNFCCC	principle	of	“common	but	differentiated	responsibilities.”274	Rather	than	relying	on	the	Annex-1	and	non-Annex	1	binary	that	divided	countries	into	developing	and	developed	categories,	Paris	allowed	differentiation	in	targets	for	mitigation,	adaptation,	finance,	capacity,	technology	and	transparency	issue	areas.275	However,	definitions	of	developed	and	developing	were	not	defined	at	Paris,	and	countries	with	“special	circumstances”	were	not	identified;	many	INDCs	were	submitted	pending	conditions	of	support	were	met,	and	no	definite	long-term	pathways	for	low-greenhouse	gas	development	was	finalized.276	However,	despite	these	drawbacks,	the	Paris	Agreement	effectively	transitioned	climate	change	negotiations	away	from	the	Annex-based	binary,	
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allowing	for	substantially	more	differentiation	amongst	nations	than	was	previously	precedented.	The	ability	to	make	conditional	offers	posed	an	excellent	bargaining	advantage	in	finalizing	negotiations.	Many	countries	–	especially	those	who	are	developing	–	committed	to	baseline	mitigation	efforts,	but	many	expressed	a	willingness	to	increase	their	personal	commitments	pending	support	or	additional	mitigation	efforts	by	specific	nations.277	This	allows	for	countries	to	better	navigate	sub-prime	results	of	prisoner’s	dilemma	arrangements	inherent	to	international	agreements,	increasing	the	stakes	of	issuing	a	sub-prime	mitigation	target.	Furthermore,	the	pledge	and	review	method	requires	review	of	INDC	pledges	every	five	years,	with	countries	are	pledged	to	review	and	strengthen	commitments.278	Longer-term	commitments	are	scientifically	undesirable	and	highly	difficult	to	negotiate	on	the	international	level.279	Thus,	the	pledge-and-review	system	enables	updates	to	be	initiated	more	swiftly,	and	can	be	amended	as	scientific	consensus	shifts.	 Despite	the	voluntary	bottom-up	approach	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	the	official	text	also	includes	an	implementation	and	compliance	committee.280	This	expert-based	committee	was	designed	to	be	non-punitive,	paying	attention	to	respective	national	capabilities	in	issuing	its	rulings.281	In	the	Adoption	text	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	the	
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composition	of	the	committee	was	determined,	with	all	12	members	holding	scientific,	socio-economic,	or	legal	competence,	and	each	of	the	five	regional	UN	groups	sending	one	member,	plus	one	member	from	the	small	island	states	and	another	from	among	the	least-developed	countries.282	However,	the	very	non-punitive	nation	of	the	group	necessarily	means	that	implementation	and	compliance	is	left	to	a	body	without	substantial	teeth.	IV.	Preliminary	effectiveness	metrics	of	the	Paris	Agreement		 The	Paris	agreement	ingeniously	blends	voluntary,	bottom-up	methods	and	a	binding,	universal	agreement	enforced	through	a	central	body.	It	also	unites	the	world	governments	under	a	set	of	common	goals	and	philosophical	objectives	to	effectively	combat	climate	change.	The	Paris	Agreement	was	met	with	global	enthusiasm	and	quickly	entered	into	force	at	an	unprecedented	speed;	these	preliminary	signs	are	all	markers	of	a	potentially	effective	treaty.	Over	a	year	after	the	COP	21	Paris	Convention,	it	is	important	to	track	the	early	signs	of	success	as	well	as	any	potential	failures	within	the	implementation	of	the	document	and	the	broader	UNFCCC	framework.	In	this	section,	I	will	assess	the	early	metrics	of	Paris’s	effectiveness,	beginning	with	its	speedy	ratification,	United	States	leadership	in	ensuring	the	document	went	into	force	before	its	next	election,	the	expected	cumulative	impact	of	individual	INDCs,	and	progress	at	COP	22	Marrakech.		 The	Paris	Agreement	entered	into	force	on	November	4,	2016,	the	first	time	all	governments	had	agreed	to	legally-binding	limits	to	rising	temperatures.283	After	more	
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than	20	years	of	buildup,	and	four	years	of	focused	negotiations,	all	governments	agreed	to	limit	warming	to	2	degrees	Celsius	above	pre-industrial	levels	while	pursuing	a	more	ambitious	target	of	a	1.5-degrees	warming	limit.284	Two	UN	climate	representatives,	Patricia	Espinosa	and	Salaheddine	Mezouar,	marked	the	occasion	with	a	joint	statement	that	declared	the	monumental	nature	of	the	Paris	Agreement:		“Humanity	will	look	back	on	4	November	2016	as	the	day	that	countries	of	the	world	shut	the	door	on	inevitable	climate	disaster	and	set	off	with	determination	towards	a	sustainable	future.	The	Paris	agreement	is	undoubtedly	a	turning	point	in	the	history	of	common	human	endeavour,	capturing	the	combined	political,	economic	and	social	will	of	governments,	cities,	regions	and	businesses	and	investors	to	overcome	the	existential	threat	of	unchecked	climate	change.”	The	pace	at	which	Paris	entered	into	force	was	unexpected;	original	intentions	for	the	2015	agreement	placed	entry	into	force	in	2020.285	Fifty-	five	countries	representing	55	percent	of	global	emissions	–	the	required	benchmark	for	entry	into	force	–	formally	ratified	the	Paris	Agreement	years	ahead	of	schedule,	reflecting	unanticipated	momentum	and	optimism	on	the	part	of	world	leaders	and	governments.286		Much	of	the	swift	speed	with	which	the	Paris	Agreement	entered	into	force	can	be	attributed	to	negotiations,	agreements,	and	announcements	formed	by	the	United	States	and	other	high-emitting	countries,	namely	China	and	India.	As	Annex	II	developing	
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countries,	both	China	and	India	had	previously	been	exempt	from	making	mandatory	emissions	cuts	in	landmark	UNFCCC	negotiations,	including	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	Yet	because	these	countries	represented	a	growing	percentage	of	overall	emissions,	both	developed	and	developing	countries	grew	to	see	this	omission	as	unfair.	The	Paris	Agreement	aimed	to	maintain	and	respect	the	existing	distinction	between	emission	targets	for	developed	and	developing	countries	while	ensuring	that	all	high-emitters	made	progress	toward	peaking	emissions	and	cutting	back	on	greenhouse	gas	use.	Both	countries	agreed	to	binding	targets	through	the	submission	of	their	respective	INDCs	before	COP	21	Paris;	President	Obama	met	with	these	nations	to	incentive	their	ratification	of	the	Paris	Agreement	in	the	latter	half	of	2016.	On	September	3,	2016,	President	Obama’s	White	House	released	a	statement	entitled	“U.S.-	China	Climate	Change	Cooperation	Outcomes,”	detailing	the	nature	of	the	two	countries’	bilateral	relationship	as	the	world’s	two	highest	emitters	and	their	efforts	to	negotiate	sustainable	development	in	the	present	and	future.287	On	September	3,	both	the	United	States	and	China	submitted	their	individual	agreements	to	join	the	Paris	Agreement,	a	significant	advancement	toward	entering	the	Paris	Agreement	into	force.288	The	White	House	anticipated	that	these	submissions	would	encourage	other	nations	to	submit	their	instruments	to	the	United	Nations	Secretary-General	Ban	Ki-moon,	expecting	the	Paris	Agreement	to	enter	into	force	that	year	with	the	help	of	other	nations.289	The	joint	
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announcement	of	the	United	States	and	China	and	their	speedy	joining	of	the	Agreement	spurred	other	countries	to	speed	up	their	domestic	processes	in	joining	the	agreement.290		 Three	months	earlier,	in	June	of	2016,	President	Obama	met	with	Prime	Minister	Narendra	Modi.	Many	perceive	Obama’s	actions	in	the	latter	half	of	2016	in	regards	to	climate	change	negotiations	to	be	safeguarding	the	success	of	Paris	against	a	potential	Trump	presidency	and	conservative	legislature.291	As	a	high-emissions	nation,	securing	India’s	ratification	of	the	Paris	Agreement	was	a	crucial	step	toward	meeting	the	55-percent-of-emissions	requirement	for	the	treaty	to	enter	into	force.	To	incentivize	Prime	Minister	Modi	and	his	nation	to	submit	their	documents	early,	the	Obama	promised	U.S.	government	assistance	in	helping	India	meet	its	target	of	expanding	solar	capacity	by	five-fold	over	the	next	six	years.292	Opportunity	for	U.S.	business	opportunity	was	also	ample	between	the	two	countries;	with	the	market	for	LED	lightbulbs	in	India	booming	and	government	plans	to	replace	all	street	lights	with	LEDs,	the	United	States	stood	to	gain	from	a	supply	relationship.293		 For	Prime	Minister	Modi,	an	agreement	with	the	United	States	meant	securing	the		financing	necessary	for	India	to	launch	solar	and	clean	energy	initiatives;294	for	President	
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Obama,	ensuring	that	Paris	entered	into	force	before	the	November	elections	gave	him	greater	reason	to	hope	that	his	legacy	in	combatting	climate	change	–	namely	the	Clean	Power	Plan	in	domestic	policy	and	the	Paris	Agreement	in	international	policy	–	would	be	cemented	no	matter	the	result	of	the	United	States	elections.	As	the	EPA	and	Department	of	Energy	enacted	bureaucratic	policy	in	accordance	with	the	Clean	Power	Plan	and	other	Paris	commitments,	businesses	modified	their	practices	to	conform	to	the	rulings.295	With	market	mechanisms	favoring	natural	gas	over	coal	in	the	electricity	sector,	it	is	possible	that	the	Obama’s	domestic	policy	despite	a	Trump	presidency.296	Obama’s	leadership	incentivized	other	nations	to	ratify	Paris	in	an	international	context,	greatly	expediting	world	expectations	of	ratification.	A	year	after	the	COP	21	Paris	Convention,	the	UNFCCC	met	again	at	its	annual	conference	of	the	parties,	this	time	in	Marrakech,	Morocco.	COP	22	Marrakech	began	three	days	after	the	Paris	Agreement	entered	into	force.297	According	to	the	Center	for	Climate	and	Energy	Solutions,	the	Marrakesh	conference	began	amongst	looming	uncertainty	is	following	Donald	Trump’s	election	as	the	United	States’	new	president.		Despite	changing	dynamics	within	US	domestic	climate	change	policy,	World	leaders	set	and	ambitious	new	deadline	for	completion	of	implementation	procedures	to	be	decided	before	COP	24,	to	be	held	in	2018.	In	the	American	action	proclamation,	UNF	CCC	parties	declared	that’s	the	momentum	which	had	led	to	Paris’s	entry	into	force	what	is	now	so	pervasive	as	to	be	irreversible.		This	rhetorical	statement	was	backed	by	tangible	agreements	and	procedures	
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set	in	place	at	CO	22	Marrakech,	which	marked	a	significant	transition	from	negotiation	to	implementation	procedures.	Though	Paris	was	designed	to	apply	only	from	the	2020	period	onwards,	by	the	Marrakech	Conference,	it	was	clear	that	significant	political	momentum	was	already	evident	in	the	pre-2020	period	to	enact	steps	for	significant	mitigation.	By	November	7,	when	the	Marrakech	Conference	began,	111	parties	had	already	ratified	the	Paris	Agreement,	representing	over	75	percent	of	global	greenhouse	gas	emissions.298	Yet	further	decisions	regarding	mitigation,	adaptation,	finance,	transparency,	implementation	and	compliance	needed	to	be	addressed,	namely	through	the	Ad-Hoc	Working	Group	on	the	Paris	Agreement	(APA).	Paris	established	no	specific	timeline	or	deadline	for	creating	these	decisions,	only	that	they	needed	to	be	adopted	at	CMA	1	–	the	first	COP	after	the	Agreement	entered	into	force.	That	CMA	1	should	be	held	only	a	year	after	Paris	was	unexpected	by	all	parties;	they	thus	agreed	to	extend	CMA	1	until	COP	24	in	2018,	though	the	CMA	will	meet	at	COP	23	in	2017	for	preliminary	agreements.	Marrakech	began	essential	policy	elaborations	for	important	features	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	such	as	mid-century	strategies,	finance,	and	loss	and	damage.	At	Marrakech,	the	nations	of	Canada,	Germany,	Mexico,	and	the	U.S.	submitted	what	have	come	to	be	known	as	“mid-century	strategies,”	a	development	strategy	plan	which	launched	the	2050	Pathway	Platform	to	extend	the	range	of	climate	change	mitigation	strategies	into	the	latter	half	of	the	century.	In	terms	of	finance,	developed	nations	released	a	roadmap	to	plan	mobilization	for	a	collective	$100	billion	per	year	to	finance	developing	country	emission	cuts	beginning	in	2020.	Parties	also	reviewed	the	Warsaw	International	Mechanism	for	
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Loss	and	Damage	(WIM)	to	aid	vulnerable	and	developing	countries	cope	with	existing	climate	change	impacts,	including	slow-onset	sea	level	rise	and	extreme	weather	patterns.	Marrakech	closed	by	setting	the	dates	for	COP	23	to	be	held	in	Fiji	and	COP	24	Poland,	as	well	as	setting	the	annual	subsidiary	bodies	meeting	to	be	held	in	May	2017	in	Bonn,	Germany.	COP	22	Marrakech	held	that	the	Paris	Agreement	was	exceeding	expectations	in	every	metric	by	this	point	in	the	supposed	implementation	timeline;	however,	given	that	the	Paris	Agreement	was	not	expected	to	enter	into	force	by	2016,	Marrakech	was	incapable	of	assessing	expectations	of	compliance	and	effectiveness,	as	there	simply	were	no	expectations	at	such	an	early	date.	What	is	clear	is	that	so	far	the	Paris	Agreement	has	in	no	way	failed	existing	expectations;	its	ability	to	ensure	compliance	and	effectively	hold	down	emissions	can	only	be	adequately	assessed	as	data	and	implementation	mechanisms	become	available	in	the	pre-2020	period	and	beyond.	V.	Objections		 Despite	initial	optimism	for	the	global	enthusiasm	expressed	in	the	Paris	Agreement,	there	are	also	numerous	reasons	to	criticize	the	scope	and	effectiveness	of	Paris.	Productive	criticism	can	be	beneficial	as	the	globe	reevaluates	the	efficacy	of	the	Paris	Agreement	annually	and	individual	countries	review	pledges	in	2020.	The	main	categories	of	objections	are	as	follows:	a)	the	individual	commitments	of	Parties	do	not	collectively	limit	warming	below	2	degrees	Celsius,	b)	the	Agreement	relies	heavily	upon	norms	rather	than	incentivizing	enforcement,	and	c)	the	Agreement	fails	to	consider	important	alternate	strategies	and	provisions	that	could	prove	more	effective.	I	will	address	each	of	these	categories	briefly	in	the	following	segment.	
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A.	The	Paris	Agreement	does	not	limit	warming	to	under	2	degrees	Celsius		 The	first	major	objection	is	a	pragmatic	fact;	expert	opinion	agrees	that	the	individual	targets	submitted	by	the	Parties	of	the	Agreement	do	not	as	a	total	sufficiently	cut	greenhouse	gas	emissions	to	avoid	dangerous	anthropogenic	interference	in	the	climate	system.	Days	before	the	Paris	Agreement	entered	into	force,	the	United	Nations	Environment	Programme	issued	a	statement	that	pledges	to	cut	emissions	would	result	in	a	predicted	temperature	rise	of	3	degrees	Celsius	above	pre-industrial	levels.299	The	ultimate	goal	of	Paris	was	to	push	for	a	target	of	1.5	degrees	of	warming	amid	uncertainty	that	2	degrees	of	warming	would	prevent	dangerous	climate	interference;	by	this	metric,	the	INDCs	failed	to	meet	their	primary	purpose.300		 However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	these	pledges	are	a	vast	improvement	upon	the	5	degrees	Celsius	of	warming	predicted	by	the	Environmental	Protection	Agency	without	substantial	mitigation.301	Business-as-usual	models	vary	in	regards	to	severity	of	the	global	temperature	in	the	year	2100	with	no	mitigation	efforts,	but		5	degrees	Celsius	is	fairly	conservative.	Six	degrees	of	warming	by	2100	would	be	“so	extreme	it’s	almost	unimaginable,”	with	most	of	the	Earth’s	surface	uninhabitable,	oxygen-deficient	oceans,	and	traditional	agriculture	impossible	except	for	the	polar	regions.302	Though	the	Paris	
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Agreement	alone	is	insufficient	to	stop	dangerous	climate	change	altogether,	it	is	still	a	significant	accomplishment	to	avert	certain	disaster.303			 Acknowledging	that	pledges	must	become	progressively	more	ambitious	is	important,	and	the	Paris	Agreement	certainly	must	encourage	greater	emission	cuts	at	its	2020	INDC	submission	deadline	in	order	to	reach	the	desired	cap	of	2	degrees	Celsius.	Fortunately,	significant	warming	compared	to	business-as-usual	has	already	been	agreed	upon	and	the	institutional	apparatuses	established;	Parties	realize	that	more	ambitious	steps	must	be	taken	to	avoid	dangerous	effects.	The	reality	of	warming	should	give	critics	reason	to	push	their	governments	toward	more	ambitious	emission	cuts	in	2020;	it	does	not	pose	a	direct	objection	to	the	structure	of	the	Paris	Agreement	itself.	B.	The	Paris	Agreement	relies	on	norms	rather	than	incentives.		 Some	critics	of	the	Agreement	deem	that	Paris	relies	disproportionately	on	norms	rather	than	restructuring	incentives	to	deter	free-riding.304	Instead	of	aligning	social	norms	and	incentives,	the	two	instead	pull	in	opposite	directions,	leaving	the	success	of	the	Agreement	hanging	in	the	balance.305	While	it	is	possible	that	social	norms	will	outweigh	the	temptation	posed	by	lack	of	free-riding	exceptions,	too	much	is	at	stake	to	leave	the	Agreement	hanging		in	the	balance.			 It	is	true	that	cooperation	in	the	realm	of	climate	change	suggests	that	incentives	almost	always	outweigh	the	pull	of	norms;	while	no	one	wants	to	be	sanctioned	by	the	
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committee,	the	non-punitive	nature	of	the	committee	means	incentives	are	weak.306	In	this	respect,	the	Paris	Agreement	relies	on	optimism	that	may	prove	false;	however,	the	failure	of	binding	incentives	in	the	past	gives	reason	to	test	the	pull	of	social	norms	in	the	international	committee.	Furthermore,	it	is	possible	that	enforcement	mechanisms	could	be	strengthened	in	subsequent	conferences	of	the	parties	if	implementation	is	on	track	to	undermine	the	force	of	the	agreement.	It	is	far	easier	to	add	incentives	and	enforcement	to	an	existing	Agreement	than	it	is	to	forge	an	entirely	new	structure	that	more	evenly	disperses	weight	between	norms	and	incentives.	C.	The	Paris	Agreement	lacks	other	provisions	and	strategies	that	could	successfully	limit	warming.		 The	sustainability	and	effectiveness	of	the	Paris	Agreement	might	be	improved	by	the	inclusion	of	at	least	three	alternate	provisions	and	strategies	that	could	prove	effective.	The	first	is	the	use	of	trade	sanctions	to	incentivize	countries	in	keeping	commitments;	the	second,	the	inclusion	of	carbon	sinks	in	assessing	a	country’s	mitigation	efforts;	the	third,	a	comprehensive	effort	to	keep	fossil	fuels	in	the	ground	so	that	they	simply	cannot	be	burned.		 The	conditional	offers	submitted	by	many	countries	suggests	a	willingness	to	increase	individual	contributions	if	it	is	credible	that	others	will	do	likewise.307	Trade	sanctions	would	certainly	lend	a	certain	degree	of	credibility	to	pledges	and	would	incentivize	countries	to	keep	their	commitments.308	However,	creating	punishment	structures	would	increase	compliance	at	the	expense	of	ambitious	content;	countries	
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would	be	incentivized	to	create	low-ambition	pledges	if	they	knew	they	were	face	trade	punishments	for	failing	to	meet	commitments.	As	such,	this	addition	would	come	with	potentially	high-cost;	however,	as	the	author	notes,	sanctions	are	not	the	only	trade	mechanism	that	could	be	used.	Countries	that	met	ambitious	targets,	for	example,	could	be	granted	a	“most-favored	nations”	status	and	benefit	from	no	or	low	border	measures	through	the	World	Trade	Organization.309	This	type	of	incentive	structure	might	boost	both	compliance	and	ambition,	and	should	be	evaluated	at	the	2020	COP;	however,	it	poses	only	an	addition	to	Paris,	not	an	outright	objection.		 The	exclusion	of	deforestation	and	carbon	sinks	from	the	Paris	emission	metrics,	however,	poses	a	deeper	problem	for	the	overall	Agreement.	Deforestation	both	contributes	to	greenhouse	gas	concentrations	through	the	elimination	of	carbon	sinks,	and	also	leads	to	irreversible	biodiversity	loss.310	Forest	conservation	is	thus	an	international	priority,	and	conservation	today	can	be	incentivized	through	the	promise	of	compensation.311	However,	compensation	is	expensive,	and	would	require	wealth	transfer	from	monetarily-rich	developed	countries	to	tree-rich	developing	countries,	typically	located	in	the	Southern	hemisphere.	It	would	also	require	that	the	globe	reframe	the	way	it	thinks	about	goods	and	services;	while	we	are	willing	to	pay	for	others	to	do	something	for	us,	we	are	less	inclined	to	pay	for	people	to	cease	an	action	or	retain	the	status	quo.	While	this	is	proposition	I	ultimately	support	for	reasons	of	biodiversity	maintenance	and	intragenerational	equity,	it	also	requires	that	the	globe	enact	policies	that	are	contentious.	With	most	of	the	wealth	and	power	concentrated	in	forest-deficient	Northern,	developed	
																																																						309	Ibid.	310	Ibid,	35.	311	Ibid.	
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countries,	it	is	difficult	to	know	whether	such	a	proposal	would	ultimately	be	pragmatic.	Despite	the	flaws	and	omissions	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	one	of	its	clear	strengths	is	its	pragmatism;	it	passed	international	negotiations	and	entered	into	force	in	less	than	a	year.	More	difficult	provisions	are	certainly	aims	for	which	we	all	should	strive	to	add	to	future	submissions	under	Paris,	and	forest	conservation	should	be	incentivized,	but	the	lack	of	contentious	elements	in	the	Paris	Agreement	is	a	key	strength	that	led	to	its	swift	implementation,	not	a	weakness.		 Along	these	same	lines	is	the	concept	that	we	should	aim	to	keep	fossil	fuels	in	the	ground;	if	Paris	is	successful	in	cutting	emissions,	demand	for	fossil	fuels	will	necessarily	decline,	as	will	the	supply	extracted.312	However,	reducing	extraction	levels	of	producers	may	be	necessary	because	a	drop	in	demand	will	decrease	price	dramatically,	making	it	difficult	to	secure	participation	of	exporters.313	The	Organization	of	the	Petroleum	Exporting	Countries	(OPEC)	see	themselves	as	facing	a	double	vulnerability	to	both	the	climate	changes	in	their	region	and	the	economic	impact	of	mitigation	of	their	leading	industry.314	Thus,	reducing	supply	will	keep	prices	up	while	simultaneously	encouraging	investment	in	green	technologies.315	If	Paris	should	fail	entirely,	limiting	extraction	limits	would	act	as	an	“insurance”	on	emissions	if	voluntary	metrics	fail.316	Though	limiting	fossil	fuel	extraction	is	also	something	that	I	admit	could	produce	substantial	benefit,	such	limitations	should	likely	be	pursued	separately	from	Paris	so	as	to	maintain	the	existing	
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solidarity	amongst	articulated	goals.	As	an	insurance	mechanism,	it	might	be	worth	pursuing	through	OPEC	incentivization,	but	it	might	also	prove	to	be	a	goal	that	is	politically	impossible	to	achieve.	VI.	Conclusion		 While	it	is	true	that	the	Paris	Agreement	in	its	current	form	needs	to	be	more	ambitious	to	meet	its	articulated	goals,	it	is	also	true	that	the	2015	Agreement	was	intended	to	be	a	baseline	to	improve	upon	in	later	agreements.	Though	it	alone	cannot	prevent	disastrous	warming,	current	pledges	signal	a	vast	improvement	when	compared	to	business-as-usual	models.	Paris’	reliance	upon	norms	and	optimism	through	a	bottom-up	approach	does	have	certain	weaknesses,	but	also	marks	a	shift	from	traditional	top-down	UNFCCC	agreements	that	ultimately	ended	in	failure	and	disappointment.	It	is	also	true	that	more	could	have	been	included	in	the	Paris	Agreement,	including	trade	measures,	conservation	incentives,	and	petroleum	supply	reductions,	but	these	metrics	would	have	likely	posed	political	problems	that	might	have	ended	in	global	stalemate.	A	clear	sign	of	success	of	Paris	is	that	it	passed	international	negotiations,	and	entered	into	force	years	ahead	of	schedule	through	global	optimism	and	careful	negotiations	of	key	leaders.		 The	voluntary	nature	of	the	Paris	Agreement	is	revolutionary	in	terms	of	UNFCCC	agreements,	and	it	structurally	allows	for	a	more	nuanced	and	varied	degree	of	differentiation	among	nations	than	was	previously	possible.	After	four	years	of	deliberate	preparations,	the	Paris	Agreement	structurally	reflected	the	principle	of	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	while	mirroring	heightened	global	momentum	to	combat	climate	change.	INDCs	allow	countries	to	reveal	what	they	want	to	happen	and	what	they	are	personally	willing	to	implement;	across	the	board,	they	reveal	that	countries	are	willing	
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to	make	substantial	voluntary	cuts	to	combat	climate	change.317	Though	it	is	too	soon	to	evaluate	the	Paris	Agreement,	preliminary	benchmarks	show	no	signs	of	failing	to	meet	compliance.		 However,	the	Paris	Agreement	and	climate	change	mitigation	likely	met	a	hurdle	in	the	2016	United	States	Presidential	Election	of	Donald	Trump;	an	EPA	transition	aid	declared	it	a	certainty	that	Donald	Trump	would	pull	the	U.S.	out	of	the	Paris	Agreement	altogether.318	Though	we	cannot	yet	know	the	exact	climatological	impact	of	the	Trump	presidency,	the	extent	to	which	U.S.	compliance	can	sink	an	international	agreement	merits	consideration.	The	next	chapter	will	examine	U.S.	leadership	in	international	climate	change	agreements	more	broadly,	from	Kyoto	to	Montreal,	and	ultimately	back	to	Paris.	I	aim	to	assess	whether	economic	incentivization	of	U.S.	corporations	affects	involvement	and	leadership	in	these	negotiations,	and	whether	the	U.S.	occupies	a	special	role	in	these	negotiations	that	might	incur	special	responsibilities.								
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Chapter	4:	United	States	Leadership	and	Special	Responsibilities	1.	Introduction												In	this	chapter,	I	will	give	substantial	background	as	to	a	single	nation’s	actions	in	shaping	and	enacting	global	mitigation	strategies	and	treaties.	The	role	of	the	United	States	in	shaping	both	successful	and	failed	environmental	treaties,	as	well	as	its	emissions	history	and	response	to	these	measures,	will	be	detailed	here.	Ultimately,	these	details	will	form	the	basis	for	an	understanding	of	how	the	United	States	has	influenced	global	environmental	politics,	and	what	its	responsibility	ought	to	be	as	the	globe	continually	navigates	these	negotiations.	I	will	ultimately	argue	that	the	United	States	of	America	has	a	particular	role	and	responsibility	in	combating	climate	change	and	negotiating	the	treaties	necessary	to	create	concerted	international	efforts.		In	Section	II,	I	will	present	accounts	of	U.S.	leadership	in	past	international	environmental	law	treaties,	including	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	largely	deemed	a	failure	by	the	international	community,	as	well	as	the	relatively	successful	Vienna/Montreal	Protocol.	In	my	account	of	Kyoto,	I	aim	to	show	that	the	United	States	has	been	accused	of	severely	undermining	international	climate	change	negotiations	in	the	past.	Despite	heavy	support	and	leadership	from	the	United	States	in	drafting	and	calling	for	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	the	United	States	never	ratified	the	treaty,	and	the	George	W.	Bush	administration	did	little	to	meet	the	country’s	articulated	commitments.	The	ultimate	failure	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	will	be	detailed	first,	and	I	will	use	the	history	of	this	treaty	to	elucidate	the	United	States’	impact	on	Kyoto,	analyzing	the	extent	to	which	the	overall	blame	on	America	for	the	Protocol’s	lack	of	success	is	valid.	I	will	examine	both	the	international	and	domestic	political	apparatuses	which	best	explain	the	failure	of	Kyoto,	as	well	as	accounts	of	the	
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negotiations	and	aims	of	the	convention	parties.	The	agreed	upon	cuts	and	emissions	standards	of	the	United	States	will	be	contrasted	against	its	actual	emissions	during	the	relevant	periods,	showing	an	increase	in	response	to	a	promised	decline	in	admissions.	I	will	present	explanatory	accounts	of	this	discrepancy,	acknowledging	the	gaps	between	the	Clinton	and	Bush	platforms	and	presenting	explanatory	accounts	of	Kyoto’s	failure	in	light	of	America’s	domestic	political	context.	I	will	also	detail	the	extent	to	which	the	most	successful	international	environmental	negotiations	–	the	Montreal	Protocol	and	Vienna	Convention	–	featured	strong	United	States	leadership	and	strong	opportunity	for	United	States	profit.	The	Montreal	Protocol	and	Vienna	Convention,	which	will	be	discussed	primarily	as	a	single	occurrence	within	international	environmental	law,	successfully	achieved	its	goal	of	reversing	the	dismantling	of	the	ozone	layer	by	restricting	the	use	and	production	of	CFCs.	The	reduction	of	these	chemicals	in	the	atmosphere	also	had	unprecedented	effects	on	the	mitigation	of	global	warming	and	climate	change.	The	United	States	played	a	major	leadership	role	in	drafting	the	treaties	and	implementing	required	changes;	however,	one	of	its	leading	chemical	companies,	DuPont,	had	a	substitute	ready	for	production,	but	required	global	cooperation	to	reduce	competition	and	launch	its	CFC	substitute.	The	company’s	statement,	as	well	as	analysis	of	substitute	availability	and	profit	margins,	will	be	used	to	contextualize	the	success	of	these	treaties	and	the	United	States’	participation	and	leadership	in	driving	the	Protocol	to	achieve	its	mission.		 In	Section	III,	I	will	argue	that	the	United	States	has	incurred	enhanced	special	responsibilities	to	lead	and	implement	international	climate	change	agreements,	beyond	the	general	duties	shared	by	all	member	states	to	reduce	emissions	as	discussed	in	Chapter	
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1.	The	basis	of	this	elevated	role	and	responsibility	is	three-fold,	based	on	both	emissions,	capacity,	and	global	leadership.	First,	the	United	States	has	contributed	the	most	to	the	problem	of	climate	change	as	the	largest	emitter	historically;	furthermore,	it	currently	boasts	the	highest	per	capita	emissions	of	any	nation	on	earth.	As	Chapter	One	established,	curbing	emissions	is	morally	required	because	of	the	moral	importance	of	the	harm	principle.	The	United	States	has	contributed	more	to	these	harms	than	any	other	nation,	and	continues	to	contribute	emissions	and	harms	that	are	disproportionate	to	its	population.	Secondly,	the	United	States	is	a	self-proclaimed	world	leader,	“the	most	powerful	nation	on	Earth”	as	its	politicians	continue	to	boast.	I	will	detail	the	role	of	the	United	States	in	establishing	the	relevant	organizations,	especially	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	and	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change,	as	well	as	its	leaders’	rhetorical	articulations	for	its	role	in	this	dimension.	I	will	argue	that	with	this	prominence	comes	a	proportionate	responsibility	to	guide	negotiations	and	put	forth	good-faith	efforts	to	combat	climate	change,	based	on	concepts	of	intentionally	formed	expectations,	voluntarily	incurred	obligations	and	promise	breaking,	and	general	hypocrisy.	As	such,	the	United	States	has	a	heightened	responsibility	in	aggressive	mitigation	efforts.		In	Section	IV,	I	will	return	to	Chapter	3’s	discussion	of	the	most	prominent	environmental	law	treaty	focused	on	global	climate	change	that	is	currently	in	effect	–	the	2015	Paris	Climate	Treaty.	In	this	section,	I	will	examine	the	United	States’	submitted	INDC,	its	international	negotiations	preceding	and	following	the	Convention,	and	its	role	in	securing	both	the	treaty	itself	and	its	rapid	ratification.	I	will	further	examine	the	extent	to	which	conditional	INDCs	submitted	by	other	countries	frame	expectations	of	U.S.	
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involvement.	To	give	further	depth	to	my	analysis,	I	will	also	look	at	a	wide	array	of	individual	country	INDCs	and	joint	position	statements,	noting	how	other	actors	explicitly	and	implicitly	identify	U.S.	leadership	and	frame	U.S.	responsibility.	The	sampling	will	include	member	states	of	the	G-77,	EU,	and	OPEC,	in	order	to	encompass	both	emitter	and	non-emitter	expectations	of	the	United	States.		In	Section	5,	I	will	also	consider	objections	related	to	the	United	States	special	obligations.	First,	I	will	consider	objections	which	state	that	the	emissions	of	transition	countries	such	as	China	and	India	are	far	more	troubling	to	overall	greenhouse	gas	stability.	Such	arguments	assert	that	the	emissions	of	such	nations,	coupled	with	their	strengthening	and	rapidly	expanding	economies,	incur	greater	or	equal	burdens	and	responsibility	to	those	incurred	by	the	United	States.	I	will	respond	by	detailing	why	these	objections	fail	to	consider	the	full	weight	of	historical	context,	ignore	the	realities	of	global	leadership	and	expectations.	Furthermore,	simply	because	other	countries	might	also	have	heightened	special	obligations	in	this	dimension	does	not	nullify	the	existence	of	such	responsibilities	in	the	U.S.;	rather,	it	instead	gives	the	United	States	incentives	and	reasons	to	include	high-emitter	transition	economies	in	international	negotiations	and	push	compliance.	I	will	next	consider	the	objection	to	the	potential	success	of	the	Paris	Agreement	and	the	one	of	the	largest	threats	to	U.S.	leadership	in	international	environmental	politics	–	Donald	J.	Trump.	There	is	broad	speculation	as	to	Trump’s	ability	to	derail	the	Paris	Climate	Agreement,	nullify	domestic	policy,	and	ultimately	ignore	any	responsibility	in	this	dimension.	I	will	examine	the	weight	of	these	claims,	but	ultimately	respond	by	showing	that	while	Trump	might	choose	to	ignore	or	defect	on	special	responsibilities,	it	does	not	
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follow	that	such	responsibilities	do	not	exist.	Finally,	I	will	respond	to	the	claim	that	U.S.	discourse	on	climate	change	–	including	the	relatively	high	number	of	“climate	deniers”	–	might	give	countries	reason	to	lower	expectations	and	U.S.	responsibilities	incurred	through	leadership.	I	will	ultimately	argue	that	the	United	States	plays	a	vital	role	in	the	ultimate	success	and	failure	of	international	environmental	law	treaties.	Its	prominence	in	this	dimension	is	best	explained	by	its	historical	culpability	for	current	emission	levels	and	its	limited	response	to	mitigation,	as	evidenced	by	its	high	per	capita	emissions,	its	capacity	to	implement	effective	change,	and	its	overarching	leadership	role	that	permeates	essential	aspects	of	global	climate	change	efforts	and	its	relevant	institutional	apparatuses.		Section	II:	U.S.	Leadership		A.	Introduction		 In	this	section,	I	will	present	a	brief	account	of	U.S.	leadership	in	past	international	environmental	law	treaties,	specifically	appealing	to	its	actions	and	negotiations	during	the	Kyoto	Protocol	and	Vienna/Montreal	Protocol.	The	Kyoto	Protocol	was	largely	deemed	a	failure	by	the	international	community,	while	Vienna/Montreal	was	heralded	as	one	of	the	most	successful	international	environmental	law	treaties;	I	contend	that	U.S.	leadership	largely	determined	the	outcomes	of	these	protocols,	playing	a	deterministic	factor	in	their	relative	success	and	failure.	Through	my	account	of	Kyoto,	I	aim	to	show	that	the	United	States	has	been	accused	of	severely	undermining	international	climate	change	negotiations	in	the	past.	Despite	heavy	support	and	leadership	from	the	United	States	in	drafting	and	mandating	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	the	United	States	never	ratified	the	treaty,	and	the	George	W.	Bush	administration	did	little	to	meet	the	country’s	articulated	commitments.	The	ultimate	failure	of	the	Kyoto	
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Protocol	will	be	detailed	first,	and	I	will	use	the	history	of	this	treaty	to	elucidate	the	United	States’	impact	on	Kyoto,	analyzing	the	extent	to	which	the	overall	blame	on	America	for	the	Protocol’s	lack	of	success	is	valid.	I	will	examine	both	the	international	and	domestic	political	apparatuses	which	best	explain	the	failure	of	Kyoto,	as	well	as	accounts	of	the	negotiations	and	aims	of	the	convention	parties.	The	agreed	upon	cuts	and	emissions	standards	of	the	United	States	will	be	contrasted	against	its	actual	emissions	during	the	relevant	periods,	showing	an	increase	in	response	to	a	promised	decline	in	admissions.	I	will	present	explanatory	accounts	of	this	discrepancy,	acknowledging	the	gaps	between	the	Clinton	and	Bush	platforms	and	presenting	explanatory	accounts	of	Kyoto’s	failure	in	light	of	America’s	domestic	political	context.	I	will	next	detail	the	extent	to	which	the	most	successful	international	environmental	negotiations	–	the	Montreal	Protocol	and	Vienna	Convention	–	featured	strong	United	States	leadership	and	strong	opportunity	for	United	States	profit.	The	Montreal	Protocol	and	Vienna	Convention,	which	will	be	discussed	primarily	as	a	single	occurrence	within	international	environmental	law,	successfully	achieved	their	goals	of	reversing	the	dismantling	of	the	ozone	layer	by	restricting	the	use	and	production	of	CFCs.	The	reduction	of	these	chemicals	in	the	atmosphere	also	had	unprecedented	effects	on	the	mitigation	of	global	warming	and	climate	change.	The	United	States	played	a	major	leadership	role	in	drafting	the	treaties	and	implementing	required	changes;	however,	one	of	its	leading	chemical	companies,	DuPont,	had	a	CFC	substitute	ready	for	production,	but	required	global	cooperation	to	reduce	competition	before	agreeing	to	launch	the	product	for	release.	The	company’s	statement,	as	well	as	analysis	of	substitute	availability	and	
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profit	margins,	will	be	used	to	contextualize	the	success	of	these	treaties	and	the	United	States’	participation	and	leadership	in	driving	the	Protocol	to	achieve	its	mission.	B.	Kyoto	Protocol		 The	United	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	established	the	goal	that	all	Annex	1	(developed)	countries	would	freeze	their	emissions	at	1990	levels	by	the	year	2000.319	However,	it	soon	became	clear	that	this	goal	alone	would	be	insufficient	to	meet	the	broader	goal	of	greenhouse	gas	stabilization	at	a	safe	level	to	avoid	dangerous	warming,	and	even	if	that	goal	was	in	itself	sufficient,	it	was	similarly	clear	that	most	Annex	1	countries	would	be	unable	to	meet	this	goal	in	the	established	time	frame.320	As	such,	beginning	at	the	first	conference	of	the	parties,	held	in	Berlin	in	1995,	fitful	negotiations	began	to	attempt	to	gain	heavier	commitments	from	Annex	1	countries.	After	two	years,	in	December	1997,	the	parties	met	in	Kyoto,	Japan,	in	December	of	1997	to	pursue	further	negotiations	and	hopefully	draft	a	more	substantial	protocol.321	Press	coverage	was	heavy,	with	attention	focused	on	the	distant	and	seemingly	irreconcilable	positions	of	the	key	parties,	namely	the	European	Union,	United	States,	and	G-	77	bloc.322			 In	order	to	further	the	pace	of	negotiations	and	avoid	an	embarrassing	failure,	the	United	States	took	several	highly-	public	and	heavily-	publicized	steps.	The	first	was	the	addition	to	the	delegation	that	came	after	several	days	of	negotiations	–	Vice	President	Al	Gore.	The	second	was	his	public	statement	addressing	the	delegation,	imploring	them	to	be	
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“flexible”	so	as	to	ensure	an	agreement	would	be	reached.323	A	few	days	after	Vice	President	Gore’s	arrival,	the	United	States	delegation	announced	its	willingness	to	consider	flexible	targets	and	timetables,	allowing	for	differentiation	among	Annex	1	parties	in	both	emission	standards	and	baseline	years.324	Two	days	before	the	close	of	the	conference,	the	United	States	eventually	conceded	to	a	3	percent	reduction	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	from	a	1990	baseline	year,	leading	to	a	48-hour	non-stop	negotiation	session	that	closed	the	conference.	Contentious	elements	of	the	protocol	were	delayed	for	a	one-year	negotiation	period,	but	the	Protocol	text	was	successfully	released.		 From	a	United	States	leadership	standpoint,	the	Kyoto	Protocol	negotiations	began	with	substantial	domestic	resistance.	The	Byrd-Hagel	Resolution,	which	passed	unanimously	in	the	Senate,	vastly	limited	the	extent	to	which	the	U.S.	delegation	was	able	to	agree	to	Protocol	demands.	The	Resolution	first	stated	that	the	U.S.	would	not	ratify	any	agreement	that	imposed	new	limits	on	greenhouse	gas	emissions,	unless	those	same	restrictions	applied	to	developing	nations	under	identical	timelines.325	Secondly,	the	U.S.	would	ratify	no	treaties	that	could	reasonably	be	expected	to	inflict	“serious	harm”	on	the	U.S.	economy.326	Thirdly,	all	treaties	would	be	agreed	to	under	advice	from	the	Senate.327			 The	Byrd-Hagel	Resolution	introduced	fierce	domestic	pressure	into	the	Clinton-Gore	administration	as	they	entered	international	negotiations,	greatly	encumbering	the	U.S.	starting	position	and	requiring	additional	compromises	to	be	me.	The	U.S.	entered	the	
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conference	pushing	for	broad	flexibility	mechanisms	to	meet	targets,	and	have	developing	countries	participate	and	accept	voluntary	targets.328	Meanwhile,	other	key	players	such	as	the	EU	wanted	a	15	percent	reduction	in	1990-baseline	emissions	by	2000,	and	the	G-77	demanded	that	developed	countries	take	the	first	steps	toward	mitigation	under	the	principle	of	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities.329	In	part	thanks	to	the	pull	of	Byrd-Hagel,	the	U.S.	began	negotiations	from	a	far	different	starting	point	than	its	other	powerful	actors.		 In	regards	to	U.S.	commitments	targets,	the	U.S.	eventually	agreed	to	a	7	percent	reduction	from	1990-baseline	levels	after	the	arrival	of	Al	Gore,	though	President	Clinton	had	previously	agreed	to	simply	return	to	1990	baseline	levels	in	a	previous	statement	to	National	Geographic.330	The	E.U.	committed	to	an	8-percent	reduction,	setting	the	15-percent	benchmark	as	a	negotiation	ploy.331	Though	the	U.S.	ceded	to	a	7-percent	decrease,	they	were	given	the	options	of	flexibility	mechanisms	as	included	in	Articles	6	and	17.332	These	came	at	the	price	of	voluntary	emissions	reductions	from	developing	countries	under	the	G-77,	which	ultimately	made	the	Kyoto	Protocol	ineligible	for	ratification	under	Byrd-Hagel.333		 In	November	of	1998,	Stuart	Eizenstat	spoke	on	behalf	of	the	U.S.,	stating	that	the	negotiations	of	the	past	year	had	been	meaningful	for	flexibility	mechanisms	and	recognizing	the	growth	of	developing	countries,	and	that	while	the	U.S.	would	sign	the	
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Protocol,	President	Clinton	would	not	submit	it	for	advice	to	the	senate,	and	it	thus	could	not	be	ratified.334	On	November	12,	Al	Gore	signed	the	Kyoto	Protocol	on	behalf	of	the	U.S.	delegation,	with	the	explicit	understanding	that	no	ratification	would	occur	without	meaningful	participation	on	behalf	of	developing	countries.335			 If	these	blows	alone	were	insufficient	to	cause	the	failure	of	Kyoto	ratification	from	the	U.S.,	the	election	of	George	W.	Bush,	sworn	in	on	January	20,	2001,	was	certainly	the	death	knell	of	the	Protocol.336	In	an	open	letter,	President	Bush	emphasized	his	opposition	to	Kyoto,	reiterating	the	95-0	senate	vote	of	Byrd	Hagel	and	stating	that	any	Protocol	that	exempted	the	major	population	centers	of	India	and	China	from	compliance	was	unacceptable.337	On	March	28,	2000,	President	Bush	officially	announced	that	the	U.S.	would	not	ratify	the	Protocol.338	Though	given	the	history	of	the	U.S.’s	involvement	in	Kyoto	meant	that	this	announcement	was	hardly	a	surprise,	it	was	nevertheless	met	with	world	outcry.339	To	make	matters	worse,	despite	failing	to	ratify	the	treaty,	the	U.S.	went	on	to	demand	after	Kyoto	that	China	accept	emissions	targets	when	it	had	not	made	those	commitments	itself.340		 Not	only	did	the	U.S.	fail	to	curb	emissions	to	a	7-percent	decrease	below	its	1990	baseline,	but	its	emissions	levels	steadily	increased	during	the	first	two	decades	of	the	Kyoto	era.341	
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C.	Vienna	and	Montreal		 In	contrast	to	the	ultimate	failure	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	the	Vienna	Convention	and	Montreal	Protocol	were	highly	successful	in	achieving	their	goal	of	halting	and	reversing	ozone	depletion.	Together,	Vienna/Montreal	are	considered	one	of	the	primary	achievements	–	if	not	the	apotheosis	of	achievements	–	within	environmental	law.	These	agreements	focused	on	fixing	and	mitigating	ozone	depletion	and	the	ozone	“hole”	above	Antarctica	through	a	reduction	in	the	consumption	and	production	of	chlorofluorocarbons	(CFCs),	and	the	United	States	played	a	defining	role	in	rallying	public	awareness,	leading	negotiations,	and	providing	CFC	substitutes	through	their	industrial	economy.	Ultimately,	as	of	2010,	both	the	Vienna	Convention	(1985)		and	the	Montreal	Protocol	(1987)	were	universally	ratified	by	all	196	parties.342	The	crowning	achievement	of	these	deals	was	the	elimination	by	2010	of	the	production	of	97	percent	of	ozone-depleting	substances,	with	commitments	to	phase-out	the	remaining	substances	by	2030.343		 Chlorofluorocarbons	were	in	fact	a	U.S.	invention,	created	in	the	1920s	by	General	Motors’s	chief	chemist,	Thomas	Midgely,	in	an	attempt	to	find	a	safe	substitute	for	toxic	and	flammable	refrigerants.344	The	ozone-depleting	substances	were	also	disproportionately	consumed	by	North	America	and	Europe;	over	75	percent	of	CFCs	and	halons	were	consumed	in	these	developed	countries,	but	developing	countries	such	as	India	and	Thailand	increased	consumption	by	300	percent	between	1985	and	1991.345		
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	 There	was	little	to	no	concern	over	the	production	and	consumption	of	CFCs	until	a	1974	study	raised	concern	for	their	connection	to	ozone	depletion,	a	hypothesis	that	was	closely	examined	by	NASA	and	other	U.S.	organizations	over	the	next	three	years.346	As	companies	such	as	S.C.	Johnson	and	Sherwin-Williams	voluntarily	issued	public	announcements,	the	public	became	increasingly	attuned	to	the	risk	of	CFCs,	and	aerosol	demand	fell	by	66	percent	within	only	two	years.347	An	EPA	ban	on	non-essential	use	of	CFC	aerosol	propellants	was	issued	in	1978.348		 This	ban	had	an	immediate	impact	on	worldwide	CFC	sales	and	competition,	as	U.S.	share	of	global	CFC	sales	dropped	from	46	percent	to	28	percent,	while	European	countries	gained	in	their	shares,	angering	the	U.S.	chemical	industry.349	Their	became	increasing	domestic	pressure	for	the	United	States	to	lobby	for	international	CFC	controls	to	regain	lost	ground	in	the	marketplace.350	Yet	with	no	affordable	alternatives,	CFCs	remained	globally	attractive;	they	were	“colorless,	odorless,	non-toxic,	nonflammable,	and	affordable,”	according	to	the	CFC	mantra.	As	one	NGO	responded,	CFCs	were	safe	in	every	way,	“except	they	will	destroy	the	universe	and	all	creatures	that	dare	to	live	there.”	As	such,	the	Vienna	Convention	was	signed	by	20	parties	of	the	43	in	attendance,	who	committed	only	to	take	“appropriate	measures”	domestically	to	protect	the	ozone	layer.351		 Two	months	after	the	Vienna	Convention’s	conclusion,	scientists	discovered	what	they	coined	an	“ozone	hole”	above	the	Antarctic,	renewing	public	interest	in	ozone	
																																																						346	Ibid.,	545.	347	Ibid.	348	Ibid.	349	Ibid.,	546.	350	Ibid.	351	Ibid.,	546-547.	
	 112	
depletion	and	its	reversal.352	The	U.S.	began	to	advocate	for	a	near-term	freeze	on	global	consumption;	meanwhile,	U.S.	chemical	giant	DuPont	announced	its	ability	to	produce	a	CFC	substitute	within	five	years	provided	global	regulatory	requirements	could	economically	justify	their	research	and	development	investment.353	U.S.	industry	began	to	declare	a	preference	for	strong	international	controls	over	U.S.	unilateral	action,	in-line	with	their	ability	to	make	profits	and	reclaim	lost	global	market	share.		 Over	60	countries	participated	in	the	Montreal	Protocol	in	1987,	just	two	years	after	Vienna,	and	adopted	the	Protocol	by	consensus.354	It	froze	production	and	consumption	of	major	CFCs	and	halons	within	three	years,	and	established	a	reduction	schedule	for	all	ozone-depleting	substances.355	The	measure	also	included	an	import	ban	for	non-member	states,	implemented	a	basket	strategy	to	allow	for	flexibility,	and	allowed	developing	countries	more	time	and	resources	to	meet	commitments.356	Moreover,	the	Protocol	was	designed	to	facilitate	ongoing	amendment	and	ambition	over	time,	requiring	readjustment	by	Parties	every	four	years.	The	first	Protocol	meeting,	held	in	London	in	1990,	drew	representatives	from	123	countries	and	included	200	media	correspondents,	and	accelerated	reduction	schedules	for	all	CFCs.357	With	landmark	phase-outs	already	achieved,	U.S.	chemical	companies,	led	by	DuPont,	announced	full-phase	out	of	aerosol	CFCs.358	
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	 By	2010,	global	consumption	of	ozone-depleting	substances	decreased	by	97	percent,	with	full	phase-out	agreed	to	by	2030.359	The	Montreal	Protocol,	signed	just	13	years	after	the	initial	hypothesis	connecting	CFCs	to	ozone	depletion	was	released,	achieved	universal	ratification	and	a	97-percent	reduction	in	only	23	years,	an	impressive	speed	by	environmental	policy	standards.	D.	Conclusion		 These	two	international	environmental	law	agreements	show	the	extent	to	which	U.S.	leadership	committees	and	delegations	are	able	to	influence	the	ultimate	path	and	success	of	these	treaties.	The	Montreal	Protocol	illustrates	that	when	backed	by	economic	motives	and	business	support,	the	U.S.	is	able	to	drive	and	adhere	to	meaningful	changes	in	the	international	environmental	law	spectrum.	When	domestic	agendas	and	economic	motives	are	contrary	to	environmental	protection,	as	in	the	Kyoto	negotiations,	the	U.S.	often	finds	itself	at	odds	with	world	parties,	especially	the	positions	of	developing	nations,	and	is	unable	to	successfully	advocate	for	its	initial	position	statements.	The	status	of	the	U.S.	in	these	negotiations	is	crucial	to	understanding	the	nature	of	its	additional	duties	to	actively	mitigate	domestically	and	continue	to	push	for	aggressive	mitigation	in	international	negotiations.	The	basis	of	these	duties	is	the	subject	of	Section	III.	Section	III:	Special	Responsibilities	of	the	United	States		 There	are	at	least	two	reasons	the	U.S.	might	incur	additional	duties	for	active	mitigation.	The	first	is	grounded	in	the	ethical	arguments	of	Chapter	1:	as	the	largest	historical	contributor	to	climate	change,	the	U.S.	thus	has	the	strongest	ethical	duties	to	mitigate.	Secondly,	the	U.S.	consistently	identifies	itself	using	rhetoric	such	as	the	“leader	of	
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the	free	world,”	the	“most	powerful	nation	on	Earth,”	and	similar	derivatives.	It	also	led	the	international	community	in	building	the	climate-change	mitigation	institutions,	in	the	IPCC	and	UNFCCC.	As	such,	there	are	significant	reasons	to	assume	that	the	U.S.	has	incurred	obligations	to	implement	the	mitigation	for	which	it	has	strongly	advocated	based	on	the	expectations	generated	and	the	promises	formed.	A.	Harm-Based	Responsibility		 No	single	nation	can	rival	the	historical	emissions	of	the	United	States.	Since	the	Industrial	Revolution,	the	United	States	has	consistently	poured	carbon	dioxide	into	the	atmosphere.	Looking	at	the	past	150	years,	from	1850	to	2011,	the	United	States	was	responsible	for	27	percent	of	global	emissions.360	In	contrast,	China	was	only	responsible	for	11	percent	of	total	emissions	during	the	same	period.361	Its	historical	record	is	irrefutable;	the	United	States	has	been	the	single	largest	contributor	to	climate	change,	and	its	economy	has	reaped	the	greatest	benefits	from	the	harm	it	passively	inflicted	on	others	by	actively	emitting	CO2	and	other	toxic	gases.		Today,	in	terms	of	per	capita	emissions,	the	United	States	emits	around	19.5	tons	of	carbon	dioxide	equivalent	per	person;	the	world	average	is	around	6.5	tons	CO2e;	China	hovers	around	7.5	tons	CO2e,	the	EU	at	8.5	tons	CO2e,	and	India	under	2	tons	CO2e.362	In	terms	of	total	emissions,	the	United	States	is	second	only	to	the	emissions	of	China,	emitting	approximately	6.5	gigatons	of	CO2	equivalent	in	2011.	Collectively,	the	people	of	the	United	States	inflict	the	second-greatest	amount	of	carbon-based	harm	of	any	nation;	
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individually,	each	American	inflicts	approximately	triple	the	carbon-based	harm	of	the	world	average.	The	harms	caused	by	the	people	of	the	United	States	are	harms	caused	by	actions;	people	in	America	actively	emit	CO2	and	other	greenhouse	gases,	and	have	done	so	for	a	century	and	a	half.	These	emission-based	harms	are	serious,	causing	the	deaths	of	real	people	in	both	the	present	and	future.363	This	non-accidental	harm	logically	imposes	some	duty	of	restitution	or	compensation;	we	should	likely	pay	our	victims	under	tort-based	duties	for	the	harms	conferred	upon	them.364	But	at	the	very	least,	as	the	largest	emissions	harmer	in	the	world,	the	United	States	and	its	people	have	duties	to	stop	harming.	There	is	some	debate	as	to	whether	countries	can	act	as	collective	moral	agents	because	imposing	duties	and	compensatory	damages	on	a	country	necessarily	imposes	them	upon	its	citizens,	whose	contributions	to	the	problem	may	vary	substantially.	Eric	Posner	and	Cass	Sunstein	present	this	objection	in	their	2007	paper,	“Climate	Change	Justice,”	stating	that	it	would	be	unfair	to	impose	upon	the	people	of	developed	countries	compensatory	duties	for	climate	change	mitigation,	since	much	of	the	harms	created	by	emissions	were	done	before	citizens	today	were	born	or	could	exercise	any	control	over	collective	affairs	and	individual	choices.365	Furthermore,	emissions	by	person	vary	substantially;	even	with	a	firm	causal	link	between	country	emissions	and	harm	elsewhere,	it	would	not	be	fair	to	impose	upon	the	entire	nation	duties	of	mitigation.366	However,	as	
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John	Broome	notes	in	his	book	“Climate	Matters”	to	a	similar	objection,	the	harm	individuals	create	by	virtue	of	their	emissions	has	firm	effects	on	people	elsewhere,	and	emitting	persons	are	an	injustice	done	on	a	fragment	of	the	world’s	population.367	There	are	exceptional	problems	creating	causal	links	in	climate	change	justice;	international	solutions,	while	they	may	be	imperfect	in	allocating	compensation	and	mitigation	strategies	across	parties,	are	pragmatically	feasible	and	ethically	justified	as	a	means	of	allocating	such	responsibilities.	To	allow	heavily	emitting	countries,	who	have	benefited	the	most	from	industrialization	and	past	emissions	and	who	continue	to	be	high	emitters	today,	to	hide	behind	the	history	and	individual	non-emitters	within	their	states	would	constitute	a	gross	injustice	in	and	of	itself.	In	environmental	law,	harm-based	approaches	to	just	allocation	of	mitigation	are	typically	packaged	under	what	is	known	as	the	“polluter	pays	principle.”	The	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-Operation	and	Development	(OECD)	first	recommended	this	principle	in	May	of	1972.368	It	essential	demands	that	states	ensure	that	the	users	of	harmful	emissions	–	the	polluters	located	within	their	borders	–	pay	the	full	cost	of	the	environmental	and	social	costs	of	their	activities	and	the	natural	resources	they	consume.369	At	its	essence,	this	principle	states	that	those	who	cause	environmentally	based	harm	ought	to	be	fiscally	responsible	for	compensation.	Applied	to	the	international	level,	the	polluter	pays	principle	heavily	burdens	the	United	States	and	imposes	clear	reason	for	heightened	mitigation	responsibility.	The	same	
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logic	which	drives	the	domestic	relationship	between	state	and	private	business	under	the	polluter	pays	principle	similarly	implicates	the	U.S.	–	the	country	with	triple	the	per	capita	emissions	of	the	world	average,	and	the	country	with	the	overwhelmingly	largest	historical	emissions	ought	to	accept	responsibility	for	the	harm	it	has	induced.	The	grossest	polluter	ought	to	pay	for	the	pollution	it	has	actively	emitted	for	decades.	B.	Expectation-based	special	responsibilities		 Dividing	common	burdens	is	a	complex	task,	but	the	United	States	might	similarly	hold	a	heightened	responsibility	to	mitigate	based	on	what	is	known	as	“remedial	responsibility.”	To	be	remedially	responsible	for	inflicting	a	particular	harm	is	to	have	a	special	or	heightened	obligation	to	right	the	wrong	inflicted	on	the	suffering	parties	that	isn’t	shared	by	all	contributing	agents.370	Issues	of	moral	responsibility	in	particular	are	often	matters	of	degrees.371	One	manner	of	assigning	responsibility	is	thus	through	assessing	the	degree	to	which	the	relevant	party	played	a	special	and	significant	role	in	the	community	which	might	incur	upon	it	special	responsibilities	through	its	promises	and	leadership,	and	through	the	expectations	it	has	knowingly	generated.372			 In	regards	to	the	United	States	in	the	community	of	international	environmental	law,	it	is	evident	that	there	exist	special	duties	upon	the	United	States	based	upon	its	voluntary	role	in	these	contexts.	Rhetorically,	the	United	States	continually	refers	to	its	leadership	position	within	these	negotiations	and	even	boasts	of	its	responsibility	and	guidance	in	the	relevant	areas.	Institutionally,	the	United	States	has	been	instrumental	
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from	the	beginning	in	creating	these	environmental	institutions,	taking	an	active	leadership	role	in	their	formation.	Such	actions	occurred	voluntarily;	with	the	formation	of	these	institutions	and	continued	self-aggrandizement	of	its	own	power,	the	United	States	has	actively	sought	its	leadership	role	in	these	international	environmental	law	contexts,	and	are	thus	bound	by	the	responsibilities	this	role	carries.		 Over	time,	the	U.S.	has	cultivated	expectations	as	to	its	status	as	a	leader	and	its	role	in	international	climate	change	negotiations,	voluntarily	assuming	the	related	responsibilities	since	the	inception	of	the	IPCC	and	UNFCCC.	The	United	States	has	a	history	of	assuming	the	role	of	a	global	power	and	leader	in	addressing	climate	change	policy	on	an	international	scale	in	prior	administrations,	especially	evidenced	in	its	claims	following	the	founding	of	the	UNFCCC.	It	was	under	the	administration	of	George	H.W.	Bush	that	the	United	States	signed	onto	the	UNFCCC	at	Rio	de	Janeiro	in	1992.	In	his	subsequent	press	conference,	Bush	claimed	success	at	the	convention,	stating	that	proposals	for	oceanic	protection	and	public	participation	in	free	markets	had	been	the	invention	of	the	U.S.	and	were	included	in	Agenda	21	and	Rio	Declaration	because	of	U.S.	intervention.373	He	further	declared,	“The	United	States	fully	intends	to	be	the	world's	preeminent	leader	in	protecting	the	global	environment.	We	have	been	that	for	many	years.	We	will	remain	so.”374	During	questions	from	the	press,	Bush	similarly	stated	that	the	U.S.	was	not	a	follower,	but	a	leader,	in	environmental	politics,	and	that	it	had	the	best	environmental	record	in	the	
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world.375	He	was	so	confident	in	this	assertion	that	he	supported	by	stating	that	the	parties	at	the	Rio	convention	would	concede	the	U.S.’s	world	leadership	role,	that	it	had	been	the	major	driver	in	phasing	out	CFCs,	and	that	his	administration	had	increased	its	funding	for	the	EPA.376	Thus,	even	if	the	United	States	had	caused	merely	an	equal	share	of	climate	change	related	harm	with	the	rest	of	the	world’s	actors,	we	might	have	reason	to	believe	that	it	should	bear	heightened	burdens	over	other	complicit	parties	and	stakeholders	because	of	its	leadership	role	and	advocacy	in	founding	the	relevant	institutions.		 In	nearly	all	disciplines,	society	attributes	special	and	heightened	responsibilities	to	individuals	based	on	their	voluntarily	assumed	roles.	Consider	Jason	Brennan’s	thought	experiment:	let	us	assume	that	no	individual	person	has	a	heightened	responsibility	to	become	a	surgeon,	or	to	know	anything	about	how	to	perform	surgery.	However,	if	one	decides	to	become	a	surgeon,	it	seems	as	though	any	surgery	performed	must	be	done	with	sufficient	knowledge	not	acquired	through	bias,	and	the	surgeon	must	not	perform	this	surgery	immorally.377	In	short,	by	voluntarily	assuming	the	position,	surgeons	incur	special	obligations	not	shared	by	the	rest	of	the	population.	We	extend	such	special	responsibilities	across	disciplines.	No	one	has	an	obligation	to	learn	about	U.S.	military	policy	in	Syria,	nor	does	someone	have	an	obligation	to	become	president	of	the	United	States,	but	the	president	of	the	United	States	certainly	has	an	obligation	to	be	reasonably	versed	in	U.S.	military	policy	in	Syria.	No	one	has	an	obligation	to	become	a	lifeguard,	but	an	off-duty	lifeguard	has	a	heightened	responsibility	to	save	a	drowning	person	that	exceeds	that	of	the	
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typical	bystander.	Similarly,	perhaps	no	one	has	an	obligation	to	leave	her	seat	on	an	airplane	to	assist	someone	having	a	heart	attack,	but	as	a	society	we	expect	that	a	trained	doctor	on	board	would	do	so,	and	morally	ought	to.	In	short,	we	regularly	attribute	special	duties	to	voluntarily	occurred	roles	across	society.		 By	analogy,	even	if	the	harms	caused	by	U.S.	emissions	gave	no	rise	to	obligations	to	become	a	leader	of	mitigation,	and	even	if	mitigation	burdens	were	dispersed	across	all	nations,	we	would	still	have	reason	to	believe	that	the	United	States	ought	to	have	particular	remedial	responsibilities	to	mitigate	climate	change,	fulfill	the	international	promises	it	makes,	and	continue	to	build	both	domestic	and	international	apparatuses	to	lower	greenhouse	gas	emissions.	Its	status	as	a	professed	leader	in	this	discipline,	its	continual	promises	to	mitigate,	and	the	expectations	it	has	generated	in	international	contexts	give	the	U.S.	special	responsibilities	to	perform	these	voluntarily	incurred	obligations.	The	harms	it	has	historically	caused	in	this	discipline	provide	yet	an	additional,	though	separate	layer,	on	which	to	ground	its	exceptional	responsibility.	C.	Conclusion		 In	terms	of	both	historical	and	present	levels	of	harm,	as	well	as	role-based	responsibility	within	the	international	community,	it	is	clear	that	the	United	States	has	a	special	mitigation	duty	that	exceeds	that	held	by	other	nations	and	states.	As	the	largest	emitter	historically,	the	United	States	has	caused	the	most	carbon-based	harm	in	the	world;	today,	its	citizens	individually	cause	three-times	the	harm	of	the	world	average	on	a	per-capita	basis.	The	United	States	also	occupies	a	special	role	in	the	realm	of	international	climate	change	negotiations.	As	a	self-professed	leader	in	this	dimension,	as	well	as	a	causal	force	in	founding	the	leading	international	climate	change	institutions	of	the	IPCC	and	the	
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UNFCCC,	the	United	States	has	tacitly	consented	to	accept	heightened	responsibilities	based	on	the	role	it	voluntarily	occupies	in	the	relevant	rhetorical	and	institutional	realms.	These	heightened	responsibilities	are	especially	important	for	the	United	States	to	actively	adhere	to	and	accept	given	the	importance	of	the	United	States’	emissions	to	the	success	of	the	2015	Paris	Climate	Treaty.	Section	IV:	The	United	States	and	the	Paris	Convention	A.	Introduction		 The	involvement	of	the	United	States	and	its	adherence	to	its	pledges	are	crucial	to	the	eventual	success	of	the	Paris	Climate	Convention.	In	numerous	country	Intended	Nationally	Determined	Contributions	(INDCs),	the	adherence	of	the	United	States	is	often	explicitly	or	implicitly	demanded	or	delineated	by	countries	throughout	the	world.	Furthermore,	many	countries	submitted	both	full-fledged	pledges,	and	what	are	known	as	“conditional	pledges.”	Conditional	pledges	are	emissions	targets	that	many	developing	and	a	few	developed	countries	put	forwarded,	intending	to	meet	such	targets	only	if	certain	outside	parties	meet	the	specified	conditions.	Many	of	these	conditional	pledges,	particularly	by	developing	countries,	are	tied	to	the	actions	and	assistance	of	developed	countries,	namely	the	United	States.	As	such,	if	the	Paris	Climate	Treaty	is	to	reach	its	fullest	mitigation	potential	for	the	globe	and	successfully	involve	developing	countries	in	a	meaningful	way	for	the	first	time	in	UNFCCC	history,	the	United	States	must	meet	its	own	INDC	mitigation	pledges	and	assist	other	developing	countries	in	global	mitigation	strategies.	B.	U.S.	INDC	text	and	highlights	
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	 The	U.S.	Intended	Nationally	Determined	contribution	offered	a	firm	commitment	in	regards	to	diminishing	its	greenhouse	gas	emissions.	The	country	agreed	to	make	a	deep	25	to	28	percent	cut	in	emissions	from	its	2005	levels	by	the	year	2025,	with	aims	of	falling	closer	to	the	28	percent	mark.378	It	also	emphasized	in	its	INDC	that	the	country	had	already	undertaken	the	necessary	steps	to	meet	the	target	of	a	17	percent	reduction	below	2005	levels	by	2020.379	To	meet	the	2025	deadline,	the	U.S.	acknowledged	that	it	would	need	to	accelerate	its	reduction	pace	to	2.3	to	2.8	percent	per	year,	a	doubling	of	the	2005-2020	annual	pace.380	The	U.S.	professed	that	these	targets	were	fully	in-line	with	its	overall	emission-reduction	pathway,	which	aims	for	straight-line	emissions	from	2020	to	deep,	economy-wide	reductions	exceeding	80	percent	by	2050.381		 In	addition	to	these	firm	goals,	the	United	States	also	included	in	its	INDC	substantial	rhetoric	as	to	its	intent	and	commitment	to	emissions	reductions	domestically	as	part	of	a	larger	global	framework.	The	country	identified	itself	as	being	“strongly	committed”	to	climate	change	mitigation,	with	the	aim	of	achieving	greenhouse	gas	stabilization	to	prevent	dangerous	anthropogenic	effects.382	It	stated	that	its	professed	targets	were	“fair	and	ambitious”	in	respect	to	global	movements	and	responsibilities.383		 In	its	transparency	section,	the	United	States	delineated	existing	domestic	regulations	relevant	to	meeting	their	committed	targets,	including	the	Clean	Air	Act,	the	
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Energy	Policy	Act,	and	the	Energy	Independence	and	Security	Act.384	The	Clean	Air	Act	enabled	the	EPA	to	strengthen	regulations	on	new	and	existing	power	plants,	improve	post-2018	fuel	economies	for	heavy	duty	vehicles,	address	methane	emissions	in	landfills	and	the	oil	and	gas	sector,	and	reduce	high	emission	HFCs	through	the	Significant	New	Alternatives	Policy	Program.385	The	Energy	Policy	Act	and	Energy	Independence	and	Security	Act	was	likewise	used	to	enable	the	U.S.	Department	of	Energy	to	reduce	buildings-sector	emissions	through	conservation	standards	for	appliances	and	equipment	and	building	codes.386	Through	Executive	Order	13693,	issued	in	March	of	2015,	emissions	from	federal	government	operations	were	to	be	reduced	by	17	percent,	with	the	target	of	reducing	these	emissions	by	40	percent	from	2005	levels	by	2025.387		 These	specific	laws	and	targets,	coupled	with	soft	rhetoric,	enables	us	to	understand	a	snapshot	of	the	United	States’	environmental	commitments	and	considerations	under	the	Obama	Administration,	including	how	the	United	States	maintained	rhetoric	and	goals	consistent	with	broader	international	frameworks.	C.	INDCs	and	bloc	position	statements		 The	impact	of	U.S.	domestic	policy	in	fulfilling	its	INDC	obligations	exceeds	the	reduced	carbon	emissions	of	the	single	state;	mitigation	by	the	United	States	is	also	a	central	component	of	the	professed	intents	of	other	countries.	Conditional	INDCs	–	released	primarily	by	developing	countries	–	are	those	which	pledge	to	meet	targets	provided	additional	provisions	are	met,	typically	financial	assistance	or	ambitious	concurrent	
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mitigation	by	another	party.	Bloc	position	statements	issued	by	groups	of	countries	also	often	reflect	similar	patterns;	below	are	a	sampling	of	implications	released	by	non-U.S.	parties	regarding	the	actions	of	the	United	States	and	other	developed	nations	in	shaping	the	commitments	of	developing	ones.		 The	OPEC	bloc,	composed	of	almost	exclusively	developing	nations,	strongly	advocated	for	the	principle	of	common	but	differentiate	responsibilities	in	its	joint	statements	preceding	the	Paris	Convention.	The	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	principle	stresses	that	all	states	are	responsible	for	the	protection	of	the	environment	and	must	promote	sustainable	development,	but	differing	economic	and	ecological	considerations	necessitate	that	countries	must	accept	differing	levels	of	responsibility.388	In	accordance	with	these	varying	levels	of	responsibilities,	developed	countries	ought	to	be	primarily	responsible	for	implementing	technological	strategies	in	developing	countries.389	It	requested	ahead	of	Paris	that	developed	country	targets	be	made	“with	regard	to	mitigation,	adaptation,	financial	resources,	technology	transfer	and	capacity-building.”390		This	stress	upon	technological	transfers	and	other	aid	was	reflected	in	suggested	modifications	to	the	draft	treaty	text	ahead	of	the	Paris	convention	by	the	OPEC	member	of	Kuwait.	On	October	5,	2015,	on	behalf	of	what	is	known	as	the	“Arab	bloc,”	Kuwait	suggested	modifications	that	focused	on	the	inclusion	of	language	that	would	provide	aid	to	developing	nations,	transferred	from	the	United	States	and	other	developed	countries.	Specifically,	any	enhanced	pre-2020	ambitions	ought	to	reflect	an	increased	emphasis	on	mitigation,	adaptation,	and	the	provision	of	means	of	implementation,	“including	
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technology	transfer,	finance	and	capacity	building…	that	will	have	significant	implications	in	a	post-2020	context”	(emphasis	indicates	Kuwait’s	additions).391	The	G-77	recently	reiterated	similar	expectations	in	March	of	2017,	affirming	its	reliance	upon	the	principle	of	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	and	stating	that	developed	countries	must	continue	to	assume	a	leading	role.392	Differentiated	responsibilities	exist	even	amongst	developed	nations;	responsibilities	ought	to	be	allocated	“in	accordance	with	historical	responsibilities	and	their	respective	capabilities,”	which	clearly	shows	a	heightened	demand	for	U.S.	mitigation	in	particular.393	Developing	countries	in	the	G-77	not	only	demand	progress	for	pledged	post-2020	commitments,	but	also	for	more	ambitious	targets	in	the	next	three	years;	for	them,	2	degrees	of	warming	is	an	insufficient	compromise.	Developed	nations	hold	that	1.5	degrees	of	warming	is	the	maximum	the	Earth	can	sustain	without	causing	undo	harm	to	their	countries,	which	are	more	likely	to	suffer	adverse	effects	than	Northern	developed	ones.394	Developed	countries	similarly	called	for	enhanced	mitigation	targets	in	the	U.S.	ahead	of	the	Paris	Convention.	In	a	comprehensive	report	released	by	the	EU	Parliament	in	2015,	the	EU	expressly	acknowledged	differing	formal	apparatuses	present	within	U.S.	domestic	law	that	pose	challenges	to	mitigation.395	While	both	the	U.S.	and	E.U.	agreed	on	metrics	of	transparency,	accountability,	and	improved	ambitions	over	time,	the	E.U.	noted	
																																																						391Kuwait	on	behalf	of	the	Arab	Group,	“Draft	decision	on	workstream	2	of	the	Ad	Hoc	Working	Group	on	the	Durban	Platform	for	Enhanced	Action,”	October	5,	2015,	1.	392	Helena	Yanez	Loza,	"Statement	on	Behalf	of	the	Group	of	77	and	China,"	Climate	Change	and	the	Sustainable	Development	Agenda,	March	23,	2017.	393	Ibid.	394	Ibid.	395"Climate	Policies	in	the	EU	and	USA:	Different	Approaches,	Convergent	Outcomes?,"	European	Parliament,	November	2015,	2.	
	 126	
that	the	U.S.	was	overtly	hesitant	of	accepting	binding	mitigation	targets,	preferring	instead	to	nationally	determine	non-binding	targets.396	Because	together	the	U.S.	and	E.U.	rival	China’s	current	emissions,	the	concurrence	of	both	parties	is	essential	to	active	worldwide	mitigation;	the	E.U.	thus	supported	the	U.S.	in	attaining	its	bi-lateral	agreements	with	China,	India,	and	Brazil,	and	likewise	created	a	joint	summit	with	China.397	Unlike	the	U.S.,	however,	the	E.U.	made	a	financial	contribution	to	developing	countries	through	the	Global	Climate	Change	Alliance	with	300	million	euros	and	programs	in	51	countries.398	This	financial	contribution	aspect	was	not	met	by	any	such	pledge	by	the	United	States.	While	the	E.U.	expressed	support	of	the	Obama	administrations	climate	change	priorities,	it	noted	that	Congress	had	not	passed	any	federal	laws	regarding	mitigation	in	10	years,	leaving	domestic	policy	as	a	patchwork	of	individual	policies	and	state-led	initiatives;	while	the	EU	noted	the	consequences	of	the	federal	framework,	it	accepted	this	roadblock	rather	than	criticizing	it.399	Perhaps	the	most	explicit	acknowledgement	of	heightened	responsibility	of	the	United	States	surrounding	the	Paris	Agreement	came	from	within	the	country	itself.	The	Press	Release	given	by	the	White	House	acknowledged	a	similar	heightened	U.S.	responsibility	to	mitigate	effectively,	and	lead	the	world	in	innovative	solutions	to	climate	change.400	In	addition	to	its	INDC,	this	press	release	stated	that	the	United	States	would	commit	to	mobilizing	public	and	private	financing	for	mitigation	and	adaptation	strategies	
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in	developing	countries,	rather	than	limiting	its	responsibility	to	internal	and	domestic	mitigation	commitments.401	Among	these	strategies	was	the	launch	of	Mission	Innovation	along	with	nineteen	other	nations	representing	80	percent	of	green	technology	research	and	development,	who	together	pledged	to	double	funding	for	these	programs	over	five	years.402	Before	the	election	of	Donald	Trump,	notable	billionaire	Bill	Gates	pledged	to	support	Mission	Innovation;	in	wake	of	the	election,	he	and	nearly	two	dozen	investors	launched	a	$1	billion	clean	energy	venture	fund	to	support	Mission	Innovation	and	the	Breakthrough	Energy	Coalition.403	In	the	public	sector,	Secretary	of	State	John	Kerry	announced	that	the	federal	government	would	double	its	grant-based	finance	for	climate	change	adaptation	by	2020	for	vulnerable	countries;	given	the	change	in	administration,	it	is	not	clear	that	such	a	pledge	will	be	met404	Regardless,	the	pledges	contained	in	this	statement	showed	an	internal	acknowledgment	of	the	heightened	role	for	the	U.S.	in	mitigation,	above	and	beyond	domestic	commitments	to	meet	INDC	targets.	D.	Conclusion		 Given	its	special	responsibilities	and	the	global	reliance	upon	United	States	leadership	in	the	Paris	Climate	Treaty,	it	is	essential	that	the	United	States	fulfill	the	targets	it	set	forth	in	the	Paris	Agreement	and	continue	to	fulfill	its	role	in	leading	other	countries	to	do	the	same.	Because	of	the	nature	of	the	conditional	INDCs	and	the	additional	global	mitigation	that	could	be	realized	from	their	implementation,	the	United	States	is	in	a	particular	position	to	influence	not	only	its	own	mitigation,	but	gigatons	of	carbon	
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elsewhere	in	the	developing	world.	Furthermore,	both	developed	and	developing	countries	alike	have	made	it	expressly	clear	that	their	domestic	actions	would	be	negatively	influenced	by	United	States	defection.	As	traditional	game	theory	would	suggest,	the	defection	of	a	major	party	like	the	United	States	would	significantly	compromise	overall	global	compliance;	the	rhetoric	of	these	INDCs	expressly	suggests	that	the	world’s	enthusiasm	for	mitigation	as	reflected	in	the	Paris	convention	would	not	withstand	the	deliberate	defection	of	a	player	such	as	the	United	States,	who	carries	the	largest	global	responsibility	in	this	matter.	Section	V:	Objections		 Two	pragmatic	objections	to	the	United	States	holding	primary	responsibility	for	global	climate	change	mitigation	in	the	present	day	are	deserving	of	address.	The	first	relates	to	the	rising	emissions	and	improved	statuses	of	major	Asian	nations,	namely	China	and	India.	Given	the	rate	at	which	their	emissions	have	increased,	as	well	as	their	emergence	from	the	status	of	“developing”	countries	to	“transitional	economies,”	the	burdens	of	mitigation	might	seemingly	be	more	appropriately	placed	on	the	shoulders	of	these	nations.	While	this	objection	has	been	foreseeable	and	present	for	quite	some	time	as	these	economies	and	emissions	have	boomed,	the	second	objection	is	of	a	far	more	novel	nature:	It	is	dangerous	and	impractical	to	place	responsibility	for	implementing	the	Paris	Agreement	and	leading	mitigation	on	the	United	States	because	of	the	rhetoric,	promises,	and	potential	policies	of	Donald	Trump.	If	President	Trump	actively	seeks	to	demolish	the	United	States’	obligations	in	terms	of	Paris,	it	seems	pragmatically	important	that	the	globe	place	responsibility	elsewhere	in	order	to	avoid	inevitable	collapse.		A.	China	and	India	
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	 The	transitional	economies	of	India	and	China	were	excluded	from	previous	UNFCCC	mitigation	targets	because	of	their	classification	as	“developing”	states.	China	has	a	current	population	of	1.357	billion	people,	with	India	at	1.252	billion.405	With	a	collective	population	of	2.609	billion,	these	two	nations	contain	over	one-third	of	the	world’s	population,	and	thus	present	the	greatest	total	emissions,	as	well	as	the	greatest	emissions	potential.	As	such,	many	parties	believe	that	these	nations	should	bear	the	primary	responsibility	for	mitigation,	diminishing	any	special	obligation	held	by	the	United	States.		 Though	the	United	States	is	the	largest	historical	emitter,	today,	China	emits	the	greatest	total	of	greenhouse	gases,	at	approximately	10.5	gigatons	of	CO2	equivalent.406	This	represents	approximately	22	percent	of	world	emissions,	and	15	percent	of	cumulative	emissions	from	the	period	1990	to	2011.407	By	contrast,	India	emits	approximately	2.25	gigatons	of	CO2	equivalent,	5	percent	of	current	world	emissions,	and	only	4	percent	of	the	cumulative	emissions	released	from	1990	and	2011.408	These	rapidly	emerging	economies	are	developing	at	an	unprecedented	pace;	the	emissions	trajectory	of	that	development	on	so	large	a	scale	has	significant	potential	to	vastly	impact	world	emissions.		 Does	this	rapid	development	impose	additional	mitigation	duties	on	China	and	India	to	be	environmentally	conscious	as	they	develop?	Almost	certainly.	But	the	existence	of	a	growing	obligation	in	one	part	of	the	world	in	no	way	diminishes	existing	special	responsibilities	elsewhere.	For	the	sake	of	elucidation,	imagine	that	through	your	own	
																																																						405	"Population,	total,"	World	Bank,	Accessed	April	07,	2017.	http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.	406	Ge,	Freidrich,	and	Damassa,	“6	Graphs.”	407	Ibid.	408	Ibid.	
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direct	action,	you	fell	a	tree	on	your	property	and	it	smashes	your	neighbor’s	fence.	On	the	other	side	of	the	property,	your	neighbor’s	other	neighbors	follow	suit,	and	topple	an	even	larger	tree	on	the	same	neighbor’s	opposite	fence.	Meanwhile,	the	neighborhood	children	have	been	known	to	throw	pebbles	at	the	fence,	causing	negligible	damage.	You	have	been	known	to	give	long	speeches	declaring	yourself	the	leader	of	the	neighborhood,	and	were	instrumental	in	creating	a	homeowner’s	association	policy	about	the	dangers	of	tree	toppling.	Who	ought	to	pay	for	fixing	the	fence?	Though	all	parties	in	the	neighborhood	are	responsible	in	varying	degrees,	it	seems	that	you	have	a	heightened	special	responsibility	to	pay	for	the	fence	repair	well	exceeding	that	of	the	pebble-throwers;	this	special	responsibility	is	by	no	means	removed	by	saying,	“But	look	at	your	other	neighbors!	They	damaged	that	fence	even	more!”	While	they,	too,	should	pay	for	the	fence	they	damaged,	and	learn	to	fell	trees	in	a	different	manner,	so	too	should	you	own	up	to	your	special	responsibility	to	mitigate	harm	to	your	neighbor.409		 Likewise,	the	United	States	has	a	heightened	obligation	to	right	the	harms	of	the	climate	change	it	has	caused	despite	the	fact	that	developing	nations	have	made	negligible	contributions	to	the	overarching	damages.	The	actions	of	China	and	India,	though	causing	similar	and	even	greater	damage	than	the	United	States	in	the	present	day,	cannot	possibly	eliminate	the	United	States’	special	obligations	to	compensate	for	its	own	damages	and	live	up	to	the	expectations	it	has	created	as	the	leader	of	the	neighborhood	and	a	prominent	creator	of	related	policy.			 There	is	a	separate	aspect	to	the	emissions	of	China	and	India	that	ought	to	be	addressed,	namely,	why	the	U.S.	ought	to	mitigate	while	these	developing	economies	
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continue	to	grow	with	high	emissions.	Essentially,	this	is	the	free-rider	problem	in	its	most	basic	form,	and	it	is	important	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	ethical	duties	and	obligations	hold	even	when	faced	with	perceived	defection	from	another	party.	The	duties	which	ground	the	argument	for	special	responsibilities	of	the	United	States	–	compensating	for	cumulative	harms	and	fulfilling	its	self-proclaimed	leadership	role	–	are	not	conditional	on	compliance	by	other	parties.	Though	China	is	now	the	world’s	largest	emitter,	it	does	not	follow	that	by	virtue	of	its	larger	contributions,	the	U.S.	is	somehow	off	the	hook	for	the	ramifications	of	its	own	actions,	even	if	China	were	making	zero	efforts	to	curb	emissions.	Consider	a	drowning	child	in	a	pool.	There	is	a	lifeguard	on	duty	–	the	best	swimmer	in	the	area	by	the	pool	–	but	said	lifeguard	has	fallen	asleep	on	the	job.	You	may	not	be	a	lifeguard,	but	you’re	the	second-best	swimmer	in	the	pool;	it	seems	that	the	lifeguard’s	inaction	would	not	excuse	inaction	on	your	part	and	you	should	take	steps	to	save	the	child	immediately.	Similarly,	even	if	China	had	made	it	explicitly	clear	that	it	had	no	intentions	to	curb	emissions,	the	U.S.	would	still	be	culpable	for	its	individual	duties,	regardless	of	defection	elsewhere.	Fortunately,	China	and	India	have	both	taken	steps	through	INDCs	and	bilateral	agreements	with	the	U.S.	to	reduce	emissions	and	mitigate	climate	change.	Though	their	populations	represent	vast	emissions	potential,	mitigation	on	the	part	of	the	U.S.	can	have	positive	results	regardless	through	marginal	good	created	by	marginal	reductions.	The	influence	of	U.S.	action,	as	seen	through	these	bilateral	agreements,	can	also	affect	actions	throughout	the	globe,	including	in	China	and	India.		 Furthermore,	it	is	likewise	important	to	note	that	while	the	development	of	China	and	India	is	certainly	causing	emissions,	the	rate	of	emissions	growth	has	significantly	slowed	in	recent	years	because	of	mitigation	on	their	parts.	China’s	CO2	emissions	
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decreased	by	0.7	percent	from	2014	to	2015,	primarily	attributable	to	a	1.5	percent	decline	in	coal	usage	and	an	increase	in	natural	gas	of	4.7	percent.410	While	in	previous	years,	China	had	increased	its	emissions	from	between	2.0	and	4.4	percent	on	pace	with	economic	growth,	2015	marked	the	first	year	of	greenhouse	gas	decrease	coupled	with	7	percent	economic	growth.411	For	the	tenth	consecutive	year,	China	also	added	more	new	hydropower	capacity	than	the	rest	of	the	world	combined,	increasing	its	capacity	by	5	percent	and	reaching	19.5	percent	of	domestic	electricity	generation	through	hydropower.412	Wind,	solar,	and	renewable	energies	increased	20	percent	in	2015,	reaching	a	total	of	5	percent	overall	electricity	generation.413		 India	continued	its	trend	of	increased	emissions,	at	a	rate	of	approximately	5.1	percent	from	2014	to	2015.	However,	this	growth	rate	is	below	the	average	2006-2015	period	rate	of	6.8	percent.414	Furthermore,	India’s	per	capita	emissions	of	just	1.9	tons	CO2e/person	is	three	times	lower	than	the	per	capita	emissions	of	the	EU	and	lower	than	average	per	capita	emissions	in	most	developing	countries.	It	emissions	increase	continues	to	be	coupled	with	its	economic	development	output.415	Total	electricity	output	is	primarily	responsible	for	the	increase,	but	India	expanded	its	renewable	energy	by	13.7	percent	in	2015,	and	nuclear	energy	by	9.6	percent.	It	aims	to	reach	40	percent	non-fossil	energy	sources	by	2030	in	its	INDC.416	
																																																						410	"Trends	in	Global	CO2	Emissions:	2016	Report,"	European	Commission	Joint	Research	Centre	and	PBL	Netherlands	Environmental	Assessment	Agency,	2017,	19.	411	Ibid,	21.	412	Ibid,	22.	413	Ibid.	414	Ibid,	30.	415	Ibid.	416	Ibid.,	31.	
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	 Though	India	and	China	certainly	share	mitigation	duties,	the	existence	of	these	duties	do	not	eliminate	the	need	for	U.S.	leadership,	nor	do	they	diminish	the	special	responsibilities	held	by	the	United	States.	The	world	is	right	to	recognize	that	the	development	of	these	countries	presents	significant	emissions	challenges,	but	those	who	think	that	the	U.S.	is	off	the	hook	because	China	now	emits	more	than	we	do	are	missing	the	nuances	of	the	issue.	Multiple	parties	can	share	in	responsibility;	the	U.S.	maintains	a	heightened	special	responsibility	to	mitigate	based	on	its	cumulative	harms	and	its	position	as	a	world	leader.	B.	Donald	Trump		 On	May	26,	2016,	a	few	months	ahead	of	his	election,	Donald	Trump	made	a	speech	specifically	relating	to	climate	change	and	the	Paris	Agreement.	In	this	speech,	Trump	referred	to	the	U.S.’s	domestic	policies	of	mitigation	as	the	“totalitarian	tactics”	of	the	Environmental	Protection	Agency,	promising	that	his	presidency	would	dismantle	the	agency	and	eliminate	the	“draconian	climate	rules”	which	were	costing	the	American	economy.417	He	then	directly	addressed	the	Paris	Agreement,	stating	that	he	would	“cancel”	it	by	withdrawing	funding	for	any	U.N.	programs	associated	with	global	warming	and	removing	domestic	policies	for	U.S.	emission	targets.418	He	identified	the	Paris	Agreement	as	being	“bad	for	U.S.	business,”	with	“foreign	bureaucrats	[controlling]	how	much	energy	we	use.”419		
																																																						417	Benjy	Sarlin,	"Donald	Trump	Pledges	to	Rip	Up	Paris	Climate	Agreement	in	Energy	Speech,"	NBCUniversal	News	Group,	May	26,	2016.	418	Ibid.	419	Matt	McGrath,	"Donald	Trump	would	'cancel'	Paris	climate	deal,"	BBC	News,	May	27,	2016.	
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	 Fast-forward	to	January	of	2017,	when	President	Trump	took	office.	Myron	Ebell,	the	head	of	Trump’s	EPA	transition	team,	verbalized	what	he	perceived	to	be	Trump’s	likely	course	of	action	in	the	coming	months	on	climate	change,	stating	that	Trump’s	presidency	would	reflect	a	shift	and	reversal	of	the	climate	change	policy	course	set	by	the	Obama	administration.420	Ebell	stated	that	Trump	had	made	it	clear	to	him	that	under	his	leadership,	the	United	States	would	withdraw	from	the	Paris	Agreement	entirely.421	Whether	or	not	this	statement	accurately	reflects	Trump’s	actions	–	what	he	says,	what	others	say	he	said,	and	what	he	actually	does	are	far	different	things	–	Ebell’s	and	Trump’s	statements	give	the	world	a	reason	to	fear	that	the	next	four	years	will	cripple	the	United	States’	ability	to	meet	its	own	emission	targets,	and	will	certainly	damper	its	ability	to	exert	global	influence.		 In	March	of	2017,	this	fear	became	more	solidified	as	Trump	released	his	proposed	budget.	President	Trump’s	blueprint	for	the	next	fiscal	year	cut	funding	for	the	Environmental	Protection	Agency	by	a	gutting	31	percent.422	Though	this	was	by	no	means	the	only	cut	Trump	made,	the	EPA	was	arguably	the	hardest-hit	bureaucratic	federal	agency,	stripping	$2.6	billion	from	its	$8.2	billion	budget,	and	giving	the	agency	the	lowest	funding	it	has	received	in	40	years	when	adjusted	for	inflation.423	This	cut	was	radical	even	from	a	Republican	perspective;	in	the	previous	year,	the	House	Spending	subcommittee	suggested	a	cut	to	EPA	funding	in	the	amount	of	$291	million,	leaving	$8	billion	allocated	to	
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the	agency.424	The	detrimental	cut	signals	not	only	practical	limitations	in	U.S.	ability	to	implement	mitigation	policy,	but	also	signals	that	Trump	has	no	plans	to	make	environmental	activism	or	carbon	mitigation	a	priority	in	his	administration.	Rather	than	making	advancements,	his	administration	intends	to	in	fact	reverse	policies	already	in	place;	for	that	reason,	his	presidency	stands	as	the	largest	pragmatic	roadblock	to	the	U.S.	involvement	in	the	Paris	Agreement	and	in	global	environmental	leadership,	and	also	might	give	us	reason	to	question	placing	heightened	responsibility	onto	the	United	States	as	an	institution.		 However,	while	the	leadership	of	Donald	Trump	does	not	seem	to	bode	well	for	domestic	climate	change	policy,	the	existence	of	pragmatic	obstacles	to	reaching	domestic	obligations	does	not	mean	that	no	such	obligations	exist,	nor	lessen	their	veracity.	Obstacles	in	the	way	of	a	graduate	paying	off	student	loan	debt	do	not	clear	the	debt	nor	her	responsibility	to	pay.	Similarly,	the	difficulty	of	solving	a	math	problem	does	not	mean	that	no	solution	exists,	merely	that	it	is	yet	unsolved.	Donald	Trump’s	presidency	and	budget	cuts	to	the	EPA	give	us	reason	to	worry,	for	the	rest	of	the	world	to	voluntarily	increase	its	mitigation,	and	for	us	to	protest,	but	the	obstacle	alone	does	not	stand	as	an	objection	to	the	existence	of	a	responsibility.	Rather,	it	increases	the	imperative	for	innovative	solutions	to	domestically	combat	climate	change	and	meet	our	obligations	in	spite	of	contrary	public	policy.	VI.	Conclusion		 U.S.	climate	policy	has	had	a	profound	impact	upon	the	success	or	failure	of	international	environmental	law	agreements,	most	notably	in	its	role	in	the	Kyoto	and	
																																																						424	Ibid.	
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Montreal	Protocols.	Given	the	historical	emissions	of	the	United	States,	as	well	as	its	status	as	a	professed	leader	in	climate	change	policy,	the	U.S.	has	incurred	special	obligations	to	lead	both	domestic	and	international	mitigation	strategies	beyond	the	shared	responsibility	common	to	all	stakeholders.	These	special	obligations	can	be	met	through	meeting	its	Paris	commitments,	and	through	support	of	developing	nations	as	requested	by	their	INDCs	and	joint	position	statements.	Though	other	parties,	such	as	China	and	India,	must	also	play	a	significant	role	in	securing	meaningful	global	mitigation,	responsibilities	of	other	parties	to	not	pose	a	direct	objection	to	the	special	responsibilities	held	by	the	United	States.	Furthermore,	the	administration	of	a	leader	generally	opposed	to	climate	change	mitigation	policy	does	not	diminished	the	responsibility	of	the	United	States	in	that	dimension;	rather	it	imposes	a	pragmatic	obstacle	that	must	be	overcome	through	private	and	state-led	initiatives	that	the	administration	cannot	touch	rather	than	through	federal	policy.	As	such,	U.S.	leadership	plays	an	essential	role	in	climate	change	mitigation	on	the	international	level,	regardless	of	particular	domestic	laws	or	administrations,	and	the	world	has	a	right	to	hold	that	the	United	States	ethically	ought	to	deliver	on	the	promises	and	expectations	it	has	cultivated	in	international	contexts.		
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Overall	Conclusions	
	 The	purpose	of	this	paper	was	to	examine	the	connection	between	United	States	leadership	and	the	matrix	of	international	environmental	law,	and	to	further	assess	the	ethical	duties	of	the	United	States	in	light	of	its	role.	Beginning	with	a	harm-based	approach	to	mitigation	ethics,	I	rooted	my	thesis	on	the	moral	assertion	that	it	is	prima	facie	wrong	to	cause	harm	to	other	people,	and	explored	the	extent	to	which	climate	change	and	related	emissions	constitutes	a	global	harm.	By	concluding	that	climate	change	is	causing	real	harms	to	people	in	both	the	present	and	future,	and	that	emissions	were	disproportionately	allocated	amongst	developed	countries,	namely	the	United	States,	I	established	a	causal	link	between	U.S.	emissions	and	climate	change	harm.	I	concluded	this	section	by	establishing	an	ethical	duty	to	combat	climate	change	through	aggressive	mitigation	in	the	present.		 I	then	turned	my	attentions	to	international	institutions,	whose	record	in	establishing	and	coordinating	effective	environmental	law	treaties	has	been	mixed.	The	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	and	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	are	the	most	relevant	institutions	best-suited	to	combatting	climate	change	in	international	contexts.	While	the	IPCC	has	consistently	met	its	intended	function	in	collecting	international	data	on	emissions,	assessing	present	harms,	and	measuring	the	likelihood	of	future	outcomes,	the	policy	results	of	the	UNFCCC	have	been	largely	ineffective.	By	introducing	both	the	Montreal	Protocol/Vienna	Convention	and	Kyoto	Protocol,	I	attempted	to	analyze	the	factors	which	led	to	the	relative	success	and	failure	of	each.	I	ultimately	concluded	that	the	UNFCCC,	by	virtue	of	its	high	membership	and	
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establish	structures,	was	in	a	good	position	to	create	effective	treaties	with	the	addition	of	more	flexible	methods	of	inclusion	in	meeting	its	intended	goals.		 I	then	turned	my	attentions	to	the	most	recent	UNFCCC	treaty:	the	landmark	Paris	Climate	Agreement	signed	in	2015.	This	agreement	was	revolutionary	for	the	UNFCCC	in	that	it	met	the	UNFCCC’s	commitment	to	the	principle	of	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	through	new	manners.	The	UNFCCC	established	the	global	goal	of	limiting	warming	to	2	degrees	Celsius	by	the	year	2100;	with	that	mammoth	task	in	mind,	it	asked	all	countries	to	be	as	ambitious	as	possible	in	setting	their	targets.	The	Intended	Nationally	Determined	Contributions	(INDCs)	thus	allowed	for	inclusion	of	developing	countries	previously	excluded	under	the	annex	system	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	while	understanding	that	developing	nations	were	less	able	to	combat	climate	change	then	developed	ones.	The	rapid	pace	with	which	the	Paris	Agreement	entered	into	force	–	within	a	year	of	initial	signing	–	displays	the	high	levels	of	willingness	within	the	global	community	to	make	individual	sacrifices	for	the	collective	good	of	climate	change	mitigation.	Though	the	Agreement	will	not	be	sufficient	to	meet	the	stated	warming	goals,	it	nevertheless	stands	as	a	testament	to	potential	of	the	international	community,	and	acts	as	a	starting	point	for	future	negotiations	in	the	post-2020	period.		 Chapter	4	analyzed	the	United	States	specifically,	and	established	a	case	for	special	responsibilities	on	behalf	of	that	particular	nation.	Though	the	impetus	to	stop	climate	change	is	a	global	problem,	and	all	countries	share	in	the	responsibility	to	care	for	the	planet,	the	burdens	of	mitigation	derive	from	duties	that	are	not	equally	dispersed	across	nations.	Following	a	harm-based	approach	established	in	Chapter	1,	this	chapter	aims	to	show	that	the	harms	caused	by	the	U.S.	give	us	reason	to	place	special	responsibilities	on	
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that	nation	to	mitigate	climate	change	aggressively,	above	and	beyond	those	responsibilities	shared	by	the	rest	of	the	world.	Furthermore,	additional	responsibilities	have	been	incurred	by	the	U.S.	through	their	voluntarily	incurred	role	as	a	leader	in	U.S.	climate	change.	By	shaping	these	institutions	and	declaring	themselves	a	world	leader,	the	United	States	has	established	a	long	history	of	global	expectations	that	it	has	consciously	cultivated	through	the	way	it	prefers	to	be	viewed.	In	taking	on	this	role,	the	United	States	has	incurred	further	responsibilities	to	meet	these	expectations.	Though	pragmatic	considerations,	such	as	rising	emissions	elsewhere	and	the	present	administration,	ought	to	be	considered	by	the	globe	in	approaching	the	next	four	years	of	climate	change	policy,	objections	on	pragmatic	grounds	do	not	negate	the	ethical	imperatives	established	in	this	chapter.		 Further	exploration	into	U.S.	leadership	and	international	environmental	law	should	likely	begin	in	the	technological	sector.	Mission	Innovation,	funded	by	Bill	Gates,	might	very	well	be	the	only	Paris	commitment	that	the	U.S.	is	able	to	fulfill	because	it	depends	on	the	private	rather	than	public	sector.	Furthermore,	the	strength	of	U.S.	leadership	demonstrated	during	the	Montreal	Protocol,	as	well	as	the	heightened	quality	of	ambitions	articulated	by	that	country	during	those	negotiations,	might	give	us	reason	to	believe	that	potential	for	U.S.	profit	largely	drives	U.S.	enthusiasm	in	international	environmental	law.	For	that	reason,	potential	for	technology	profit	in	developing	countries	might	incentivize	the	U.S.	to	drive	ambitious	bargains	and	protocols	in	the	future	once	sufficient	research	and	development	is	launched	through	private	investors.		 In	regards	to	the	leadership	of	the	present	Trump	administration,	policy	research	should	greatly	explore	the	extent	to	which	Paris	Agreement	commitments	could	be	fully	
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realized	without	the	help	of	any	federal	policy.	State-wide	initiatives	in	implementing	regulations	under	the	Clean	Power	Plan	on	a	voluntary,	non-federally	mandated	basis	could	allow	us	to	meet	our	international	obligations	without	compliance	from	coal	states	or	the	administration.	Coordination	on	the	state	level,	separate	from	the	institution	of	the	federal	government,	might	play	a	similar	role	to	the	UNFCCC	within	the	domestic	sphere,	though	the	extent	to	which	states	could	organize	bilateral	and	multilateral	agreements	amongst	themselves	is	highly	limited.	However,	just	as	the	U.S.	has	incurred	special	responsibilities	through	its	leadership	role	in	global	environmental	politics,	so	might	certain	states	have	special	responsibilities	to	lead	domestic	mitigation	and	encourage	other	states	to	do	likewise.	California	might	be	a	candidate	for	a	domestic	state-wide	leader	on	this	charge,	as	might	the	other	deep-blue	West-Coast	states	of	Oregon	and	Washington.	Further	investigation	as	to	the	ethical	nature	and	potential	of	special	responsibilities	on	the	state	level	would	be	required,	though	it	seems	intuitive	that	the	allocation	of	these	special	responsibilities	to	mitigate	and	coordinate	might	similarly	derive	from	considerations	of	harm,	capacity,	and	declared	roles,	much	as	it	does	on	the	international	level.		 												
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